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Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
Coors Brewing Company v. Dave Zike a/k/a
Handicapping DZ a/k/a Webnamesforsale
Claim Number: FA0202000104202
PARTIES
Complainant
is Coors Brewing Company, Golden, CO
(“Complainant”) represented by Christopher
J. Hussin, of Sheridan Ross P.C.
Respondent is Dave Zike a/k/a Handicapping DZ a/k/a Webnamesforsale, Arvada, CO
(“Respondent”).
The
domain names at issue are <coorsoriginal.com>
and <coorsextragold.com>, registered with Register.com and Namesecure, respectively.
PANEL
The
undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and, to
the best of his knowledge, has no known conflict
in serving as Panelist in this
proceeding.
Alan
L. Limbury as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (“the Forum”)
electronically on February 4, 2002; the Forum received
a hard copy of the
Complaint on February 4, 2002. The
Complaint named as Respondent “Handicapping DZ (a/k/a Webnamesforsale)”.
On
February 4, 2002, Register.com confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain
name <coorsoriginal.com> is registered with Register.com and
that Dave Zike is the current registrant of the name. Register.com has verified that Dave Zike is bound by the Register.com
registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain
name disputes
brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On
February 6, 2002, Namesecure confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain
name <coorsextragold.com> is
registered with Namesecure and that Webnamesforsale is the current registrant
of the name. Namesecure has verified
that Webnamesforsale is bound by the Namesecure registration agreement and has thereby
agreed to resolve domain
name disputes brought by third parties in accordance
with the Policy.
On
February 6, 2002, at the request of the Forum, Complainant filed an amended
Complaint naming as Respondent “Dave Zike a/k/a/ Handicapping
DZ a/k/a Webnamesforsale”
On
February 6, 2002, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of
Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”),
setting a deadline
of February 26, 2002 by which Respondent could file a Response to the amended
Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent
via e-mail, post and fax, to all
entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical,
administrative and billing
contacts, and to postmaster@coorsoriginal.com and
postmaster@coorsextragold.com by e-mail.
A
timely Response was received from “Dave Zike (27 years Coors Employee)” on February
26, 2002. The Exhibit to the Response was received
after the deadline but the
Panel has decided to admit it because there has been no delay as a result and
Complainant is unlikely
to have suffered prejudice.
Complainant
filed an additional timely submission in accordance with Supplemental Rule # 7
on March 1, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, pursuant to Complainant’s request to
have the dispute decided by a single-member
Panel, the Forum appointed Alan L. Limbury
as Panelist.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A.
Complainant
The
domain names <coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com>
incorporate and are identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s ORIGINAL
COORS, COORS and COORS EXTRA GOLD trademarks.
Respondent has no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names and he registered
and used the disputed
domain names in bad faith.
B.
Respondent
<coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com> are similar to Coors and that is why
I reserved them – because I worked for Coors for 27 years. If I, a 27-year
employee of Coors,
cannot have legitimate free speech rights to an Internet
address similar to Coors, then nobody could have legitimate rights except
Coors. CoorsOriginal.com and <coorsextragold.com> are merely electronic addresses to
Coors and nothing more. <coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com> are not a product, they are not a
place and they are not a person.
My response to Complainant’s counsel’s letter of
November 20, 2001 is evidence that I do not intend to sell the disputed domain
names
to Complainant – not to mention sell these Internet addresses to several
current and retired Coors employees who have requested me
to sell these
Internet addresses to them. This would defeat the whole reason I reserved them.
When I set up my Registrar accounts
to reserve Internet addresses, I reserved
generic addresses for websites I would develop and then market. Around the same time, I reserved the
disputed domain names as a free speech forum for myself and for current and
retired Coors employees. To keep things
simple and manageable within the Registrar, I did not set up another cumbersome
account. Complainant has provided no
evidence that I intended to reserve these
Internet addresses for the primary reason to sell to them at an enormous
profit.
Furthermore,
I made Coors upper management aware I was going to reserve these Internet
addresses and they indicated Coors would ‘never
have a use for
CoorsOriginal.com and CoorsExtraGold.com’ and I said ‘good because I do’. One
Coors person I had a conversation like
this with was Purvish Katiri, VP of
Coors Information Technology.
