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Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
United States of America Department of
the Navy NAVSEA v. NAVYWEB
Claim Number: FA0203000105977
PARTIES
Complainant is United States of America Department of the Navy NAVSEA,
Washington, DC (“Complainant”),
Respondent is NAVYWEB, San Diego, CA
(“Respondent”) represented by Stephen H.
Sturgeon, of Law Offices of Stephen
H. Sturgeon & Associates, PC.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED
DOMAIN NAMES
The domain names at issue are <navsea.com>,
<navsea.org>, and <navsea.net>
registered with Tucows, Inc.
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that they have
acted independently and impartially and to the best of their knowledge, have no
known conflict
in serving as Panelists in this proceeding.
Carolyn M. Johnson, G. Gervaise Davis
III, and Irving H. Perluss (presiding) are the Panelists.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the
National Arbitration Forum (“the Forum”) electronically on March 21, 2002; the
Forum received
a hard copy of the Complaint on March 21, 2002.
On March 21, 2002, Tucows, Inc. confirmed
by e-mail to the Forum that the domain names <navsea.com>, <navsea.org>, and <navsea.net> are registered with Tucows, Inc. and that the
Respondent is the current registrant of the names. Tucows, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Tucows,
Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name
disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On March 25, 2002, a Notification of
Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement
Notification”), setting
a deadline of April 15, 2002 by which Respondent could
file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail,
post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration
as technical, administrative and billing contacts,
and to postmaster@navsea.com,
postmaster@navsea.org, postmaster@navsea.net by e-mail.
A timely Response was received and
determined to be complete on April 15, 2002.
Complainant and Respondent each made a timely additional submission.
On May 2, 2002,
pursuant to Respondent’s request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the Forum appointed Carolyn M. Johnson, G. Gervaise Davis, III,
and Irving H. Perluss as Panelists.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The Complainant requests that the domain
names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
1. Complainant, NAVSEA, is a famous
organization, well known throughout the world, particularly throughout the
worldwide naval and maritime
communities.
The largest of the United States Navy’s five systems commands,
Complainant designs, builds and supports the entire U.S. Navy fleet
of ships
and combat systems.
2. Complainant accounts for nearly
one-fifth of the U.S. Navy’s annual budget (approximately $20 billion) and
provides services for more
than 130 acquisition programs, all requiring
extensive dealings with the worldwide naval and maritime communities. Complainant’s approximately 50,000 uniformed
and civilian personnel presently serve nationwide in four shipyards, two naval
warfare
centers, nine major commercial shipyards, and at its corporate
headquarters located in Washington, D.C.
3. Complainant is commonly known
throughout the world as “NAVSEA.”
Complainant is also the owner of two federally registered service marks
for “NAVSEA,” both registered at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office on
February 27, 2001. Complainant has
continuously used the NAVSEA marks in interstate commerce since at least
1981. Complainant also owns and
operates several Internet websites for providing information and advertising
its services to the public.
Complainant’s websites have been operated and freely accessible to the
public since at least 1994.
4. Respondent
is an unincorporated business, operating under the fictitious name “NAVYWEB” in
San Diego, California. NAVYWEB is owned
by Andy Breece. Andy Breece is an
employee of the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) in
San Diego, California. As two of the
Navy’s major system commands, SPAWAR and Complainant often have overlapping
missions and cooperate in several major
acquisition and research and
development programs. Therefore,
Respondent was aware, or should have been aware, of Complainant’s use of the
NAVSEA mark prior to registering the disputed
domain names. Neither Complainant nor SPAWAR authorized or
agreed to the registration of the disputed domain names or to the operation of
websites
under the disputed domain names by Mr. Breece.
5. Respondent is the registered owner of
the disputed domain names <navsea.com>, <navsea.org>
and <navsea.net>, all registered by Tucows, Inc. on October 9,
1998. Respondent operates websites at
<navsea.com> and at <navsea.org>. At both of these
websites, Respondent offers to sell “vanity” e-mail addresses to members of the
public within the same industries
in which Complainant has continuously
provided services for decades, e.g..
