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Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
START-UP TRADEMARK
OPPOSITION POLICY
DECISION
Foot Locker, Inc. v.
J.L. Stevens
Claim Number:
FA0206000114458
PARTIES
Complainant is Foot
Locker, Inc., New York, NY
(“Complainant”) represented by Melissa L. Klipp, of Drinker
Biddle & Shanley LLP. Respondent is J.L. Stevens, Houston,
TX (“Respondent”).
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED
DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue
is <americanfootlocker.com>, registered with iholdings.com, Inc.
PANEL
The undersigned
certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of
his knowledge, has no known conflict
in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Judge Richard B.
Wickersham, (Ret.) as Panelist
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint
to the National Arbitration Forum (the “Forum”) electronically on May 31, 2002;
the Forum received
a hard copy of the Complaint on June 4, 2002.
On June 4, 2002,
iholdings.com, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <americanfootlocker.com>
is registered with iholdings.com, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current
registrant of the name. iholdings.com,
Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the iholdings.com, Inc.
registration agreement and has thereby agreed
to resolve domain-name disputes
brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy
(the “Policy”).
On June 6, 2002, a
Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the
“Commencement Notification”), setting
a deadline of June 26, 2002 by which
Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to
Respondent via e-mail,
post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on
Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts,
and to postmaster@americanfootlocker.com by
e-mail.
A timely
Response was received and determined to be complete on June 25, 2002. Complainant’s Additional Submission was
received in a timely manner and determined to be complete on July 1, 2002. Respondent’s Response to Supplemental
Statement of Complainant was received timely on July 5, 2002 and was fully
considered by Panel.
On July 10,
2002, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a
single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Judge
Richard B. Wickersham, (Ret.),
as Panelist.
RELIEF
SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’
CONTENTIONS
A. COMPLAINANT
1. This Complaint concerns the Respondent’s
bad faith registration and use of a domain name confusingly similar to the
Complainant’s
registered, famous, and distinctive mark. The Respondent is knowingly damaging
Complainant by holding the <americanfootlocker.com>
domain name (the “domain name”).
A. Complainant’s Business and Marks:
2. On November 1, 2001, Complainant
changed its legal name from Venator Group, Inc. to Foot Locker, Inc. Venator was the former owner of the FOOT
LOCKER® trademark. Pursuant to the name
change, Complainant Foot Locker is the current owner of the FOOT LOCKER® mark.
3. Since 1976, the distinctive and famous
FOOT LOCKER® mark has been used in connection with the sale and advertisement
of athletic footwear,
equipment, and apparel.
4. The FOOT LOCKER® mark is registered in
the United States with the Patent and Trademark Office and has reached
“incontestable” status.
5. Foot Locker, Inc. is the world’s
leading multi-channel retailer of athletic footwear and apparel. Foot Locker operates approximately 2,000
retail stores worldwide bearing the Foot Locker name including, FOOT LOCKER®,
LADY FOOT LOCKER®,
and KIDS FOOT LOCKER®.
6. Foot Locker also maintains a
significant presence over the Internet.
Foot Locker provides international online ordering under the FOOTLOCKER.COM®
name. In addition, Foot Locker operates
several websites using the FOOT LOCKER® trademark, and variants thereof,
including: <footlocker.com>,
<foot-locker.com>,
<efootlocker.com>, <ladyfootlocker.com> and
<worldfootlocker.com>.
In 2001
alone, Foot Locker had over $100 million dollars in Internet-only sales. Through Foot Locker’s longstanding use of
the FOOT LOCKER® trademark, the public has come to expect domain names and web
addresses
incorporating FOOT LOCKER®, or variations thereof, to be owned by
Foot Locker. See Venator Group
Retail, Inc. v. Ayrton Mercado, FA 100651 (Nat. Arb. Forum) (finding
“Complainant has established recognition on the Internet through its
footlocker.com, efootlocker.com,
and worldfootlocker.com Web sites”).