Just by
me reserving the disputed Internet addresses prevents Coors from reserving them
which, in itself, probably satisfies some
form of ‘bad faith’.
This
Panel might look at other recent panel decisions I have located on the web such
as: denying Clorox the <clorox.org> Internet
address (WIPO
D2001-0923), denying Philips
Electronics the <philips.ws> Internet address (WIPO DWS2001-0003),
denying Novell the <novellpress.com>
Internet address (WIPO D2001-1100), denying Alcoholics Anonymous the <alcoholicsanonymous.org>
Internet address (WIPO D2001-1124), denying the ‘Beanie Baby’ Mark Holder
the
<beaniecanada.com> Internet address (WIPO D2001-1366, Jan 26, 2002) where
a response was not even submitted, and a panel
of 3 arbitrators unanimously
denying 3M the <3mtapes.com>, <3madhesives.com> and
<3mabrasives.com> Internet addresses
(WIPO D2001-0727). Furthermore, four(4) registered United
States Marks exist for ‘Novell Press’, <novellpress.com> was offered for
sale and <novellpress.com>
was apparently used in an quasi-commercial
capacity at some point. The <alcoholicsanonymous.org> and
<beaniecanada.com>
opinions find good grounds for ‘bad faith’ yet
strongly suggest UDRP exploits trademark law and UDRP ‘bad faith’ is irrelevant
and
is a deterrent from the fundamentals of the free world.
There is
a striking resemblance between the previously mentioned
<novellpress.com>, <3mtapes.com>, <3madhesives.com>,
<3mabrasives.com> and <beaniecanada.com> Internet addresses and the
<coorsoriginal.com>
and <coorsextragold.com>
Internet addresses (i.e. <coorscanada.com>, <coorstapes.com>,
<coorspress.com>).
Quite
frankly, if a guy who gave 27 years of his life to Coors cannot use current
technology (i.e. a website that uses the disputed
Internet addresses), then the
Policy is not part of the free world.
C.
Additional Submission by Complainant
Respondent
concedes that the disputed domain names incorporate and are confusingly similar
to Coors Brewing Company’s ORIGINAL COORS,
COORS, and COORS EXTRA GOLD
trademarks.
Respondent’s
employment with Complainant does not establish any rights or legitimate
interests in domain names which incorporate and
are confusingly similar to
Complainant’s trademarks. A respondent
does not make a legitimate non-commercial, fair use of a domain name where he
knew or should have known of the existence
of the Complainant’s mark at the
time of registration.
By
purposely choosing two domain names which indisputably incorporate and are
confusingly similar to Complainant’s famous trademarks,
Respondent intended
misleadingly to divert consumers to get his message, if any, across. Only by reading through the content, if any,
of the web sites could the user discover that the domain names are not associated
with
Complainant. Accordingly, Respondent
has not demonstrated rights or legitimate interests.
Respondent’s
claims of a First Amendment right to post commentary about Complainant, or a
Coors “fan site”, has no relevance to this
proceeding. It may well be that the content, if any,
posted by Respondent on each web site may be entitled to some First Amendment
protection,
but it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make such an
evaluation here. Estee Lauder, Inc.
v. Estelauder.com, D 2000-0869 (WIPO Sept. 25, 2000). Paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy requires a
determination of whether a respondent has rights or legitimate interests in a
particular
domain name. A determination
“whether respondent has a legitimate or protected interest in the contents of
its web sites, or, more generally, in
its establishment of fora to air
complaints against certain companies” is not pertinent to a Policy
proceeding. Id. Moreover, because the domain names at
issue merely incorporate trademarks of Complainant, they do not constitute a
protectable, communicative
message. Morrison
& Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F.Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (D. Colo. 2000). Such use is more akin to source
identification than a communicative message and, for that reason, such use is
not protected by the
First Amendment:
The
grant to one person of the exclusive right to use a set of words or symbols in
trade can collide with the free speech rights of
others. When another’s trademark (or a confusingly
similar mark) is used without permission for the purpose of source
identification, the
trademark law generally prevails over the First Amendment. Free speech rights do not extend to labeling
or advertising products in a manner that conflicts with the trademark rights of
others. In these circumstances, the
exclusive right guaranteed by the trademark law is generally superior to the
general free speech rights
of others.