Respondent offers to sell shipbuilder@NAVSEA.COM>,
and Complainant provides services to shipbuilders worldwide.
6. Respondent does not advertise vanity
e-mails for sale at its <<navsea.net> website. But Respondent is offering to sell the <<navsea.net>
domain for $11,000.00, or lease it for $90.00/month or $990.00/year.
7. Respondent has also aggressively and
systematically purchased numerous other domain names that use the marks of
other naval commands
closely associated with Complainant, including SPAWAR
<spawar.com>; <spawar.org>, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
<navsup.net>; <navsup.net>, and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
<navair.org>. At most of these
websites Respondent repeatedly offers vanity e-mail addresses for sale. Moreover, just as it does for <navsea.net>,
Respondent offers <navsup.net> domain for sale to anyone for $11,000.00.
8. The disputed domain names incorporate
Complainant’s mark “NAVSEA” in its entirety.
Therefore, the disputed domain names are identical to Complainant’s federally
registered NAVSEA mark and satisfy ¶4(a)(i) of the ICANN
Policy.
9. Respondent has no rights or a
legitimate interest in the disputed domain names. This is because Respondent had not used, before any notice of a
dispute, the disputed domain names in connection with a bona fide
offering of
goods or services. (ICANN Policy,
¶4(c)(i).)
Respondent’s
owner is a Navy employee and should have been aware of Complainant’s use of the
NAVSEA mark when it registered the disputed
domain names. Respondent knew that Complainant had
long-established trademark rights in the word NAVSEA and would likely dispute
its unauthorized
use by others. Indeed,
Complainant used its mark long before Respondent registered the disputed domain
names. During Complainant’s existence,
having roots dating back over one hundred years, it has had extensive commerce
with commercial industry
in furtherance of the nation’s defense. Since at least 1981, such commerce has been
conducted under the NAVSEA mark.
Although Complainant’s mark was federally registered in 2001, it is
actual use of a mark in commerce that creates legal rights.
10. Respondent is not commonly known by the
disputed domain names, nor is Respondent licensed or authorized to use
Complainant’s mark
(ICANN Policy, ¶4(c)(ii).)
Respondent uniformly conducts its business under the fictitious trade
name NAVYWEB, and Respondent is known by that name as evidenced
by its
statement to that effect on websites it operates under the disputed domain
names. Respondent identifies itself as
NAVYWEB, not by Complainant’s mark or the mark in combination with any other
words or shape. Therefore, Respondent
has no need or legitimate interest to use Complainant’s mark in conducting its
business.
11. Respondent’s use of the disputed domain
names is not a legitimate non-commercial or fair use (ICANN Policy,
¶4(c)(iii).) Under two of the disputed
domain names Respondent is offering to sell vanity e-mail addresses
incorporating Complainant’s mark, and
under the third is offering to sell the
domain name outright. Respondent’s
attempts to sell vanity e-mail addresses and the domain name, in addition to
the many other addresses and domains it
is offering, indicates that Respondent
is using the disputed domain names as part of a larger business enterprise; one
in which Respondent
is profiting on the goodwill and recognition of the marks
of others.
12. Respondent’s offered services confusingly
overlap the same services provided by Complainant. Under the disputed domain names, Respondent offers a private
e-mail service for civilian and military personnel, family and friends. But since at least 1994, Complainant has
continuously operated a much larger nationwide e-mail service for civilian and
military personnel.
Most e-mail addresses in Complainant’s e-mail service
contain its registered service mark.
13. Respondent’s registration and use of the
disputed domain names demonstrate bad faith with the intent to gain
commercially by attracting
Internet users to its websites by creating a likelihood
of confusion with Complainant’s mark (ICANN Policy, ¶4(b)(iv).) An unwitting member of the relevant public,
seeking information about Complainant or attempting to access Complainant’s
website, is
more likely to type in the common “.com,” “.org,” or “.net” to
level domain names rather than the less common “.navy.mil” extension
used at
Complainant’s current website. When
that person does, he or she will be taken directly to Respondent’s website,
where Respondent immediately offers to sell, for
commercial gain, the domain
name itself or e-mail addresses incorporating Complainant’s mark.