8. Foot Locker has invested billions of
dollars into promoting the FOOT LOCKER® name and marks worldwide, and building
Foot Locker’s
reputation, goodwill, and brand recognition.
B. Respondent and the Disputed Domain Name:
9. On February 9, 2002, decades after the
Complainant’s adoption and first use of the FOOT LOCKER® mark, the Respondent
registered the
<americanfootlocker.com>
domain name.
10. Respondent has no connection or
affiliation with the Complainant, and has received no license or consent,
express or implied, to use
the famous FOOT LOCKER ® trademark in the domain
name or in any other manner.
11. Respondent has no rights in the FOOT
LOCKER® trademark.
12. At present, the <americanfootlocker.com> domain name resolves to a parked Web
page that provides links to various Internet topics, including clothing and
shoe stores.
C. The Domain Name is Confusingly Similar
to Complainant’s Trademark
13. The <americanfootlocker.com>
domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s FOOT LOCKER® trademark as
required by paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Uniform Policy
for Domain Name Dispute
Resolution adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
and the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy adopted by
DotRegistrar.com (the “Policies”).
14. There is no question that the domain name
is comprised, almost entirely, of Complainant’s famous FOOT LOCKER®
trademark. See e.g., Trump v.
Grimaldi, FA 99713 (Nat. Arb. Forum) (finding the domain name is
identical to Complainant’s mark since it incorporates Complainant’s mark
in its
entirety); Magnum Piering, Inc. v. Mudjackers., D2000-1525 (WIPO)
(stating that “numerous panels have held that when a domain name wholly
incorporates a complainant’s registered
mark, that is sufficient to establish
identical or confusing similarity for purposes of the Policy”).
15. Arbitrators consistently have held that
domain names that differ from the relevant mark only by the addition of a
top-level domain
name are confusingly similar.
See Foot Locker, Inc. v. Video Images Prods., FA 103129
(Nat. Arb. Forum) (finding the inclusion of “.com” in the domain name is
immaterial to the determination of whether it
is confusingly similar to
Complainant’s mark); Venator Group Retail, Inc. v. Ayrton Mercado,
FA 100651 (Nat. Arb. Forum) (finding <footlocker.tv> to be confusingly
similar to the FOOT LOCKER® mark); Trump v. Grimaldi, FA 99713
(Nat. Arb. Forum) (“addition of top-level indicator such as “.com” or “.org” is
not enough to defeat a claim of identical
or confusing similarity”); Lee
v. Aeon Network Servs., FA 95035 (Nat. Arb. Forum) (finding
<aeon.net> confusingly similar to Complainant’s <aeon.com> domain);
Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. d/b/a Sound Choice Accompaniment Tracks v. Sound
Choice, FA 93631 (Nat. Arb. Forum) (<soundchoice.net> confusingly
similar to Complainant’s <soundchoice.com> domain name).
D. Respondent Has No Rights or Interests in
Complainant’s Trademark
16. Respondent is not known by and has no
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name as required by paragraph
4(a)(ii) of the Policies. See Compangnie
de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., D2000-0020 (WIPO) (finding no
rights or legitimate interests where Respondent was not commonly known by the
mark or never applied
for a license or permission from the Complainant to use
the trademarked name); Just Jeans Group Ltd. v. Domain Trade,
D2000-1821 (WIPO) (finding the Respondent lacked the right to use the
Complainant’s mark in the domain name when the Respondent
has never offered
goods or services under the mark, or otherwise used the mark).
17. Of course, even if Respondent did have
plans to develop some type of business–which apparently she does not–it does
not follow that
Respondent can present fair use or rights to the <americanfootlocker.com> domain name. Respondent’s actions are in an attempt to
interfere with Complainant’s online identity and to prevent Complainant from
owning the
domain name. (See Ciccone
v. Parisi, D2000-0847
(WIPO) (“use which intentionally trades on the fame of another cannot constitute
a ‘bona fide’ offering of goods or services.