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id., quoting Yankee Pub. Inc. v. News
America Pub, Inc., 809 F.Supp. 267, 275-276 (SDNY 1992) (emphasis added). Further, where a respondent may display the
content of his web sites using different domain names which do not merely
incorporate
the trademarks of another and, thus, has many places to display his
message, there is no violation of the First Amendment. Id. citing Shields v. Zuccarini,
89 F.Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000). As
Respondent has indicated in his Response, he has registered many domain names,
and thus, has many places to display any message
he may have.
Further,
Respondent recognizes that by reserving the disputed domain names, he has
prevented Complainant “from reserving them which,
in itself, probably satisfies
some form of ‘bad faith.’” Respondent’s
attempts to argue around this bad faith are misplaced. First, Complainant is unaware of any conversations
Respondent may have had with Purvish Katiri.
Because Mr. Katiri was only employed by Coors Brewing Company for a very
short time, Coors is also unable to verify the accuracy of
Respondent’s
assertions concerning that conversation.
In any event, any such statements by Mr. Katiri would have been in
direct violation of Complainant’s brand and trademark policies,
under which all
trademark issues must be addressed by Coors’ legal department.
While
Respondent feels his communication with Complainant, once the dispute arose,
indicating that the Internet addresses were not
for sale overcomes
Complainant’s argument that it was Respondent’s motivation to sell the domain
names for valuable consideration
in excess of his costs, it is his actions
prior to this dispute which are the best evidence of Respondent’s bad
faith. Specifically, Respondent claims
to have registered numerous other domain names for generic marks around the
same time he registered
the domain names at issue. Further, he claims to have used the WEBNAMESFORSALE reference in
connection with these other registrations to indicate that these
other domain
names were for sale. Here, Respondent’s
listed e-mail address for both registrations at issue was also webnamesforsale@netzero.net. Respondent changed his e-mail address for
both only after this dispute arose.
Moreover, Respondent used and continues to use WEBNAMESFORSALE as the
registrant name for <coorsextragold.com>.
Finally,
Respondent directs the Panel to a number of Policy decisions which Respondent
alleges bear a “striking resemblance” to the
dispute herein. A thorough review of these decisions shows
that is not the case.
Complainant
is not trying to preclude Respondent from using web sites and domain names to
communicate a message, whether good or bad,
about Complainant. Complainant takes issue with Respondent’s
assertion that use of Coors’ product name trademarks as domain names is necessary
to communicate
his message. Rather, the
use of these domain names is calculated to cause confusion and divert
customers. Only by reading through the
content, if any, of the sites, would a consumer be able to discover that
Respondent’s domain names are
not associated with Complainant. This is exactly the type of confusion the
Policy was intended to address.
FINDINGS
Complainant is one of the largest brewing
companies in the world. It has numerous registered trademarks in the United
States, including
COORS, COORS ORIGINAL and COORS EXTRA GOLD. It also has
numerous trademark registrations in other countries.
Respondent was employed by Complainant
for 27 years, first in the warehouse and storerooms as an hourly employee, then
as a salaried
employee in the purchasing and computer support departments. He
is a self-educated computer person. His employment by Complainant
ended on
November 6, 1999. On November 9, 1999 Respondent registered the disputed domain
name <coorsoriginal.com> under the name Handicapping DZ. On
January 5, 2000 Respondent registered the disputed domain name <coorsextragold.com>
under the name Webnamesforsale. The email addresses for both registrants were webnamesforsale@netzero.net
before this dispute arose.
Complainant has not authorized Respondent
to register the disputed domain names, nor otherwise to use any of its
trademarks. Complainant
did not become aware of the identity of Respondent
until after the filing of the initial Complaint.
Complainant has discharged its burden of
proof and is entitled to the relief sought.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint
on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of
law that it deems
applicable.” Since this
dispute involves domain names registered in the United States, where both
parties are based, applicable principles of
law include U.S. trademark law.
