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Last Updated: 19 November 2007
Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law Fifteen Annual Conference, Canberra, 28-30 June 2007 Restoring the Rule of Law in International Affairs
Kyoto is Dead, Long Live Kyoto! A New Era for International Climate Change Law
Dr Tim Stephens*[1]
Introduction
We are familiar with the story of Australian exceptionalism in international climate change law. In 1998 Australia signed the Kyoto Protocol[2] triumphantly, after winning major concessions in negotiations on the agreement.[3] Five years later it performed a volte-face and refused to move to ratification. In repudiating Kyoto, Australia took its lead from the Bush Administration whose exceptionalism in relation to international law has become ever more unexceptional. Although Australia and the United States were unsuccessful in derailing Kyoto,[4] its entry into force prompted a new trans-Pacific campaign to discredit the agreement. Though often misplaced, this criticism has had the intended discursive effect of shifting popular, and even scholarly,[5] views about the agreement. This is a powerful illustration that in environmental law and policy-making, perceptions can be shaped by narratives that supply apparent order and meaning in complex debates. As John Dryzek observes, ‘language matters’ in environmental politics, as ‘the way we construct, interpret, discuss and analyse environmental problems has all kinds of consequences.’[6]
Of course debate on Kyoto cannot now be avoided. The first commitment period, under which industrialised states (Annex I nations[7]) agreed to reduce emissions, ends in 2012. Rolling Kyoto into second commitment period for 2012-2016 will require agreement by a supermajority (75 per cent[8]) of parties, and this is likely to take several years to secure.[9] Despite throwaway lines by successive Australian environment ministers that the world will embrace a ‘new Kyoto’, there is little international appetite for a novel climate regime. Both more likely and more desirable is for Kyoto to be adapted and built upon, with renewed and updated targets and timetables. But on this the clock is ticking if a lawless interregnum between commitment periods is to be avoided.
The next Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change[10] (UNFCCC) and Meeting of Parties to Kyoto will be held in December in Bali; an event that will mark ten years since Kyoto was concluded. The purpose of this paper is to provide an update on the state of play in climate science and global negotiations, and to highlight items that should be on the agenda in Indonesia. At the most fundamental level the choice for the international community is between two opposing visions. The first is the top- down and comprehensive architecture supplied by the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol that sets a quantified goal for reducing emissions. The second is a bottom-up or decentralised approach whereby governments agree to an overall goal, but are free to set their own national targets according to their national circumstances. In essence, therefore, discussions about the future of climate change policy are centred on whether it can or should be subject to the international rule of law.
Climate Science
COP 13 and MOP 3 in Bali will follow hot on the heels of the Fourth Assessment Report (the AR4) released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the IPCC). As in other areas of international environmental lawmaking, epistemic communities of concerned scientists have had a critical influence upon regime formation in the climate change context.[11] These scientific communities have been given a more formalised structure through the work of the IPCC whose role is to gather and synthesise the latest science in its assessment reports.
The AR4 reports that emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from human activities are almost certainly responsible for a rise in global average surface of approximately 0.75°C.[12] It projects that temperatures are likely to increase by a further 1.1°C to 6.4°C by 2100, and sea levels by between 0.18 and 0.59 metres.[13] Turning to impacts, the AR4 concludes that climate change has already influenced environmental systems.[14] Moreover, the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century. Finally, as regards mitigation, the AR4 makes clear that substantial reductions in emissions are required 14
stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations. To retain concentrations of CO2e[15] at between 445 and 490 ppm, and thereby keep temperature increases to between 2.0 and 2.4°C, will require emissions to peak by 2015, and then to be reduced by between 50 and 85 per cent by 2050.[16] A 2°C rise on pre-industrial temperatures is probably the upper limit beyond which we should not step, as it could stimulate irreversible processes including the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. For this reason the 2°C target has been adopted by the European Union in its climate change strategy.[17]
The value of the AR4 is fivefold. First, it has clearly linked human activities to observed changes in the climate. Second, it has identified effects to date and projected future impacts. Third, it has provided a pathway for mitigation efforts by identifying the headline goal that should be aimed for, and the emissions reductions target that will be needed to achieve it. Fourth, it has brought greater clarity to individual country positions and emissions footprints, so we can understand what they are set to gain or lose in climate negotiations.[18] Fifth, it has introduced a new sense of urgency. Respected climatologists and other scientists now speak of civilisation being in ‘imminent peril’ and call for immediate action to be launched in aid of ‘planetary rescue’.[19]
But while permitting more informed choices to be made in developing a climate regime, climate science cannot dictate what these should be. Three such choices now confront the international community. The first and most important is what global average temperature increase we are prepared to tolerate, and are comfortable bequeathing to future generations. Two degrees Celsius appears the most scientifically defensible target, which in turn implies a global goal for reducing emissions of around 80 per cent on 1990 levels by 2050.[20] This then leads to a second choice, namely when will emissions reductions begin, and how will they ramp up over time to meet the 2050 target. The third choice is the most intractable – how is the burden of reducing emissions to be distributed fairly among nations?
