Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions

The Complainant in this administrative proceeding is Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, more commonly referred to as BMW AG, a corporation organized under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, with a principal place of business in Munich, Germany.

The Respondent in this administrative proceeding is "(This Domain is For Sale) Joshuathan Investments, Inc.", of "62 Cleghorn Street, Belize City, Belize none, US".

The disputed domain name is <bmwdealer.com>. The Registrar of the domain name is BulkRegister.com, 10 East Baltimore St., Suite 1500, Baltimore, MD 21202, USA.

This is a mandatory administrative proceeding submitted for decision in accordance with the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"), adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") on August 26, 1999, the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), approved by ICANN on October 24, 1999, and the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").

By registering the disputed domain name with the Registrar, the Respondent agreed to the resolution of disputes pursuant to the Policy and Rules.

According to the information provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center"), the history of this proceeding is as follows:

The Complainant filed its Complaint with the Center on August 21, 2002, by email and on August 26, 2002, by hardcopy.

On August 22, 2002, the Center requested and obtained from BulkRegister.com, the registrar of the disputed domain name, verification that the domain name is registered with BulkRegister.com and the Respondent is the registrant for the domain name.

On August 27, 2002, having verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Policy and the Rules, the Center formally commenced this proceeding and delivered to the Respondent notice of the Complaint and commencement of this proceeding.

The Center attempted to deliver the Complaint to the Respondent by Federal Express courier, facsimile transmission, and email. The Complaint was delivered by Federal Express to the Respondent at 62 Cleghorn Street, Belize City, Belize. However, the email was rejected and the facsimile number provided by the Respondent in the domain name registration information was not operative.

The Complainant sent an email on September 3, 2002, informing the Center that the copy of the Complaint sent to the Respondent was returned to the Complainant.

The Respondent failed to file a Reply within the prescribed time limits or at all, and on September 19, 2002, the Center delivered a Notification of Respondent Default to the Respondent.

The single Panel member, Bradley J. Freedman, agreed to act as Panelist in this proceeding and filed the necessary Statement Of Acceptance and Declaration Of Impartiality And Independence, and on September 24, 2002, was duly appointed by the Center.

On September 24, 2002, the Center delivered a Notification of Appointment of Administrative Panel and Projected Decision Date to the parties.

The Panel finds that it was properly constituted and appointed in accordance with the Rules and the Supplemental Rules.

Based upon the information provided by the Center, the Panel finds that all technical requirements for the prosecution of this proceeding were met.

The following information is derived from the Complaint and supporting evidence submitted by the Complainant.

The Complainant manufactures and distributes motor vehicles and other products and services throughout the world.

The Complainant is the registered owner of the trademarks BMW and BMW and design in over 120 countries, including Germany and the United States of America, in connection with motor vehicles and numerous other products and services. The BMW and BMW and design trademarks were registered in Germany in 1917 and 1929 respectively. The BMW trademark was registered in the United States of America in 1955.

By virtue of the use of the BMW trademarks by the Complainant and on its behalf, the BMW trademarks have become well-known throughout the world and identified by the public solely with the Complainant and its products and services.

The disputed domain name was registered on June 9, 1997. The disputed domain name currently resolves to a website with the url "www.top10sites.com", that presents a directory of commercial websites called "Top10Sites.com". The website prominently displays the statement "This Domain Name is for SALE. Click Here for more Info", and presents a pop-up window that displays the statement: "The domain name you typed is for Sale. Feel free to Contact our Representative listed Below. joshuathaninvest@aol.com."

The website also prominently displays a hypertext link labeled "21 And Over Click Here", which leads to a pornographic website called FreeSexMovies, which professes to be the "Napster of Pornography".

The Respondent is not authorized by the Complainant to register or use the disputed domain name, and the Respondent’s use of the domain name or the BMW trademark is not connected to, sponsored or authorized by, or within the control of the Complainant.

The Complainant first became aware of the disputed domain name on June 28, 2002. By letter dated June 28, 2002, the Complainant advised the Respondent that the disputed domain name violated the Complainant’s trademark rights, and demanded that the Respondent discontinue use of the domain name and transfer it to the Complainant. The Respondent did not respond to the Complainant, and did not stop using the disputed domain name.