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the
following three elements to obtain an order that
a domain name should be
cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant
has rights;
(2)
the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name; and
(3)
the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
Essential or virtual identity is
sufficient for the purposes of the Policy:
see The Stanley Works and
Stanley Logistics, Inc v. Camp Creek. Co., Inc., D2000‑0113 (WIPO
Apr. 13, 2000), Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki
Kaisha v. S&S Enterprises Ltd., D2000-0802 (WIPO Sept. 9, 2000); Nokia Corp. v. Nokiagirls.com,
D2000-0102 (WIPO Apr. 18, 2000) and Blue Sky Software Corp. v. Digital Sierra
Inc., D2000-0165 (WIPO Apr. 27,
2000).
For
US cases see Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., [2000] USCA2 33; 202 F.3d 489,
497-98 (2d Cir. 2000) (the differences
between the trademark “sporty’s” and the domain name “sportys.com” –
specifically, an apostrophe in the
trademark and the addition of .com in the domain name – are “inconsequential”,
such that the domain name is “indistinguishable” from and “certainly
‘confusingly
similar’ to the protected mark”); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.[1999] USCA9 225; ,
174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (differences between the domain
name <moviebuff.com> and the mark “MovieBuff” are “inconsequential”). See
also Public Serv. Co. v. Nexus Energy
Software, Inc., 36 F.Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 1999)
(<energyplace.com> and “Energy Place” are virtually identical); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor,
21 F.Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D.Minn. 1998) (<post-it.com> and “Post-It” are
the same); Interstellar Starship Services
Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1331, 1335 (D.Or. 1997)(<epix.com>
“is the same mark” as EPIX); Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97-0629, 1997 WL
133313, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (<planned-parenthood.com> and
“Planned Parenthood” are essentially
identical), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834, 119 S.Ct. 90, 142 L.Ed.2d 71 (1998).
The test of confusing similarity under the Policy, unlike
trademark infringement or unfair competition cases, is confined to a comparison
of the disputed domain name and the trademark alone, independent of the other
marketing and use factors usually considered:
Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. In Seo Kim, D2001-1195
(WIPO Nov. 12, 2001); Energy Source Inc. v. Your Energy Source, FA
96364 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2001); Vivendi Universal v. Mr. Jay
David Sallen and GO247.COM, INC., D2001-1121 (WIPO Nov. 7, 2001) and the
cases there cited. See also the similar approach adopted by the U.S. Federal
court in Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4732 (D. Mass. Mar 31, 2000).
Respondent concedes the disputed domain
names are similar to Complainant’s marks and says that is why he registered
them.
The Panel finds the domain name <coorsoriginal.com>
is confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks COORS and ORIGINAL COORS and the
domain name <coorsextragold> is identical to Complainant’s mark
COORS EXTRA GOLD and confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark COORS.
Complainant has established this element.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
Complainant’s marks are very well known
and long established. Respondent, having been a long time employee of
Complainant, knew the
disputed domain names were similar to Complainant’s
trademarks when he registered them, shortly after that employment ended. He registered them under names and with
contact information which effectively concealed his identity from Complainant
until after
these proceedings had been initiated. Complainant asserts it has
not authorized Respondent to register the disputed domain names,
nor otherwise
to use any of its trademarks. Respondent is not known by either of the disputed
domain names.
These circumstances are sufficient to
constitute a prima facie showing by
Complainant of absence of rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain
names on the part of Respondent. The
evidentiary burden therefore shifts to Respondent to show by concrete evidence
that he does have rights or legitimate interests
in respect of those names: Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) and the cases
there cited.
Respondent
says he registered the disputed domain names as a free speech forum for
himself and for current and retired Coors employees. He also says he made
Coors upper management, in particular Mr. Katiri, aware he was going to reserve
those Internet addresses and that they raised
no objection.
As to the first of these points, it is beyond the scope of a proceeding under the Policy to consider the
boundaries of free speech: Mission
KwaSizabantu v. Rost, D2000-0279 (WIPO June 7, 2000). Complainant rightly distinguishes
between a domain name and the content of any web site to which that domain name
leads. Respondent’s registration of the
disputed domain names precludes everyone without the permission of Respondent
from exercising the
right of free speech at any websites reached by means of
the disputed domain names.