To conclude otherwise would mean that a Respondent could rely on
international infringement to demonstrate a legitimate interest,
an
interpretation which is obviously contrary to the intent of the Policy”); CHANEL,
Inc. v. ESTCO Tech. Group, D2000-0413 (WIPO) (finding the “Respondent
may not use Complainant’s famous fashion trademark as a domain name to entice
Internet
users to its database. This is
not fair use but instead infringing use”).
E. Respondent Registered and is Using the
Domain Name in Bad Faith
18. Arbitration Panels have found that
registration together with inactivity constitutes bad faith. See Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Nuclear
Marshmallows, D2000-0003 (WIPO); Venator Group Retail, Inc. v.
Ayrton Mercado, FA 100651 (Nat. Arb. Forum) (finding that registration
of an infringing domain name coupled with passive holding is evidence of
bad
faith); Venator Group Retail Inc. v. ShopStar Network, FA 100575
(Nat. Arb. Forum) (finding that Respondent’s passive holding of
<shopfootlocker.com> was evidence of bad faith).
2.
RESPONDENT
1. The Respondent is a Lieutenant Colonel
in the Army National Guard with over 23 years of Active and National Guard
service. The Respondent identified a
business opportunity of selling at discount military medals, ribbons and other
military uniform paraphernalia
to include rank and patches but not to include
any type of footwear or sportswear.
Respondent also identified an opportunity to establish a website where
service members, for a fee, could exchange military rank and
used
uniforms. For example, an Army Dress
uniform can cost several hundred dollars, while the rank worn on the uniform is
an additional cost of $35-55
dollars.
The Respondent recognized the desire of military personnel to see/trade
their old rank and uniforms upon promotion or separation from
the military.
2. The Respondent sought a domain name
that would attract a military person to the website. The term “footlocker” has been the traditional name given to the
“locker” or box located at the “foot” of a military service member’s
bed,
hence, the name “footlocker.” Since a
soldier (sailor, Marine, airman, etc.) secured their “worldly possessions” in
their footlocker, Armed Forces members readily
recognize and possess a strong
affinity to the term “footlocker” because of the known military
affiliation. There were numerous
websites containing the term “footlocker” that were already owned by other
parties many not associated with the
Complainant.
3. The Respondent was able to secure the
name <AmericanFootlocker.com>.
The name appeared appropriate given the fact that the Respondent intends
to limit the website to U.S. military items.
[a.] The domain name is not identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has
rights. ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(1); ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
4. The Respondent did not intend to use
the term “footlocker” to divert customers as alleged by the Complainant. There clearly is no benefit to be derived
from any diversion of their “civilian or non-military” customers. The nature of the products and services
being offered has no relationship. The
Complainant’s simple reliance on naked conclusory allegations does not meet
their burden of proof. Block Drug
Co. v. Targon Domain, FA 094260 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 11, 2000).
5. Respondent acquired the name from a
suggestion of Colonel James Stryker.
The Respondent had attempted to secure the name
<MILITARYFOOTLOCKER.COM> but discovered that name was already registered
by
a third party. Accordingly, the
Respondent established the domain name <americanfootlocker.com>
with the intent to capitalize on the “country” as in the Armed Forces “Duty,
Honor, Country” and on the common military association
of the term
“footlocker.” The Respondent wishes to
attract American military personnel seeking military items, not tennis shoes.
6. The Complainant, through its
registration and use has established that it has the rights in the FootLocker
mark. However, in light of the common
use of the word “footlocker” the Respondent fails to see how there is a
likelihood of a confusing
similarity between the disputed domain name and the
mark. The Complainant has to show that
the public would be confused between its mark and the addition of the prefix
“American.” The fact that the
Respondent is dealing with totally unrelated product and services is adequate
to refute the conclusory allegations
of the Complainant. For cases on point, please see Bank of
Am. Corp. v. Fluxxx Inc., FA 103809 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 18, 2002)
where it was decided, as a result, of the common use of the terms “nations” and
“banking”
the Panel failed to see how there was a likelihood of confusion
between NATIONSBANK and nationsbanking.com
NATIONSBANK pointed to a financial institution and nationsbanking.com
pointed to a porn site. Accordingly, it
concluded <nationsbanking.com> was not confusingly similar to the
trademark NATIONSBANK.