The Respondent has not filed any response to the Complaint or answered the Complainant’s factual assertions or evidence in any other manner.

The Complainant contends as follows:

(i) The Complainant is the owner of the BMW registered trademark, and the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s mark.

(ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name because the Complainant has not been authorized by the Complainant to register or use the disputed domain name, and has not made a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name.

(iii) The Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith because: (1) the Respondent registered the disputed domain name primarily for the purpose of selling it at a profit; (2) the Respondent is intentionally using the domain name to attract for commercial gain Internet users to the Respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s trademark; (3) the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name for a pornographic website tarnishes the Complainant's trademark; (4) the Respondent failed to reply to the Complainant’s correspondence; and (5) the Respondent registered the domain name using false contact information.

As previously indicated, the Respondent has not filed any response to the Complaint and has not answered the Complainant’s contentions in any other manner.

The Policy is narrow in scope. It applies only to disputes involving alleged bad faith registration and use of domain names – conduct commonly known as "cybersquatting" or "cyberpiracy". The Policy does not apply to other kinds of disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. The narrow scope of the Policy reflects its origins as a novel form of Internet dispute resolution designed to balance a wide range of perspectives regarding the regulation of Internet conduct[1].

The application of the Policy is limited to situations in which a complainant asserts and proves the following: (i) the registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith[2]. A complainant must prove all three elements in order to be entitled to relief under the Policy[3].

The burden is on the Complainant to prove each of the three requirements elements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a). It is not sufficient for the Complainant to make assertions without providing proof[4].

(a) The Respondent’s Default

Rules paragraph 10(a) requires that the Panel ensure that each party is given a fair opportunity to present its case. Rules paragraph 14 reads as follows:

The Respondent was given notice of this proceeding in accordance with the Rules. As previously indicated, the Respondent failed to file any reply to the Complaint and has not sought to answer the Complainant’s assertions, evidence or contentions in any other manner. The Panel finds that the Respondent has been given a fair opportunity to present its case, and the Panel will proceed to a decision on the Complaint.

The Respondent’s default does not automatically result in a decision in favour of the Complainant. The Complainant must still prove each of the three elements required by Policy paragraph 4(a)[5].

Rules paragraph 15(a) provides that the Panel shall decide the Complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, the Rules, and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable. In accordance with Rules paragraph 14(b), the Panel may draw such inferences as are appropriate from the Respondent’s failure to reply to the Complainant’s assertions and evidence or to otherwise contest the Complaint. In the circumstances, the Panel’s decision is based upon the Complainant’s assertions and evidence and inferences drawn from the Respondent’s failure to reply[6].

The Complainant is the owner of the BMW trademark registered in over 120 countries, including Germany and the United States of America, and uses that mark in association with its manufacture and distribution of motor vehicles and other products. The Complainant’s assertions in this regard are supported by documentary evidence. The Respondent has not filed any reply to the Complaint, and has not contested the Complainant’s assertions. In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the BMW trademark.

The Policy requires that the disputed domain name be "identical or confusingly similar" to the Complainant’s BMW trademark. The Complainant asserts that the challenged domain name is confusingly similar to its trademark.

Neither the Policy nor the Rules provide any guidance with respect to the test to be applied regarding the confusing similarity requirement of the Policy. Panels have applied different tests. Some panels have undertaken a literal comparison of the domain name and the trademark, and have not considered whether there is any source confusion[7]. Other panels have undertaken a source confusion analysis as required by conventional Anglo-American trademark law, which involves a consideration of all of the circumstances including the strength of the complainant’s mark, the sophistication of likely consumers, and the nature of the wares and services with which the domain name and conflicting mark are used[8].

A number of considerations support the view that the appropriate test for confusing similarity under the Policy is a literal comparison of the challenged domain name and conflicting mark:

1. The language of Policy paragraph 4(a) should be interpreted in a purposive manner consistent with the Policy’s remedial nature and objective – to prevent the extortionate behaviour known as "cybersquatting".