The right to freedom of speech is subject
to the rights of others under laws such as those of defamation, trademark
infringement,
misrepresentation and breach of confidence. As stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the
Beefeater, Inc., [1978] USCA7 305; 572 F.2d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1978): “…a
trademark infringement action involves not only the right of the trademark
owner to control the reputation of his
product, but also the right of the
consuming public to be free of confusion”.
The U.S.
Constitution does not permit a person to misrepresent his or her identity, to
the detriment of the person whose identity is assumed:
“[T]he right to express one’s views is
not the same as the right to use another’s name to identify one’s self as the
source of those
views. One may be perfectly free to express his or her views
about the quality or characteristics of the reporting of the New York
Times or
Time Magazine. That does not, however, translate into a right to identify one’s
self as the New York Times or Time Magazine”: Monty & Pat Roberts Inc. v. J. Bartell, D2000-0300 (WIPO June 12, 2000). See also
The New York Times Co. v. New York Internet Serv., D2000-1072 (WIPO Dec. 5, 2000) and Women on Waves Found. v.
Hoffman, D2000-1608 (WIPO Jan. 29, 2001).
The issue here is whether the disputed
domain names themselves signify critical or commentary purposes, as opposed to
imitation of
the trademark. A domain name for the purpose of criticism or
commentary must on its face indicate that any site to which it leads
is not
that of the trademark holder but is instead a site for the criticism of or
commentary on the trademark holder. Otherwise,
there is created impermissible
initial interest confusion: Dykema Gossett PLLC v DefaultData.com, FA
97031 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 29, 2001) and Robo Enter., Inc. v. Tobiason,
FA 95857 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 24, 2000).
Here,
Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names will cause initial interest
confusion of the type discussed in Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., [1999] USCA9 225; 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(1999), by “capturing initial consumer attention, even though no sale [or other
economic benefit] is finally completed [or
realized] as a result of the
confusion.”
As
to the second point, the Panel is prepared to accept that Respondent made known
his intentions to colleagues during his employment
with Complainant and may
have received some encouragement. However, by virtue of his 27 years employment
with Complainant, Respondent
must be taken to have been aware of Complainant’s
brand and trademark policies, which require trademark issues to be addressed by
its legal department. The Panel finds that Complainant did not authorize
Respondent to register the disputed domain names and that
Respondent knew or
ought to have known that he did not have Complainant’s authority to do so.
In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reger, FA 95651 (Nat. Arb. Forum
Nov. 13, 2000) no legitimate interest was found where a State Farm employee
registered <statefarmclaims.com>.
In Weekley Homes v. Wilsher Co.,
FA 95331 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 2, 2000) transfer of <davidweekley.com> was ordered where respondent registered
that name while an employee of complainant. Here Respondent had ceased
to be an
employee of Complainant but this circumstance alone does not give rise to
rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
disputed domain names.
The
Panel finds that, by registering the disputed domain names, Respondent falsely
and misleadingly identified himself as Complainant
and any sites to which those
names might lead as those of Complainant. Accordingly, Respondent is not making
fair use of the Complainant's
mark under paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy.
Respondent
has no right or legitimate interest in respect of the disputed domain names.
Complainant has established this element.
Paragraph
4(b) of the Policy sets out four circumstances in particular which, without
limitation, shall be evidence of both bad faith
registration and bad faith use.
In SportSoft Golf, Inc. v. Hale
Irwin’s Golfers’ Passport, FA 94956 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 11, 2000) a
finding of bad faith was made where the respondent “knew or should have known”
of the registration
and use of the trade mark prior to registering the domain
name. Likewise Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. Marriot, FA 94737 (Nat. Arb.
Forum June 15, 2000); Canada Inc. v. Ursino, AF-0211 (eResolution July
3, 2000) and Centeon L.L.C./Aventis Behring L.L.C. v. Ebiotech.com, FA
95037 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 20, 2000).
Here there is no dispute that Respondent knew of Complainant’s marks.