14. Respondent is systematically registering
multiple names of various U.S. government organizations, including variations
of Complainant’s
mark, for the purpose of attracting more such traffic. For instance, Respondent is warehousing a
wide variety of U.S. Navy domain names, including the names of many famous Navy
commands,
and is presently encroaching into source-indicating marks of the U.S.
Air Force and U.S. Army. Respondent
advertises selling e-mail addresses for “Armyweb, AFWeb, NAVSUP, NAVYJAG,
BuMed, etc.” Respondent’s systematic
registration, use, and sale of domain names and vanity e-mail address
incorporating the marks of others demonstrate
bad faith.
15. Respondent has made an ineffective
attempt to inform the relevant public that is not associated with Complainant’s
mark. Thus, Respondent posts
sponsorship disclaimers at the bottom of several of its websites. Respondent also tries to distinguish its e-mail
services as “not-for-profit” and “private.”
Yet, Respondent’s significant fees and offers to sell domain names at
high prices belie such claims.
Complainant’s e-mail service, however, is genuinely “not-for-profit” and
“private” for civilian and uniformed employees. Respondent’s tactic of placing sponsorship disclaimers at the
bottom of websites misleads the public by forcing them to scroll through
the
homepage to learn, to their confused dismay, that Complainant is not the owner
or operator of the disputed domain names.
16. Respondent was aware, or reasonably
should have been aware, of Complainant’s mark prior to registering the disputed
domain names. This also constitutes bad
faith. There is a legal presumption of
bad faith when Respondent reasonably should have been aware of Complainant’s
trademarks when it registered
the disputed domain names.
17. If Respondent registered a domain name in
order to prevent Complainant from reflecting its mark in a corresponding domain
name, this
also may demonstrate bad faith.
Complainant “is presently working to integrate all NAVSEA Activities
into a single integrated NAVSEA Corporation, with a single NAVSEA
Strategic
Plan.” http://www.crane.navy.mil/Corp/Strategicplan/Default.htm. As part of its evolution towards efficient
corporate business processes, Complainant needs to reflect its services in
public websites
operating under commercial top-level domain names. Yet Respondent, by systematically buying up
commercially valuable domain name variants of Complainant’s mark, including the
new <navsea.biz>
domain name, acts to prevent Complainant from reflecting
its registered mark in any commercial top-level domain name.
B. Respondent[1]
1. The UDRP was established to permit the
expedited disposition of clear abuses.
A clear abuse is certainly not present in the instant case.
2. The disputed domain names are not
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
Complainant has rights,
because Complainant does not provide conclusive proof,
evidence or substantiation to prove that the Complainant had any trademark
rights in the names in question at the time of Respondent’s registrations...
Although
Complainant obtained a trademark registration on February 27, 2001, Respondent
registered the domains on October 9, 1998
– substantially earlier than
Complainant’s application for a trademark.
Since Complainant did not have a registered trademark prior to February 27,
2001, Complainant must prove that it had common law trademark
rights prior to
the date of registration. However,
Complainant has failed to provide any proof of any common law trademark rights
of any entity. Complainant has not met
the legal test for proving a common law trademark, i.e., Complainant has not established recognition of the words as
being associated with any services or products that Complainant may
market or
provide.
3. Since Complainant has not provided any
conclusive proof of trademark rights prior to the registration of the domain
names, it fails
to prove the first element that is required to obtain the
transfer of a domain name.
4. Complainant also has failed to sustain
its burden of proving that Respondent did not have any legitimate interest in
the disputed
domain names. The
statements and arguments of Complainant do not constitute proof that is
sufficient to justify the taking away of Respondent’s
valuable domain names
that Respondent has registered for use in its business.