2. The language of Policy paragraph 4(a) does not invoke a likelihood of confusion test, as contrasted with Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv) which expressly refers to a "likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the registrant’s] website or location or of a product or service on [the registrant’s] website or location" as an indication of bad faith domain name registration and use.

3. The Policy is international and, in the absence of express language, it is inappropriate to import into Policy paragraph 4(a) a test that may not exist under all national trademark laws.

4. The procedure contemplated by the Policy is not well suited to the kinds of factual issues presented by a conventional source confusion analysis. In particular, the Policy is intended to be a relatively quick and inexpensive process, panels must make factual determinations based upon written submissions and documentary evidence, complainants have no right of reply without the panel’s permission, and parties are often not represented by counsel.

For these reasons, the Panel considers the appropriate test for confusing similarity to be a literal comparison of the disputed domain name and the complainant’s mark.

When comparing a challenged domain name and a trademark, the addition of the ".com" suffix is irrelevant for determining whether the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark. Rather, one looks to the second-level domain for such a determination, since the ".com" suffix is merely descriptive of the registry services and is not an identifier of a source of goods or services[9].

The addition of non-distinctive, descriptive words, such as "dealer", to a well-known trademark in a domain name does not necessarily detract from the overall impression of the primary, distinctive element of the mark in the domain name[10].

In this case, the use of the word "dealer" – referring to an activity that would commonly be associated with the Complainant or an authorized dealer of BMW motor vehicles – together with the Complainant’s BMW mark is likely to cause Internet users to believe that the domain name connects to a website that is owned or sponsored by, or affiliated with, the Complainant[11].

In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s BMW trademark. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied the first element required by the Policy.

The second element required by Policy paragraph 4(a) – the registrant has no legitimate right or interest in the domain name – requires the Complainant to prove a negative proposition, which can be particularly difficult[12].

A number of panels have held that the burden on a complainant regarding the second element is necessarily light, because the nature of the registrant’s rights or interests, if any, in the domain name lies most directly within the registrant’s knowledge[13]. Other panels have held that once the complainant makes a prima facie showing that the registrant does not have rights or legitimate interest in the domain name, the evidentiary burden shifts to the registrant to rebut the showing by providing evidence of its rights or interests in the domain name[14].

The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name because the Respondent is not and has not been known commonly by the disputed domain name, and has not been authorized by the Complainant to register or use the disputed domain name. The Complainant has not provided any evidence of trademark searches or other investigations to indicate that the Respondent does not have any interest in any marks that include the term "BMW" and is not commonly known as "BMW". In some circumstances, the omission of such evidence would be fatal to a complaint under the Policy. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of this dispute – the indisputable fame of the Complainant’s mark, the evidence adduced by the Complainant (the Respondent’s name, the website for which the disputed domain name is used by the Respondent, and the Respondent’s lack of rights granted by the Complainant) – together with an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to reply to the Complaint or provide any justification for its registration and use of the disputed domain name, are sufficient to satisfy the Complainant’s evidentiary burden.

Even though the Respondent has not filed any reply to the Complaint and has not contested the Complainant’s assertions, it is incumbent upon the Panel to consider whether the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name demonstrates rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. According to Policy paragraph 4(c), the following circumstances, if proved, demonstrate a registrant’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name:

(i) the registrant used or demonstrably prepared to use the domain name or a corresponding name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to notice of the dispute;

(ii) the registrant (as an individual, business, or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if it has not acquired trademark rights; or

(iii) the registrant is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the complainant’s mark.

To satisfy the requirements of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i), the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name must be in connection with a "bona fide" offering of goods or services. In some circumstances, a directory of websites may constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services. In the circumstances of this case, however, the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name is not "bona fide" within the meaning of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i) because: (a) the disputed domain name is fairly unique and specific to the Complainant; (b) there is no apparent connection between the disputed domain name and the Respondent’s website directory or the linked pornographic website; and (c) there is no other apparent legitimate justification for the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name for its website. In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to provide any explanation or rationale for its use of the disputed domain name for its website[15].