Respondent also knew or ought to have known of Complainant’s
brand and
trademark policies, which required any trademark issues to be addressed by the
legal department. Respondent waited until
he had left Complainant’s employment
before registering the disputed domain names.
When he did register those names, he provided registration information
(“webnameforsale”), available to anyone making a Whois search,
which was
calculated simultaneously to conceal his identity while conveying a willingness
to sell those names. Other information
provided contributed to the concealment of his identity and impeded contact
with him.
Respondent’s claim that the domain name
<coorsoriginal.com> was not for sale, made a year later in
response to Complainant’s counsel’s letter of demand (addressed to Respondent
under one
of his aliases, DZ, without knowledge on Complainant’s part that
Complainant was writing to a former employee), must be set against
the
circumstances under which Respondent registered that domain name and maintained
the “webnamesforsale@netzero.net” contact address
until after receiving that
letter of demand. Likewise, Respondent’s claim that the domain name <coorsextragold.com>
was not for sale must be set against its registration in the name
Webnamesforsale, also with the “webnamesforsale@netzero.net”
contact address.
Respondent says he registered generic
domain names for websites he intended “to develop and then market” and that he
decided not to
set up another cumbersome Registrar account when he came to
register the disputed domain names. This explanation does not affect
the
natural and logical conclusion that, by registering <coorsoriginal.com> with the “webnamesforsale@netzero.net”
contact address and by registering <coorsextragold.com> in the
name Webnamesforsale, also with the “webnamesforsale@netzero.net” contact
address, Respondent intended to convey the message
that the disputed domain
names were for sale.
Respondent’s claim to have registered the
disputed domain names to provide a free speech site must be set against:
·
the
representations, made upon registration, that the names were for sale;
·
the steps
taken to conceal his identity; and
·
the absence
of any evidence that either disputed domain name has ever been used as a free
speech site, despite the lapse of time between
registration (late 1999 and
early 2000) and the initiation of these administrative proceedings in January
2002.
While it is possible that Respondent has
formed and may now have the intention to use the disputed domain names as a
free speech site,
the Panel regards Respondent’s conduct at the time of
registration of each of the disputed domain names, including the steps taken
to
conceal his identity (which were very effective in that regard) as evidencing
an intention at that time to sell those names to
Complainant at a profit, a
transaction Respondent must have known would be likely doomed to failure if
Complainant realized who he
was. Accordingly
the Panel finds Respondent registered the disputed domain names primarily for
the purpose of selling them to Complainant
for valuable consideration in excess
of his documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain names.
This is evidence
of both bad faith registration and bad faith use.
Complainant
has established this element.
The
Panel has examined the cases on which Respondent relies. All turned on their
own facts and were decided against the complainant
because, on the evidence,
one or more of the required elements had not been established. In The Clorox
Co. v. Marble Solutiohs, D2001-0923 (WIPO Nov. 20, 2001), Novell,
Inc. v. Marinelli Co., D2001-1100 (WIPO Nov. 13, 2001) and Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Overbey, D2001-0727 (WIPO Oct. 15,
2001) there was insufficient evidence of bad faith, (in the latter case also
legitimacy was not negated);
in Koninklijke
Philips Electronics N.V. v. Relson
Ltd., DWS2001-0003 (WIPO Nov.
15, 2001) complainant relied on bare assertion, not evidence; in Alcoholics
Anonymous World Serv., Inc. v. Friends of Bill W and Jimmy K, D2001-1124
(WIPO Dec. 28, 2001) and Tomassini. v. Chan, D2001-1366 (WIPO
Jan. 26, 2002) complainant failed to negate legitimacy (in the latter case also
failing to produce evidence of bad faith).
Here, on all the material before the Panel,
including the material provided by Respondent, the Panel has concluded that
Complainant
has produced evidence of its trademark registrations;
identity/confusing similarity are uncontested; Complainant has demonstrated
absence of rights or legitimate interests and has proved bad faith registration
and use.
DECISION
In
accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the relief
sought by the Complainant is hereby granted.
The disputed domain names, namely <coorsoriginal.com>
and <coorsextragold.com>, are ordered transferred to the
Complainant
___________________________________________________
Alan L Limbury, Panelist
Dated: March 15, 2002
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