5. Although the Complainant has the burden
of proving that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of
the domain
name, and the Respondent does not have the burden of proving that it
does have legitimate rights in the domain name, Respondent has
provided
evidence to prove that Respondent does have legitimate rights in the domain
name.
The
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy provides a listing of several
circumstances which, if proved, demonstrate that a
respondent has rights or
legitimate interests to the domain name.
Section 4c of the UDRP provides as follows [emphasis added]:
Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to the domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4a)(ii) [emphasis added]:
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute,
your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding
to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of
goods or services; or * * *
Respondent
does, in fact, have rights in the domain name for purposes of Paragraph
4(a)(ii) since Respondent has satisfied the conditions
of section (i) above by engaging in
the preparation for the use and the use of the domain names in connection with
a bona fide offering of
goods and services; before any notice of the dispute. There has been the “use of, or demonstrable preparations to use,
the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods
or services”
as required by the UDRP.
6. Respondent’s business plan is to use
the domain name NAVSEA to establish an e-mail service for NAVSEA employees,
thereby providing
them with a NAVSEA domain name that can be used for personal
use as opposed to the “.mil” extension that is subject to strict restrictions,
regulations and monitoring. It is to be
a community domain, including chat rooms and special interest pages for
employees only. Respondent’s business
plan also included the use of the domain name <navsea.net> as the
domain name serving, hosting “.com” and “.org.” The plan also included the use of the domain name <navsea.com>
to provide e-mail addresses for Navy contractors’ personnel, allowing them a
distinctive e-mail address separate from the <navy.mil>. <navsea.com> would additionally
provide tertiary level domain opportunities for contractors. For example, Respondent’s plan includes the
possibility of using tertiary level domain such as <XYZ.NAVSEA.com> for
all of the
company XYZ’s business related to NAVSEA. All of these services would be on a server totally independent
from the “.mil” network.
7. The reason that the Respondent’s plans
have not been fully developed and implemented is that the Respondent has not
yet retired from
his current employment and wishes to have no apparent conflict
of interest. Permission was granted by
his employer to engage in his proposed business on retirement, and the current
use has been limited.
8. Although Complainant asserts that
Respondent is intentionally attracting, for commercial gain, Internet users to
its websites by creating
a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark,
this is not so because the reference to “attracting for commercial gain” in the
UDRP is for the purpose of permitting the transfer of a domain name if the
domain name is being used to attract Internet users by
creating a likelihood of
confusion with a trademark for the purpose of drawing business from the owner of the
trademark. In the instant case, the Respondent is not
engaged in that activity. Respondent’s
business plan is to offer e-mail addresses to non-governmental entities and
individuals for non-governmental purposes.
This is not a business activity of the Complainant. Consequently, Internet users are not being
attracted for this prohibited type of activity. Respondent’s services are markedly different from those provided
by the Complainant. The Complainant
does not provide any personal e-mail services to its employees. Complainant monitors e-mail on “.mil” sites
to prevent personal use. Respondent’s
private e-mail services in no way overlap those provided by the Complainant. Current Navy instructions specifically
require that any <NAVY.mil> address used by contractor personnel clearly
identify the
person as being a contractor in the e-mail address, e.g., john.doe.contractor@hg.navy.mil.
9. Complainant asserts that Respondent was
aware of Complainant’s alleged trademark rights prior to registering the domain
name and that
shows bad faith. This is
not so because Complainant has not conclusively proven that Complainant did, in
fact, have common law trademark rights prior
to Respondent’s registration. Consequently, since there were no trademark
rights at the time of Respondent’s registration, this argument fails to prove
that Respondent
has
registered and has used the domain name in bad
faith.
10. Complainant
asserts that there was a demonstration of bad faith when a “for sale”
designation was put on a couple of domain names. This is not so because there are legitimate circumstances, such
as the attempt to raise capital, for a Respondent to consider selling
a domain
name.