Policy paragraph 4(c)(ii) is not applicable. The Respondent does not contend, and there is no evidence that, the Respondent has been commonly known by the disputed domain name or that the disputed domain name is derived from one of Respondent’s trademarks or trade names.

Policy paragraph 4(c)(iii) is not applicable. The Respondent is using the domain name for an offering of services, namely a commercial directory of websites.

For these reasons, the Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

Policy paragraph 4(a)(iii) requires the Complainant to prove that the Respondent registered and has used the disputed domain name in bad faith. The language of Policy paragraph 4(b)(iii) is conjunctive, and requires that both bad faith registration and bad faith use be proved[16].

"Bad faith" within the meaning of the Policy is a term of art, and is not intended to apply to distasteful conduct that might constitute bad faith in the ordinary sense of the term[17]. The use of a domain name for a website directory or pornographic website is not necessarily a bad faith use[18].

Policy paragraph 4(b) provides that the following circumstances are deemed to be evidence that a registrant has registered and used a domain name in bad faith:

(i) circumstances indicating that the registrant has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of its documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) the registrant has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, the registrant has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its Website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its Website or location or of a product or service on its Website or location.

The Policy expressly states that these circumstances are non-exclusive[19].

The Complainant relies upon Policy paragraph 4(b)(i), arguing that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name primarily for the purpose of the selling the domain name for valuable consideration in excess of Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name.

The Respondent’s name (as indicated in the WHOIS registration information) is "(This Domain is For Sale) Joshuathan Investments, Inc.". Similarly, the Administrative Contact for the disputed domain name (as indicated in the WHOIS registration information) is "This Domain is For Sale (This Domain is For Sale) Joshuathan Investments, Inc." The disputed domain name resolves to a website that prominently displays the statement "This domain name is for sale (Click here)", and presents a pop-up window that displays the statement: "The domain name you typed is for Sale. Feel free to Contact our Representative listed Below. joshuathaninvest@aol.com."

These circumstances all demonstrate that the Respondent intended, from the date of registration, to sell the disputed domain name. This conclusion is supported by an adverse inference drawn from the Respondent’s failure to rely to the Complaint or dispute the Complainant’s assertion regarding the primary purpose of the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name.

The Respondent’s offer to sell the disputed domain name is made to the public. There is no direct evidence that the Respondent offered to sell the domain name specifically to the Complainant or its competitors, or that the sale price would exceed the registration costs. Nevertheless, those requisite elements may be inferred from the circumstances, including the nature of the domain name (its incorporation of the Complainant’s famous and specific trademark) and the manner in which the domain name has been advertised for sale[20]. In addition, this conclusion is supported by an adverse inference drawn from the Respondent’s failure to rely to the Complaint or dispute the Complainant’s assertion regarding the primary purpose of the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name.

The Panel finds that the Complainant has established that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy paragraph 4(b)(i).

The Complainant also relies upon Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv), which requires the Complainant to establish that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its website for commercial gain. There is no direct evidence that the Respondent knew of the Complainant or its BMW trademark, or intended to use the disputed domain name to confuse and divert Internet users. Nevertheless, the Respondent’s knowledge and intention may be determined by common sense inferences from circumstantial evidence[21].

A domain name is more than a mere Internet address. It often identifies the Internet site to those who reach it, and sends a message that the site is owned by, sponsored by, affiliated with, or endorsed by the person with the name, or owning the trademark, reflected in the domain name[22].

The Panel finds that the Respondent knew of the Complainant’s famous BMW trademark and registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its website, based upon the following circumstances: (a) the disputed domain name is well-known, unique and specific to the Complainant; (b) there is no apparent connection between the disputed domain name and the Respondent’s website or its content; (c) there is no other apparent legitimate justification for the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name for its website; and (d) the Respondent has not denied any knowledge of the Complainant or its trademark. In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to provide any explanation or rationale for its use of the disputed domain name for its website[23].

The Panel also finds that the Respondent’s directory website results in commercial gain to the Respondent. It is well known that many directory websites generate revenue by directing traffic to other websites. In the absence of any reply by the Respondent, the Panel finds that the Respondent’s website generates revenue for the Respondent in that manner.