7. The Panel in Coca-Cola Co. v.
Svensson, FA 103933 drew a similar conclusion (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 27,
2002). The issue in that case dealt
with the use of the domain name <sprite.nu>, which Coca-Cola felt
violated their SPRITE trademark. The
Panel took judicial notice that the term “sprite” in the Encyclopedia
Britannica did not refer to the Coca-Cola Company but rather
the flashes of
light common in a thunderstorm. A
similar result is found in referring to a dictionary for the definition of
“footlocker”. The Oxford Desk
Dictionary and Thesaurus defines “footlocker” as a small trunk usually kept at
the foot of a soldier or camper’s bunk.
(The exact reasoning of the Respondent in selecting the name). No reference is made to a supplier of shoes
or sportwear.
8. To further demonstrate the sites will
be dissimilar, the Respondent’s website will include META tags (META tags are
“keywords” that
search engines use to “find” websites) like “American, U.S.,
footlocker, military, armed forces, Army, soldiers, Navy, sailors, Air
Force,
airmen, Marines, Coast Guard, National Guard, Reserves, awards, medals,
ribbons, rank, uniforms, swap, exchange, etc.”
There will be no reference to “tennis shoes or shoes or
sportswear.” If a search engine “pulls”
both <AmericanFootlocker.com> and <FootLocker.com>, a
potential tennis shoe customer is not likely to be confused or tricked into
purchasing from the military
site.
9. The Complainant has shown that it holds
legal rights in a well-known mark but the domain name in dispute is different,
generic and
the site content is not likely to confuse the public, either
through initial interest confusion or otherwise, that the Complainant
is the
sponsor of Respondent’s site which offers military items.
[b.] The Respondent (domain-name holder) should
be considered as having rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name, AmericanFootlocker.com,
which is the subject of the complaint. ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(2); ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
As concluded in Coca-Cola
Co. v. Svensson, Supra:
“It is clear from the
evidence that complainant does not hold exclusive rights in SPRITE. It does have exclusive rights in relation to
the uses for which it has registered trademarks, but the word “sprite” itself
is a generic
word. For example, the
evidence before me establishes that “sprite” is a generic term in the computer
software industry, that it is a scientific
term for flashes of light in a
thunderstorm.”
11. Accordingly, it should be concluded that
the evidence is clear that the Complainant does not hold exclusive rights for
use of “footlocker”
as held for similar reasons in reference to SPRITE. In that case, the Panel held the word
“sprite”, as used by the Respondent in the domain name <sprite.com> was
intended as a
reference to the scientific term. Similarly, in this case, the term “footlocker” is intended as a
reference to its long-standing military interpretation as demonstrated
by its
definition in dictionaries and falls outside of the protection granted to the
Complainant’s trademark.
[c.] The domain name should not be considered as
having been registered and being used in bad faith. ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(3); ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
12. There are no circumstances indicating
that Respondent has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for
the purpose of
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name
registration to the Complainant who is the owner of the trademark or
to a
competitor of the Complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of
Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly
related to the domain
name. Again, the Complainant has relied
solely on naked conclusory allegations that have not met their burden of
proof. Block Drug Co. v. Targon
Domain, Supra. The sole
intent of the Respondent is to use <AmericanFootlocker.com> as an e-commerce
website to sell and allow of the exchange of military items.