11. Complainant
asserts that Respondent registered the domain name in order to prevent
Complainant from reflecting the alleged mark in
a corresponding domain
name. This is not the purpose and
intent of Respondent.
12. Although
Respondent does not have the burden of proof in this matter, none of the
circumstances set forth in the Policy Section 4(b)
are present, as follows:
(a) Neither Respondent, his company, his
business activities nor any of his associates have had any intent for
commercial gain to misleadingly
divert consumers or to tarnish any alleged
trademark/service mark.
(b) Neither Respondent, his company, his
business activities nor any of his associates have registered or acquired the
domain names in
question for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise
transferring the domain name registration to the Complainant who is alleged
to
be the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of
Complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the documented
out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name.
(c) Neither Respondent, his company, his
business activities nor any of his associates have registered the domain name
in question in
order to prevent the owner of any trademark or service mark from
reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name (and neither
he, his
company, his business activities nor any of his business associates have
engaged in a pattern of such conduct).
(d) Neither Respondent, his company, his
business activities nor any of his associates have registered the domain name
for the purpose
of disrupting the business of Complainant or any competitor.
(e) By using the domain names in question,
neither Respondent, his company, his business activities nor any of his
associates have attempted
to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to
their websites or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion
with any alleged mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of a website or location or of a product or service
on a website or
location. Respondent points out that
the website contains a clear, prominent disclaimer explaining that the site is
not the official U.S. government
site.
There has been
absolutely no evidence presented by Complainant before the Panel to show one of
the circumstances set out above or
any other circumstance of bad faith. The Complainant has therefore failed to
establish this element.
In the instant
case there has not been any conclusive evidence presented by Complainant to
show one of the listed circumstances or
any other circumstance of bad
faith. Therefore, the Complainant has
failed to establish this required element.
Complainant has failed to prove that there was bad faith both at
the time of registration and in the current use of the domain names.
Since
Complainant has failed to prove the element of bad faith, Complainant’s request
for the transfer of the domain name should,
therefore, be denied.
C. Complainant’s Additional Submission[2]
1. Respondent’s registration of the
disputed domain names was clearly abusive, and that Complainant is entitled to
relief under the UDRP
Policy. It is
clear that Respondent knew of Complainant’s rights in the NAVSEA mark; that
Respondent intends to capitalize on the fame of
the mark; and that the relevant
public will be confused by Respondent’s ongoing use of the mark in the disputed
domain names.
2. The burden of proof is “preponderance
of the evidence.” Conclusive proof is
not required.
3. Complainant has provided documentary
proof of ownership of two federal trademark registrations that are identical to
the disputed
domain names. Further,
Complainant has provided sworn affidavits by senior NAVSEA officials, averting
personal knowledge of Complainant’s continuous
use of the NAVSEA mark in
interstate commerce since 1981 and on the Internet since at least 1994. Thus, documentary evidence submitted by
Complainant meets the preponderance standard of proof, establishing common law
rights.
4. Respondent is incorrect in asserting
that “[t]he word NAVSEA is only recognized by a very limited audience
throughout the world.” According to
Respondent’s own evidence, Complainant accounts for over 70% of the national
shipbuilding revenues and 95% of the revenues
of the “Big Six” shipyards. Indeed, Complainant provided over $7 billion
dollars worth of construction and maintenance and modernization contracts to
the U.S.
shipbuilding industry in 2001.
5. Respondent is not commonly known by the
disputed domain names and its offered services confusingly overlap the same
services provided
by Complainant.
Respondent admits targeting its business efforts at NAVSEA employees and
Navy contractors. It has chosen not to
use its registered business name NAVYWEB, but instead uses Complainant’s
federally registered mark without permission.
Complainant asserts that the purpose of this strategy is obvious: Respondent is attempting to attract NAVSEA
and Navy customers to the disputed domain names by capitalizing on the
recognition and
fame of Complainant’s mark.
6. Despite Respondent’s efforts to imply
that it had permission to use Complainant’s mark in a business enterprise, the
only permission
Mr. Breece received was general permission to carry on an
outside web server business. This does
not give rise to a legitimate business use of Complainant’s mark by Respondent.