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has established that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv).

The Complainant also relies upon other grounds, not specifically enumerated in Policy section 4(b), for contending that the Respondent has registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith: (i) the Respondent’s use of the domain name tarnishes the Complainant’s BMW trademark; (ii) the Respondent provided false contact information; and (iii) the Respondent failed to reply to the Complainant’s demand letter and failed to reply to the Complaint. Given the Panel’s determination based upon two of the grounds enumerated in Policy paragraph 4(b), it is not necessary for the Panel to determine whether these additional grounds are a basis for a finding of bad faith domain name registration and use.

The Complainant has established each of the three requirements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a) – the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s BMW trademark, the Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

The Panel therefore directs that the registration of the disputed domain name be transferred from the Respondent to the Complainant.

1. See Quarterview v. Quarterview Co. Ltd., Case No. AF-0209(a-b) (July 6, 2000); Libro AG v. NA Global Link Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-0186 (May 16, 2000); Toronto Star Newspapers Limited v. Virtual Dates Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-1612 (February 6, 2001); Educational Testing Service v. TOEFL, WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 (March 16, 2000); FLOS Spa. v. Victory Interactive Media S.A., WIPO Case No. D2000-0771 (December 15, 2000); Re. Infolink v. Nathan Frey, WIPO Case No. D2000-1687 (March 26, 2001); Tribeca Film Center Inc. v. Lorenzo Brusasco-Mackenzie, WIPO Case No. D2000-1772 (April 10, 2001); Deutsche Welle v. DiamondWare Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-1202 (January 2, 2001); Nintendo of America Inc. v. Alex Jones, WIPO Case No. D2000-0998 (November 17, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104 (November 23, 2000); Jules I. Kendall v. Mayer, WIPO Case No. D2000-0868 (October 26, 2000); and the ICANN Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, October 24, 1999, www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm, at paragraph 4.1(c).
2. Policy paragraph 4(a).
3. See Edward Van Halen v. Morgan, WIPO Case No. D2000-1313 (December 20, 2000).
4. See Radio Globo SA v. Diogo Pimentel, WIPO Case No. D2000-1705 (January 31, 2001); Two Systems Enterprises Co. Ltd. v. Sonie's Creations, Case No. AF-0911 (September 7, 2001); Link Clicks Inc. v. John Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1547 (January 12, 2001).
5. See Packaging World Inc. v. Zynpak Packaging Products Inc., Case No. AF-0233 (July 28, 2000); Cortefiel S.A. v. Quintas, WIPO Case No. D2000-0140 (April 24, 2000); Shore Media Ventures Inc. v. Both Worlds Inc., Case No. AF-0228; Softquad Software Inc. v. Eleven-Eleven Ltd., Case No. AF-0143; The Estate of Tupac Shakur v. Andronian, Case No. AF0349 (October 3, 2000); Cho Yong Pil v. Dooseok, WIPO Case No. D2000-0754 (August 28, 2000); Rickey Skaggs v. Vincente, WIPO Case No. D2000-1134 (December 18, 2000); Ingram Micro Inc. v. Noton Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0124 (March, 2001); Link Clicks Inc. v. John Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1547 (January 12, 2001).
6. See Packaging World Inc. v. Zynpak Packaging Products Inc., Case No. AF-0233 (July 28, 2000); MatchNet plc v. MAC Trading, WIPO Case No. D2000-0205 (May 11, 2000); SeekAmerica Networks Inc. v. Masood , WIPO Case No. D2000-0131 (April 13, 2002); The Pep Boys Manny, Moe and Jack of California v. E-Commerce Today, Ltd., Case No. AF-0145 (May 3, 2000); Bloomberg L.P. v. Baltic Consultants Ltd., Case No. FA0010000095834 (November 20, 2000); Isabelle Adjani v. Second Orbit Communications Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0867 (October 4, 2000); Sony Corporation v. Inja, WIPO Case No. D2000-1409 (December 9, 2000); Doctor.Ing.h.c. F. Porsche AG v. Stonybrook Investments Limited, WIPO Case No. D2001-1095 (October 26, 2001); Credit Suisse Group v. Milanes-Espinach, Fernando and Milanes-Espinach, SA, WIPO Case No. D2000-1376 (March 20, 2001); Ingram Micro Inc. v. Noton Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0124 (March 6, 2001); American Online Inc. v. Johuathan Investments Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0918 (September 14, 2001); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Brown, WIPO Case No. D2001-0716 (July 18, 2001).