These are difficult choices because they involve the stretching of social relations across time and space,[21] in time between the interests of current generations in continued economic prosperity against the interests of future generations in a habitable and biodiverse environment, and in space between the interests of north and south.
Building Blocks
The existing international legal framework does not confront these choices unambiguously, but it does set out important parameters and principles that form the foundations for an effective international climate change law.[22]
The UNFCCC
The UNFCCC was a centrepiece of the 1992 Rio Conference, and now has 189 parties. Its provisions have been well documented,[23] and for the purposes of this paper only several key features need be noted. The foremost of these is the overarching goal to stabilise[24] emissions at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.[25] Second, the UNFCCC introduces the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities, urging industrialised nations responsible for most carbon wastes stored in the atmosphere to take the lead in cutting emissions, with developing countries to contribute according to their capacity to do so. Third, the precautionary approach is to structure the response, so that scientific uncertainty should not justify inaction. Finally, while all parties took on a commitment to reduce emissions, industrialised are encouraged, but not required,[26] to limit their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000.
Kyoto Protocol
When the UNFCCC entered into force, negotiations began immediately on an implementing agreement that would give concrete effect to the broad objectives of the UNFCC by setting quantified and binding emission reduction targets and the modalities for achieving them. The result was the Kyoto Protocol. In deference to considerations of intra-generational equity, through the notion of ‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities, only industrialised countries are committed to individually specified and legally- binding emissions reduction or limitation targets. These Annex I parties agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels by the first commitment period.
To achieve its objectives Kyoto establishes three so-called ‘flexible mechanisms’, which have a definite market focus. These are joint implementation of emissions reduction projects by two or more industrialised parties; the clean development mechanism (the CDM) under which such projects can be implemented in developing state parties, and emissions trading. Guidelines for these mechanisms were fleshed out in the Marrakesh Accords agreed at COP 7 in 2001, and formally adopted at MOP 1 in Montreal in 2005.
Kyoto has enjoyed widespread support in the international community, now with 172 ratifications, and its mechaanisms has been supported in practice. Massive investments have been made under both joint-implementation and the CDM,[27] and emissions trading under Kyoto will begin in 2008. Given the international commitment to Kyoto and its long and difficult gestation it is naïve in the extreme to think that a new agreement can be concluded quickly.
As Clive Hamilton has noted, Kyoto represents ‘the most complex and ambitious international treaty process ever attempted.’[28]
Post-2012 Commitments
Against this backdrop, negotiations on post-2012 commitments are taking place across multiple regional groupings and institutions, including the European Union, the G8, the G20, and agencies and organs of the United Nations. Not all of these dliberations are pulling in the same direction, and this is rendering more complex and fraught the processes of forming a post- 2012 climate regime.[29] In broad terms there are three streams in the negotiating process – mainstream discussions through the UN process, counter-currents offered by divergent regional approaches, and unilateral initiatives.
Mainstream Negotiations
The mainstream negotiations are being pursued through the UNFCCC framework, and the centrality of this forum was recently affirmed at the G8 summit in Germany. The G8 declaration acknowledges ‘that the UN climate process is the appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on climate change’, that ‘further action should be based on the UNFCCC principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, and that a global agreement ‘under the UNFCC’ should be agreed by 2009. Other important features of the declaration include recognition of the seriousness of climate change, a commitment to avoiding dangerous climate change, and an undertaking to ‘consider seriously’ a halving
of global emissions by 2050.[30]
There has already been substantial work towards a post-2012 framework undertaken through the UN system, through two separate diplomatic tracks. These are the ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol’ (the AWG),[31] and the ‘Dialogue on long- term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention’ (the Convention Dialogue). In addition there is also biannual review of the adequacy of Kyoto Protocol as required by Article 9.
Both the AWG and the Convention Dialogue were established at COP 11 and MOP 1 in Montreal in 2005 and they have been critical for keeping discussion moving, building trust and confidence, resolving gaps in information and clarifying negotiating positions. While there has been no breakthrough on targets for the second Kyoto commitment period these processes have laid important foundations for the post-2012 regime.[32] What has emerged with particular clarity is that the G-77 nations are resolutely opposed to taking on carbon reduction commitments until industrialised countries take the lead in reducing emissions in the order of at least 25 to 40 per cent on 1990 levels.