13. In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
v. Bernstein, FA 102962 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Feb. 27, 2002) the Panel appreciated that without discovery or
substantive position taken, it is often difficult for a Complainant
to present
evidence of registration and/or use in bad faith, but it is still Complainant’s
burden to do so under the evidence of
registration and/or use in bad faith
requirement. As noted in that Opinion:
“The Complainant does...
not provide evidence that the domain name is being used in bad faith. In fact, the parties seem to agree that it
does not seem to be in “use” in connection with a planned ‘dance studio.’”
14. As in that case, the Complainant has not
met its burden to prove by a preponderance of competent, credible and
admissible evidence
that the domain name at issue has been registered or is
being used in bad faith. The
Complainant alleged the Respondent secured the domain name foxstudios.com in
bad faith to capitalize on the name and had not even
placed the site into
action to promote the Respondent’s planned dance studio. In spite of the weak response, the Panel
concluded the Complainant had failed to prove bad faith on the part of the
Respondent. Also in Block Drug
Co. v. Targon Domain, Supra, it was held simple reliance on
conclusory allegations would not carry the required burden.
15. The Respondent takes issue with the fact
that <AmericanFootlocker.com> website is inactive and as such
constitutes bad faith. While it is
true, the Respondent has yet not published the <AmericanFootlocker.com>
website, there are other reasons for inactivity aside from bad faith. The Respondent has not been inactive. As stated above the Respondent had taken
aggressive actions in preparation to initiate the website and the planned
business but participating
in the Master’s Program slowed the process. The Respondent is the sole member of the
business and intended to continue the progress after graduation.
16. Neither has the Complainant shown that
the Respondent intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain,
Internet users to their
website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement. As noted above, the Respondent was simply
using the term “footlocker” solely as a result of military members association
of that generic
term.
Conclusion
17. The Complainant has not carried their
burden of proof. The Respondent has not
simply relied on this failure, but has demonstrated with overwhelming evidence
the Respondent had secured the
domain name for the sole purpose of selling
military type objects with no bad faith or intent or damage to the Complainant
as demonstrated
by the frequent and common usage of the term “footlocker.”
18. Remedy Sought. The Respondent requests <AmericanFootlocker.com>
domain name remain registered to the Respondent. The Respondent is willing to provide a disclaimer on the website
indicating no affiliation to or sponsorship by the Complainant.
Additional Submissions
Both sides submitted
timely additional material and argument which was fully considered by Panel.
FINDINGS
Identical or Confusingly
Similar
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant owns
numerous registrations with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for
its FOOT LOCKER family of marks, more
specifically, Reg. No. 1,126,857 issued
on November 20, 1979 and listed on the Principal Register.
Since 1976, the
distinctive and famous FOOT LOCKER mark has been used in connection with the
sale and advertisement of athletic footwear,
equipment and apparel. Complainant is the world’s leading
multi-channel retailer of athetic footwear and apparel. Complainant operates approximately 2,000
retail stores worldwide bearing the FOOT LOCKER name.
Complainant asserts that
Respondent’s <americanfootlocker.com> domain name is confusingly
similar to Complainant’s FOOT LOCKER family of marks. Respondent’s domain name incorporates Complainant’s entire FOOT
LOCKER mark with the addition of a geographic qualifier, namely,
“American.” The addition of a
geographic qualifier to a famous mark fails to make the domain name separate or
distinct, and in this case, renders
it confusingly similar. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. S G &
Delmonte-Asia.com, D2001-0432 (WIPO May 22, 2001) (finding that the
domain names<sunkistgrowers.org>, <sunkistgrowers.net> and
<sunkistasia.com>
are confusingly similar to Complainant’s registered
SUNKIST mark and identical to Complainant’s common law SUNKIST GROWERS
mark). We agree.
Furthermore,
Respondent’s domain name resolves to a website that provides links to various
Internet topics, including clothing and
shoe stores. The Panel finds that because Respondent is offering identical
services as Complainant, the possibility of confusion among Internet
users is
further increased. See Slep-Tone
Entm’t Corp. v. Sounds Choice Disc Jockeys, Inc., FA 93636 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Mar. 13, 2000) (stating that “likelihood of confusion is further
increased by the fact that the Respondent
and [Complainant] operate within the
same industry”).