7. See Smoky Mountain Knife Works v. Deon Carpenter, Case No. AF-230 (July 3, 2000); Newport News Inc. v. VCV Internet, Case No. AF-0238 (July 18, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Richard MacLeod d/b/a For Sale, WIPO Case No. D2000-0662 (September 19, 2000); Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation v. Sound Choice Disc Jockeys Inc., Case No. FA20002000093636 (March 13, 2000); VeriSign Inc. v. Michael Brook, WIPO Case No. D2000-1139 (March 7, 2001); Tourism and Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., Case No. AF-0096 (March 16, 2000); The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Boris Kapachev, WIPO Case No. D2000-1571 (January 15, 2001); Bayerishe Motoren Werke AG v. JMXTRADE.com Selling Premium Domain, Case No. D2000-1693 (January 26, 2001); Nikon Inc. v. Technilab Inc., Case No. 2000-1774 (February 26, 2001).
8. See Aurora Foods Inc. v. David Paul Jaros, WIPO Case No. D2000-0274 (June 7, 2000); Robert Chestnutt v. Jennifer Tumminelli, WIPO Case No. D2000-1758 (February 2, 2001); Jordan Grand Prix Limited v. Gerry Sweeney, WIPO Case No. D2000-0233 (May 11, 2000); Automatic Data Processing Inc. v. Access Electronics, Case No. FA0101000096483 (February 20, 2001); Motorola Inc. v. Newgate Internet Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0079 (April 14, 2000); America Online Inc. v. Frank Albanese, WIPO Case No. D2000-1604 (January 25, 2001). See also Trademarks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 6.
9. See Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Denny Hammerton and The Jimi Hendrix Fan Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-0364 (August 15, 2000); VAT holding AG v. Vat.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0607 (August 22, 2000); Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Kim Jong Sub, Case No. FA01010000096377 (February 19, 2001); Rollerblade Inc. v. Chris McGrady, WIPO Case No. D2000-0429 (June 25, 2000); Nintendo of America Inc. v. Alex Jones, WIPO Case No. D2000-0998 (November 17, 2000); AltaVista Co. v. Stonybrook Investments, WIPO Case No. D2000-0886 (October 26, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000).
10. See Komatsu Ltd. v. RKWeb Ltd., D2000-0995 (November 13, 2000); Oki Data Americas Inc. v. ASD Inc., Case No. D2001-0903 (November 6, 2001); Toyota Motor Sales USA v. Hamid, Case No. D2001-0032 (March 28, 2001); Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. bmwcar.com. D2002-0615 (August 27, 2002); Xerox Corporation v. Imaging Solution, Case No. D2001-0313 (April 25, 2001).
11. See Toyota France and Toyota Motor Corporation v. Computer-Brain, WIPO Case No. D2002-0002 (March 22, 2002); Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. Freeworld and/or Luis, WIPO Case No. D2000-1807 (March 14, 2001); Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porche AG v. Brown, WIPO Case No. D2001-0919 (September 15, 2001); Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. Reid, WIPO Case No. D2001-0495 (May 21, 2001); Scania CV AB v. Shera, Case No. D2001-0704 (July 28, 2001); Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Anpol, Case No. D2001-1151 (December 13, 2001).
12. See Radio Globo S.A. v. Diogo Pimentel, WIPO Case No. D2000-1705 (January 31, 2001).
13. See Packaging World Inc. v. Zynpak Packaging Products Inc., Case No. AF-0233 (July 28, 2000); Educational Testing Service v. TOEFL, WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 (March 16, 2000); Grove Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v. Telesystems Communications Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-0158 (May 9, 2000); Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Commonwealth Hotels Inc. v. CCD Internet, Case No. AF-00771 (May 17, 2001).