Counter Currents
There are powerful counter-currents working against the UN-led process. On rejecting Kyoto, Australia and the United States have sought to sideline both the UNFCCC and Kyoto through the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate which was agreed in Sydney 2006. Although presented as a agreement that is complementary with Kyoto, this non-binding partnership is in substance foreign to the principles that animate Kyoto and the UNFCC.
AP6, as the agreement is known, comprises the United States, China, India, Japan, Korea and Australia, which together produce half of total global emissions. It embraces the tropes of voluntarism and technologism that have dominated the Australian Government’s domestic response to climate change. It sets no targets, timeframes or benchmarks for emissions reductions, but places its faith in promoting technological innovation through voluntary programs and government subsidies.[33] There are a number of good reasons to think that AP6 breaches the UNFCCC, not least because it promotes an increase in emissions so long as there is a decline in greenhouse gas intensity
(i.e. level of emissions as a proportion of GDP), whereas the UNFCCC requires total emissions reductions. AP6 also appears ineffective; according to modelling by ABARE it appears unlikely to deliver any substantial emissions reductions.[34]
In late May, President Bush announced plans that suggested that the AP6 approach could be expanded from a regional to a global scale. The President called for a new framework including commitments from developed and developing countries to be agreed under United States supervision within 18 months.[35] The plan remains sketchy, however it appears to envisage a long term aspirational goal being set for major developed and developing states to reduce emissions, with each party setting its own mid-term national targets, based on national circumstances. However, it is not clear that the this approach will be pursued to conclusion given movements on climate policy within the United States, the G8 support for the UN process, and criticism of the initiative by key developed and developing states.[36]
Swimming Alone
In a context of potential gridlock in international negotiations, some national and sub-national governments have opted for unilateral action to reduce emissions. Various reasons are given for such measures, ranging from purely pragmatic concerns (such as investment opportunities) to moral imperatives
(such as concern for future generations). Whatever their motivation, the scale and pace of legislative change is overwhelming as legislatures debate climate change measures, and fashion carbon trading schemes.[37]
As sovereign and sub-sovereign governments seek to anticipate the future of global climate negotiations, they are engaged in an elaborate regulatory dance. There are legislative vanguards and laggards, and many in between the two extremes. This is having both intended and unintended effects on international climate change law. Indirectly, it is helping to map out ideas and principles for the emerging post-2012 regime. It is doing so in much the same way as rules of domestic environmental law have always had an upstream influence on norms and principles of international environmental law. In addition, and more directly, some unilateral efforts are designed to facilitate greater international cooperation. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Draft Climate Change Bill, released for public consultation in March this year, is a unilateral commitment to reduce Britain’s emissions by 60 per cent on 1990 levels by 2050. Its first stated purpose is to stimulate international negotiations,[38] in line with the recommendations of the Stern Review that ‘codifying and passing commitments into domestic law can reinforce current and future commitments for action on a global public good.’[39]
A Rule of Law Agenda for Bali and Beyond
Having now mapped out the state of climate science and progress on negotiations on a post-2012 climate change regime, we now turn to the third and final part of the paper – the agenda for Bali and beyond. While no comprehensive agreement could possibly be an outcome from COP13/MOP 3, the hope is that the meeting will produce a 2007 Bali Mandate akin in importance to the 1995 Berlin Mandate that let to the Kyoto Protocol.
Broadly speaking there are two groups of questions to be resolved in forming a post-2012 regime. The first concern the international institutions best able to deliver the emissions reductions that are required. There are two main options in this regard. A global and solidary approach that amends or replaces Kyoto on the one hand, or, on the other, an abandonment of international coordination in favour of a bottom-up system which coalesces gradually and organically as individual states begin to implement carbon abatement measures. A global compact modelled on Kyoto appears the likely outcome, given the agreement has attracted wide support, its flexible mechanisms are basically sound, and significant investment has already been made under their auspices. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that substantial amendments may be made to the text, and not simply to the specific Annex B commitments.