7. Respondent states that its business
plans are to provide e-mail addresses to NAVSEA employees and contractors,
thereby “[a]llowing
them a distinctive
e-mail address separate from navy.mil.”
Respondent’s e-mail addresses, however, will not be “distinctive” from
those offered to the same consumers by Complainant, since Respondent’s
e-mail
addresses incorporate Complainant’s mark in its entirety. In other words,
Respondent’s e-mail addresses look confusingly similar
to those provided by
Complainant to the same consumers since at least 1994. Thus, Respondent’s e-mail service
confusingly overlaps with Complainant’s e-mail service because both use
Complainant’s federally
registered mark as part of their respective e-mail
addressing system and both target the same set of consumers.
8. It follows that Respondent, who is
registered to operate NAVYWEB as a for-profit business, registered and is using
the disputed domain
names in bad faith by buying up domain names that have
long-standing, ubiquitous source-indicating significance to the public as
trademarks of the military departments of the United States of America. In particular, Respondent’s use and public
offers for sale of domain names including Complainant’s mark will confuse the
relevant
public and trade off the strength of Complainant’s long-standing and
significant rights in the mark.
Therefore, the domain names were registered and are being used in bad
faith by Respondent.
D.
Respondent’s Additional Submission
1. Complainant obtained a trademark
registration on February 27, 2001.
Respondent registered the domains on October 9, 1998 – substantially
earlier than Complainant’s application for a trademark. Complainant then proceeds to attempt to
prove that common law trademark rights were acquired prior to Respondent’s
registration. This is a complex issue
which involves factual determinations and determinations of law – which are
beyond the proper scope of the
UDRP arbitration process. Complex factual determinations such as this
are typically subject to extensive fact-finding processes, discovery
procedures, rules
of evidence, and jury determinations. The UDRP process is designed and intended to
deal only with simple, clear abuses and not complex determinations as presented
in this
domain name dispute.
2. Complainant has the burden of proving
that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
names. Complainant has failed in
sustaining its burden of proof.
Furthermore, although Respondent does not have the burden of proving
that it does have legitimate rights in the domain names, it has
provided
substantial evidence, legal rationale, and case law support to prove that
Respondent does, in fact, have legitimate rights
in the domain names.
3. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Policy
requires that Complainant must prove bad faith both at the time of
registration and in the current use of the domain name. A close examination of Complainant’s filing
does not provide adequate proof or evidence to support the allegation that
Respondent
acted in bad faith – both at the time of registration and
in the current use of the domain name.
Complainant
focuses on the one issue when it states that “Complainant [sic] is
intentionally attracting, for commercial gain, Internet
users to its web sites
by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark.”
Even
if proven, the alleged activity is only one bit of evidence that may indicate that
Respondent has acted in bad faith. The
UDRP provides that:
Evidence of Registration and Use in Bad
Faith. For the purpose of Paragraph
4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but with out limitation,
if found by the Panel
to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and
use of a domain name in bad faith.
The UDRP does not provide that any one
circumstance is proof of bad faith. It
only states that each circumstance will provide some evidence of bad faith.
4. Whether Complainant had trademark
rights at the time Respondent registered the disputed domain names is a complex
issue beyond the
proper scope of the UDRP.
5. Complainant has not proved that
Respondent had no legitimate interest or rights in the disputed domain names
and, in fact, has conceded
that Respondent does have such rights and a
legitimate interest in the names.
6. Complainant charges that Respondent is
creating a likelihood of confusion with its marks. If proven, this is only one bit of evidence that may indicate
that Respondent has acted in bad faith.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Paragraph 15(a) of
the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”)
instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint
on the basis of the statements and
documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules
and principles of
law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires
that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain
an order that
a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the
Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark
in which the Complainant
has rights;
(2) the Respondent has no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered
and is being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
It
is evident that the disputed domain names are identical and confusingly similar
to Complainant’s name.