14. See Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation v. Khaled Ali Soussi, WIPO Case No. D2000-0252 (July 5, 2000); Electronic Commerce Media Inc. v. Taos Mountain, Case No. FA0008000095344 (October 11, 2000); Universal City Studios Inc. v. G.A.B. Enterprises, WIPO Case No. D2000-0416 (June 29, 2000); Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532 (January 25, 2001); Credit Suisse Group v. Milanes-Espinach, Fernando and Milanes-Espinach, SA, WIPO Case No. D2000-1376 (March 20, 2001); See also Ingram Micro Inc. v. Noton Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0124 (March 6, 2001); Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropical Web, WIPO Case No. D2000-0624 (August 21, 2000).
15. See also Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. bmwcar.com. WIPO D2002-0615 (August 27, 2002).
16. See e-Duction Inc. v. Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1369 (February 5, 2001); World Wrestling Entertainment v. Michael Bosman, WIPO Case No. D99-0001 (January 14, 2000); Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v. William H. Wilson, WIPO Case No. D2000-0265 (June 16, 2000); Audiopoint Inc. v. eCorp., WIPO Case No. D2001-0509 (June 14, 2001); A Prompt Corporation v. Aprompt Computers Inc., Case No. AF-00816 (June 18, 2001); A & F Trademark Inc. v. Justin Jorgensen, WIPO Case No. D2001-0900 (September 19, 2001).
17. See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104 (November 23, 2000).
18. See Paragon Electric Co. Inc. v. Buy This Domain d/b/a/ NameRegister.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-1439 (February 20, 2002).
19. See Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 (February 18, 2000); The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. DR Seagle t/a Mr. Oxford-University, WIPO Case No. D2001-0746 (August 14, 2001); The Bruce Trail Association v. Andrew Camp and Bruce Trail Enterprises, WIPO Case No. D2001-1021 (October 12, 2001); A & F Trademark Inc. v. Justin Jorgensen, WIPO Case No. D2001-0900 (September 19, 2001); Vivendi Universal v. Jay David Sallen, WIPO Case No. D2001-1121 (November 7, 2001).
20. See Bayerishe Motoren Werke AG v. JMXTRADE.com Selling Premium Domain, WIPO Case No. D2000-1693 (January 26, 2001); Komatsu Ltd. v. RKWeb Ltd., D2000-0995 (November 13, 2000); United Artists Theatre Circiut Inc. v. Domains for Sale Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0005 (March 27, 2002); Pfizer Inc. v. Re This Domain For Sale -Email, Case No. D2002-0409 (July 3, 2002); Educational Testing Service v. TOEFL, WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 (March 16, 2000); National Hockey League and Lemieux Group Lp v. Domain For Sale, Case No. D2001-1185 (December 6, 2001); Parfums Christian Dior v. QTR Corporation, WIPO Case No. D2000-0023 (March 9, 2000).
21. See Tourism and Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., Case No. AF-0096 (March 16, 2000); Educational Testing Service v. Netkorea Co., WIPO Case No. D2000-0087; Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 (February 18, 2000); Bloomberg L.P. v. David Cohen, Case No. FA01020000096600 (February 19, 2001).
22. See Parfums Christian Dior v. 1 Netpower, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0022 (May 29, 2000); Cardservice International Inc. v. Webster R. McGee, 950 F.Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997); aff'd 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997). See also Green Products Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F.Supp. 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Brookfield Communications Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., [1999] USCA9 225; 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); British Telecommunications plc v. One In A Million Ltd., [1997] E.W.J. No. 1599 (H.C.), aff'd, [1998] 4 All E.R. 476 (C.A.); TCPIP Holding Company Inc. v. Haar Communications Inc. [2001] USCA2 82; 244 F. 3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2001); Ford Motor Company v. Ford Financial Solutions Inc. 103 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (N.D. Iowa 2000); PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Technologies L.L.C., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12857 (E.D.Mich. 2000).
23. See also Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. bmwcar.com. D2002-0615 (August 27, 2002).