Once the institutional issues are resolved, the issue becomes the substantive commitments to be assumed by the parties. The framework for such commitment will need to be a clearer understanding of the headline goal. What precisely is dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate systems? What overall emissions reduction is to be aimed for? The recent AR4 provides a way forward for answering both questions, opening up the possibility of building longer-term commitments into a post-2012 regime and obviating the need to recommit to the Kyoto Protocol every decade. While rolling commitments allow flexibility to deal with uncertainty (such as the possible need for even greater carbon reductions) such plasticity can be incorporated in a longer-term agreement through periodic review.[40]
When it comes to individual commitments the issues will largely be the same as they were when Kyoto was negotiated – how reduction commitments are to be distributed, when will they need to be met, and finally how they are to be implemented.[41] Approaches that offer a methodology for dividing the emissions cake are plentiful and bear exotic names such as ‘contraction and convergence’, ‘common but differentiated convergence’, ‘multistage’, ‘triptych’, ‘sectoral’ and ‘intensity’.[42] Most can be built in to the Kyoto architecture.[43]
All of these approaches seek to provide an organising rationale for allocating emissions reductions. The specific targets in Annex B of Kyoto, though reflecting national circumstances to some extent, were motivated mostly by expediency rather than environmental effectiveness or equity.[44] Whatever approach is adopted in the post-2012 era will need to be judged according not only to these two issues, but also criteria of economic efficiency, simplicity, flexibility, and political acceptability. The Kyoto Protocol establishes a framework for addressing these and other concerns in second and future commitment periods. In particular, to enhance environmental effectiveness, there is no reason why developing countries, most of which are parties to Kyoto, could not take on emissions reduction commitments once substantial progress was achieved by Annex I states. After all the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer took just such a two stage approach, by imposing obligations on industrialised countries first and developing countries later.[45]
Conclusion
To many it may seem that negotiations on an international climate change regime have moved at a glacial pace since the Kyoto Protocol was agreed ten years ago. This metaphor seems particularly appropriate – as global temperatures have increased glaciers worldwide have receded, and similarly negotiations on a global agreement have at times appeared to be in retreat. There have undoubtedly been major roadblocks, some placed intentionally, on the road to a climate regime to apply in the post-2012 period. However, there is also broad agreement on the organising principles of the UNFCCC and Kyoto, and the market-based mechanisms of CDM and emissions trading. This consensus should not be discarded in the new era of international climate change law. It is important to be clear about what is at stake here. With climate change looming as an existential threat, climate change law ought not to be characterised merely as a subset of an environmental law in search of the amorphous objective of ‘sustainable development’. Instead it should properly be seen as a frontline defender of the social, economic and ecological foundations upon which the rule of law is built.
[1] Sydney Centre for International
and Global Law and Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Sydney.
E-mail:
t.stephens@usyd.edu.au.
[2]
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature 11 December 1997 (1998) 37 ILM 22 (entered into force
16 February 2005).
[3] These were
the so-called ‘Australia clause’ that permitted countries with net
emissions from land use change and forestry
in 1990 to include net land use
change emissions in their 1990 baseline, and an emissions increase (to 108 per
cent of 1990 levels)
rather than the reduction that most other states were
required to implement (such as the 92 per cent of 1990 levels required of the
European Union).
[4] Clive Hamilton
has documented the efforts made by the Australian Government to sabotage the
Kyoto Protocol: Clive Hamilton, Scorcher: The Dirty Politics of
Climate Change (2007)
221-230
[5] Thankfully not all have
been swayed. For instance, 274 Australian academic economists recently signed a
statement calling on the
government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol as
‘the first step towards a major international effort to deal with climate
change in the long term’: ‘A Statement
by University Economists on
Climate Change’
<http://www.tai.org.au/documents/downloads/WP101.pdf> (26 June
2007)
[6] John S Dryzek, The
Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (2nd ed, 2005)
10
[7] Those states listed in Annex
I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened
for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 165 (entered into force 21 March
1994).
[8] Kyoto Protocol,
above n 1, Articles 20 and
21.
[9] Wolfgang Sterk, Hermann E
Ott, Rie Watanabe and Bettina Wittneben, ‘The Nairobi Climate Change
Summit (COP 12 – MOP 2):
Taking a Deep Breath before Negotiating Post-2012
Targets?’ (2007) 2 Journal for European Environmental and
Planning Law 139, 140.
[10]
Above n 6.
[11] Peter M Haas,
‘Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone’ (1992) 46 International Organization 1. Such
communities may be defined as networks ‘of professionals with recognised
expertise and competence in a particular domain
and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’: Peter M
Haas, ‘Introduction:
Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination’ (1992) 46 International Organization 1,
3
[12] Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Summary
for Policymakers, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment
Report (2007).
[13] These are
probably conservative projections, as they exclude the potential for positive
feedback processes to produce rapid, runaway
climate change far in excess of
these ranges: James Hansen et al, ‘Climate Change and Trace
Gases’ (2007) 365 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A
1925.
[14] Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Climate Change Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers, Contribution
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report
(2007).
[15] A tonne of CO2e
(carbon dioxide equivalent) means one metric tonne of CO2 or a
volume of another greenhouse gas with the identical warming
effect.