Respondent
contends, however, that it registered the disputed domain names prior to
Complainant’s registration of its mark in the
United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
Respondent
cannot prevail on its contention. This
is because Complainant could and did acquire common law trademark rights based
on its use of the name since 1981. It
is the actual use that creates legal rights to the mark, not a race to the
Patent and Trademark Office. (See, 4
McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (updated 2000) §25:74.2; See
Also Passion Group, Inc. v. Usearch, Inc. (eResolution Aug. 10,
2000) (Complainant established
sufficient rights by virtue of its distribution and advertising to enable it,
at common law, to prevent another
magazine by the same name from being passed
off as that of Complainant).[3]
The
name “NAVSEA” is not generic, but very specific, and, if it were not, it would have
no value to Respondent as a domain name.[4]
As
will be seen, the Panel has found that Respondent registered and used the
disputed domain names in bad faith. It follows, accordingly,
that it has no
rights or a legitimate interest in the disputed domain names.
Respondent
is using <navsea.com> and <navsea.org> in order to
sell vanity e-mail addresses. It is not generally unlawful to conduct an e-mail
service (except in instances like
here), but Respondent would not have registered
the disputed domain names but for the obvious connection they have with the
Complainant
and its operations. Were it
not for the well-known abbreviated name for the government agency, the
registration and use of these domains would be valueless
as an e-mail service
to both the Respondent and his customers.
It is not the same at all as the use of a common surname for e-mail
businesses, where the purpose is for people with the same name
to have a shared
domain. Nor is it like the case of using a common
collective term, such as <collies.com> for e-mail accounts for a class of
dog fanciers. Here, the Panel finds that Respondent
registered and
uses the domain names solely
because of their clear and obvious connection with the operations of the specific
government agency holding the trademark.
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
Whether
Respondent registered and used the disputed domain names in bad faith are
crucial issues in this domain name dispute.
The
Panel finds that Respondent, an employee of the United States Navy, was on
notice as to Complainant’s rights in the NAVSEA mark
when it registered the
disputed domain names. The registration
of a domain name despite actual or constructive notice of Complainant’s mark is
evidence of bad faith.[5]
The
registration of domain names, by former employees (and, presumably, current
employees), which contain the trademarks of their
employers is evidence of bad
faith.[6]
Respondent
was fully aware when he registered the disputed domain names that the Navy had
this long-standing agency name and its association
in the minds of the public
or least the people working with or in that agency. He registered the disputed domain names solely because he felt he
could create a business that made use of the trademark of another
and the
association of these domains had with the agency. Respondent’s own arguments about the purpose of the business and
his selection and solicitation of people who want to be associated
with the
agency and its business, establish this.
Thus, it follows that Respondent has no legitimate interests in the
domain names and that he registered them in bad faith in an attempt
to trade on
the value of the mark.
The
Panel also finds that the use Respondent is making and intends to make is in
bad faith. Respondent contends he does
not have his business fully going and that he has invested much in preparation
for the operation when
he retires, but the fact remains, he is, and the Panel
finds that he is, soliciting the use of the domain for e-mails by people who
want to indirectly advertise that they are associated with NAVSEA in some way,
either as a former employee or a present one or a
present contractor.
Moreover,
the intended use of Complainant’s mark clearly is not a transformative
nominative, or descriptive use of the mark.