Rights and Legitimate
Interests
Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Complainant argues that
it has the exclusive right to use the FOOT LOCKER trademark, and that
Respondent is neither a licensee nor
authorized agent of Complainant. Complainant maintains that Respondent is not
commonly known by the “AMERICANFOOTLOCKER” moniker or the <americanfootlocker.com>
domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
See Gallup Inc. v. Amish Country Store, FA 96209 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that Respondent does not have rights in a domain
name when Respondent is not known
by the mark); see also Compagnie
de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., D2000-0020 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2000)
(finding no rights or legitimate interest where Respondent was not commonly
known by the mark and
never applied for a license or permission from
Complainant to use the trademarked name).
We so find.
Complainant also argues
that Respondent’s disputed domain name resolves to a “parked domain name.” Respondent’s website states, “This domain is
registered at DotRegistrar.com by a customer and parked temporarily until the
owner establishes
a permanent site.”
Complainant argues that any eventual use of the domain name would
interfere with Complainant’s online identity while disrupting its
business. Complainant asserts that any
development of Respondent’s website would represent an opportunistic attempt to
trade on the goodwill
of Complainant’s FOOT LOCKER family of marks; thus, Respondent’s
actions are not in connection with a bona fide offering of goods
or services
under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), nor do Respondent’s actions represent a
legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). We agree.
Registration and Use in
Bad Faith Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant argues that
Respondent’s lack of development or stated purpose in connection with the
disputed domain name since its February
9, 2002 registration signifies passive
holding and bad faith. Complainant
further states that ICANN’s four criteria, as listed in the Policy, are not
exhaustive, as the Panel may consider other
circumstances that support finding
the Respondent acted in bad faith. See
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Risser, FA 93761 (Nat. Arb.
Forum May 18, 2000) (finding that in determining if a domain name has been
registered in bad faith, the Panel
must look at the “totality of
circumstances”); see also, DCI S.A. v. Link Commercial Corp.,
D2000-1232 (WIPO Dec. 7, 2000) (concluding that the Respondent’s passive
holding of the domain name satisfies the requirement of
¶ 4(a)(iii) of the
Policy). We so find.
Complainant also argues
that Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name represent an
opportunistic attempt by Respondent
to trade on the fame and goodwill
associated with Complainant’s FOOT LOCKER family of marks. Complainant believes Respondent’s actions
exhibit bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because Respondent will
capitalize on the
Internet confusion generated by the misuse of Complainant’s
FOOT LOCKER family of marks. We so
find.
In addition, the Panel
finds that because of the notoriety associated with Complainant’s FOOT LOCKER
family of marks, Complainant’s
prolonged and extensive use of its FOOT LOCKER
marks, and Complainant’s listing on the Principal Register of the USPTO,
Respondent
had constructive notice of Complainant’s rights in its mark. The Panel determines that Respondent’s
registration and use of an infringing domain name, despite knowledge of
Complainant’s preexisting
rights evidences bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the
Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs
this Panel to “decide a complaint
on the basis of the statements and documents
submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and
principles of
law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the
Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three
elements to obtain that a domain
name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the
Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark
in which the Complainant
has rights;
(2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name;
and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is
being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or
Confusingly Similar
We find for the reasons
stated hereinabove in our Findings that the domain name registered by the
Respondent is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark
in which the Complainant has rights; and,
Rights or Legitimate
Interests
The Respondent has no
rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and,
Registration and Use in
Bad Faith
The domain name has been
registered and is being used in bad faith.
DECISION
The Panel finds in favor
of the Complainant and against the Respondent. We hereby direct that the domain name be transferred from
Respondent to Complainant.
JUDGE RICHARD B.
WICKERSHAM, (Ret. Judge), Panelist
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Dated: July 19, 2002
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