[16] Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change,
Summary for Policymakers, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth
Assessment Report (2007).
[17]
Council of the European Union, Information Note 7242/05, 11 March
2005.
[18] Niklas Höhne,
Dian Phylipsen and Sara Moltmann, Factors Underpinning Future Action: 2007
Update (2007).
[19] See
Hansen et al, above n 12. See also James Lovelock, The Revenge of
Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back and How We Can Still Save Humanity
(2006).
[20] Nathan Rive
et al, ‘To What Extent Can a Long-Term Temperature Targe Guide Near
Term Climate Change Commitments?’ (2007) 82 Climactic Change
373.
[21] Harriet Bulkeley,
‘Governing Climate Change: The Politics of Risk Society? (2001) 26
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 430,
434.
[22] Nicholas Stern, The
Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review
(2007)
[23] See, eg, Daniel
Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary’ (1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law
451.
[24] The notion of
stabilising greenhouse gas emissions is that a steady concentration can be
maintained over time by ensuring that emissions
of gases are equal to
removals.
[25] UNFCCC,
above n 6, Article 2.
[26]
Alexander Gillespie, Climate Change, Ozone Depletion and Air Pollution
(2006) 181.
[27] See Paul
Cleary, ‘Taking the Credit’ (2007) 6 The Diplomat
47
[28] Clive Hamilton,
‘Building on Kyoto’ (2007) 45 New Left Review 91,
96.
[29] Erik B Bluemel,
‘Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive Entropy in the
Regulation of the Global Public Good’
(2007) 155 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review
(forthcoming).
[30] G8 Summit
Heiligendamm 2007, Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy: Summit
Declaration, 7 June 2007
<http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/anlagen/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-
wirtschaft-eng,property=publicationFile.pdf>
(27 June
2007).
[31] The AWG was
established in line with Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol which requires
the MOP to start considering post 2012 commitments at least seven years before
the end of the firs commitment
period.
[32] See generally
Wolfgang Sterk, Hermann E Ott, Rie Watanabe and Bettina Wittneben, ‘The
Nairobi Climate Change Summit (COP 12
– MOP 2): Taking a Deep Breath
before Negotiating Post-2012 Targets?’ (2007) 2 Journal for European
Environmental and Planning Law
139.
[33] See
<http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/> (29 March
2007).
[34] B Fisher et al
Technological Development and Economic Growth: ABARE Research Report 1
(2006) 34. See also Clive Hamilton ‘The Political Economy of Climate
Change’, Milthorpe Lecture, Macquarie University,
June 2006 at
<http://www.tai.org.au> (27 March
2007).
[35] See
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070531-13.html> (26
June 2007).
[36] Such as Brazil.
See John Vidal and Julian Borger, ‘Lula Rejects Bush Move on Climate
Change Talks’ The Guardian Monday 4 June 2007.
[37] See in particular the United Kingdom’s Draft Climate Change Bill 2007 (UK) (included included in United Kingdom, Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Draft Climate Change Consultation Document (13 March 2007) <http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/climatechange-bill/index.htm> (27 June 2007); Canada’s Clean Air Bill (Bill C-30) 2007 (Can) <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/redirector.aspx?RefererUrl=Publication.aspx%3fDocid=24137 97%26file%3d4>; California’s Global Warming Solutions Act 2006, see <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_32_bill_20060927_chaptered.pdf> (27 June 2007); South Australia’s Climate Change and Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Bill 2006 (SA) <http://climatechange.sa.gov.au> (27 June 2007).
[38] For comment see Tim
Stephens, ‘United Kingdom Carbon Emissions Reduction Legislation’
(2007) 24 Environmental and Planning
Law Journal
1
[39] Stern Review, above
n 21, 462.
[40] Daniel Bodansky,
‘Climate Commitments: Assessing the Options’ in Joseph E Aldy et
al, Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort Against Climate
Change (2003) 37, 44.
[41] Shelia M Olmstead and Robert
N Stavins, ‘A Meaningful Second Commitment Period for the
Kyoto
Protocol’ Economists’ Voice, May 2007,
1.
[42] See Bodansky, above n 39.
See also Aaron Cosbey et al, Which Way Forward? Issues in Developing an
Effective Climate Regime After 2012 (2005); K Blok et al, Towards
Post-2012 Climate Change Regime
(2005).
[43] Niklas
Höhne, Dian Phylipsen and Sara Moltmann, Factors Underpinning Future
Action: 2007 Update (DEFRA, 2007); Daniel Bodansky, ‘International
Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches’
(2004).
[44] Peter Singer, One
World: The Ethic of Globalisation (2002)
25.
[45] Ibid, 50.
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