In
Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. (9th
Cir. 1999) [1999] USCA9 225; 174 F.3d 1036, 1065-1066, it is said:
“Contrary to West Coast’s contentions, we
are not in any way restricting West Coast’s right to use terms in a manner
which would constitute
fair use under the Lanham Act. See New Kids on the Block
v. News Amer. Publ’g, Inc., [1992] USCA9 2148; 971 F2d 302, 306-09 (9th Cir. 1992);
see also August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco,
Inc., [1995] USCA7 709; 59 F.3d 616, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1995). It is well established that the Lanham Act
does not prevent one from using a competitor’s mark truthfully to identify the
competitor’s
goods, see, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563
(9th Cir. 1968) (stating that a copyist may use the originator’s
mark to identify the product that it has copied), or in comparative
advertisements,
see New Kids on the Block,
971 F.2d at 306-09. This fair use
doctrine applies in cyberspace as it does in the real world. See Radio
Channel Networks, Inc. v. Broadcast.Com, Inc., No. 98-4799, 1999 WL 124455,
at *5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber,
29 F.Supp.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Welles,
7 F.Supp.2d at 1103-04; Patmont Motor
Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. 96-2703, 1997 WL 811770, at *3-*4
& n. 6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997); see also Universal Tel-A-Talk, 1998 WL 767440, at *9.
In Welles,
the case most on point, Playboy sought to enjoin former Playmate of the Year
Terri Welles (“Welles”) from using “Playmate” or “Playboy”
on her website
featuring photographs of herself. See 7
F.Supp.2d at 1100. Welle’s website
advertised the fact that she was a former Playmate of the Year, but minimized
the use of Playboy’s marks’ it also
contained numerous disclaimers stating that
her site was neither endorsed by nor affiliated with Playboy. The district court found that Welles was
using “Playboy” and “Playmate” not as trademarks, but rather as descriptive
terms fairly
and accurately describing her web page, and that her use of
“Playboy” and “Playmate” in her website’s metatags was a permissible,
good
faith attempt to index the content of her website. It accordingly concluded that her use was permissible under the
trademark laws. See id. At 1103-04.”
Obviously
Respondent’s use of Complainant’s mark is not such a use.
Respondent
has argued both that the use of the mark has to be for-profit or in connection with a business, and
that the
scope of the businesses of
Respondent and the Complainant are not in conflict. Neither element is a requirement of trademark law, which only
requires a commercial use, nor
of the ICANN Policies
and Rules. Here, the ICANN issues are simply whether
the Panel can find sufficient evidence in that presented by Complainant to find that Respondent registered
the domain names and is using the domain names in bad faith, since the marks
are essentially the same and Respondent is using the mark as a domain solely
because of its reference to the trademark
owner which provides commercial value
to his operations.
But, says
Respondent, “I have placed disclaimers on my websites.”
Such
disclaimers are not sufficient to prevent initial interest confusion in cases
such as this. (See Madonna v. Parisi,
D2000-0847 (WIPO Oct. 12, 2000) (citing Brookfield
Comm., Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. (9th Cir. 1999)
[1999] USCA9 225; 174 F.3d 1036, “[r]espondent’s use of a disclaimer on its website is
insufficient to avoid a finding of bad faith.
First, the disclaimer may be ignored or misunderstood by Internet users. Second, a disclaimer does nothing to dispel
initial interest confusion that is inevitable from Respondent’s actions. Such confusion is a basis for finding a
violation of Complainant’s rights.”).[7]
It
is to be noted in conclusion that Respondent has cited to decisions or dissents
written by one of the Panelists herein.
The principles set forth therein are sound, but they are not applicable
here. This is because this case has a
unique set of facts that were not present in those cases. The sole and only value of the disputed
domain names to Respondent is because of their association with Complainant and
its operations. In the Crew
case,[8]
for example, the purpose was to have a boating site, not to sell clothing, and
this is so in many other of the cases which Respondent
tries to use to defend
his position. It is only when a
non-trademark use is made, that does not depend for its value on the existence
of the trademark, that it is appropriate
to use a trademark as another’s
domain.
DECISION
Based on the above findings and
conclusions, and pursuant to Rule 4(i), it is decided that the following domain
names registered by
Respondent NAVWEB, shall be and the same are, transferred
to Complainant United States Department of the Navy, NAVSEA:
<NAVSEA.com>
<NAVSEA.org>
<NAVSEA.net>.
CAROLYN
M. JOHNSON G.
GERVAISE DAVIS III
Panelist Panelist
IRVING H. PERLUSS, (Presiding) Panelist
Dated:
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