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Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Landcruiser Connection
Claim
Number: FA0303000152460
Complainant is
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Torrance, CA (“Complainant”) represented
by Jordan S. Weinsten, of Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier &
Neustadt, P.C. Respondent is Landcruiser Connection, Sterling, VA
(“Respondent”).
REGISTRAR
AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <landcruiserconnection.com>, registered
with Network Solutions, Inc.
The
undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to
the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in
serving as Panelist in this
proceeding.
Tyrus
R. Atkinson, Jr., as Panelist.
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the "Forum")
electronically on March 28, 2003; the
Forum received a hard copy of the
Complaint on March 31, 2003.
On
April 2, 2003, Network Solutions, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that
the domain name <landcruiserconnection.com> is registered with Network
Solutions, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Network
Solutions, Inc. has
verified that Respondent is bound by the Network Solutions,
Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name
disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").
On
April 2, 2003, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"),
setting a deadline of
April 22, 2003 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via
e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts,
and to postmaster@landcruiserconnection.com by e-mail.
Having
received no Response from Respondent, using the same contact details and
methods as were used for the Commencement Notification,
the Forum transmitted
to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On
April 29, 2003, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided
by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Tyrus
R. Atkinson, Jr., as
Panelist.
Having
reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the
"Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its
responsibility under
Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(the "Rules") "to
employ reasonably available means calculated
to achieve actual notice to Respondent."
Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents
submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules,
the Forum's
Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems
applicable, without the benefit of any Response
from Respondent.
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant makes the following assertions:
1. Respondent’s <landcruiserconnection.com>
domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s LAND CRUISER mark.
2. Respondent does not have any rights or
legitimate interests in the <landcruiserconnection.com> domain
name.
3. Respondent registered and used the <landcruiserconnection.com>
domain name in bad faith.
B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in
this proceeding.
Complainant,
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Toyota Motor
Corporation, the owner of the LAND CRUISER mark.
Complainant holds U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) Reg. No. 2,590,587 for the LAND CRUISER mark
registered on July 9, 2002.
Complainant is the exclusive distributor of all
Toyota brand vehicles, including LAND CRUISER vehicles, in the United States
(except
Hawaii), the United Mexican States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Complainant is a
signatory to an Importer Agreement that grants it a License to use Toyota’s
trademarks in the distribution territory.
The Importer Agreement also obligates
Complainant to monitor continuously the distribution territory for possible
trademark infringement.
Complainant has
used the LAND CRUISER mark in the United States in connection with its goods
and services since as early as 1958.
Since 1993 alone, sales of LAND CRUISER
vehicles, parts and accessories in the United States have exceeded one billion
dollars. Complainant
has expended significant resources advertising and
promoting its products under the LAND CRUISER mark. As a result of
Complainant’s
extensive promotion and sales of products and services under the
LAND CRUISER mark, Complainant’s mark has acquired fame and distinctiveness.
Respondent,
Landcruiser Connection, registered the <landcruiserconnection.com> domain
name on March 10, 1997. Complainant’s investigation of Respondent reveals that
Respondent is a Virginia corporation that amended
its name to Cruiser
Connection in 2000. As of September 1999, Respondent was using the domain name
in connection with the “servicing
of Complainant’s LAND CRUISER vehicles, and
for sales of aftermarket products adaptable to Complainant’s LAND CRUISER
vehicles.”
Complainant’s
correspondence with Respondent indicates that Respondent was prepared to sell
the domain name registration to “interested
entities.” As noted, Respondent
eventually changed its company name to Cruiser Connection, Inc., and also
changed its website to
<4x4connection.com>. However, Respondent indicated
in a discussion with Complainant’s counsel that it intended to “minimally
maintain” the subject domain name “as a vehicle to direct our customer base to
our enhanced capabilities.”
Paragraph 15(a)
of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of
the statements and documents submitted
in accordance with the Policy, these
Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
In view of
Respondent's failure to submit a Response, the Panel shall decide this
administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's
undisputed
representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and
draw such inferences it considers appropriate
pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of
the Rules.
Paragraph 4(a)
of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three
elements to obtain an order that a domain
name should be cancelled or
transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent
is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which
Complainant has
rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and
is being used in bad faith.
Complainant has
established rights in the LAND CRUISER mark through registration and subsequent
continuous use of the mark. See The Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. v. Brian Wick,
FA 117861 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 16 2002) (“Under U.S. trademark law,
registered marks hold a presumption that they are inherently
distinctive and
have acquired secondary meaning”).
Respondent’s <landcruiserconnection.com>
domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s LAND CRUISER mark.
Respondent’s second-level domain incorporates Complainant’s
mark in its
entirety, and deviates only with the addition of a generic word. Further,
because Complainant’s LAND CRUISER mark is
well-known among the consuming
public, it is provided an expanded scope of protection under the Policy. See Treeforms, Inc. v. Cayne Indus. Sales Corp.,
FA 95856 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 18, 2000) (finding that confusion would result
when Internet users, intending to access Complainant’s
website, think that an
affiliation of some sort exists between Complainant and Respondent, when in
fact, no such relationship would
exist); see also Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Inja, Kil, D2000-1409 (WIPO Dec. 9, 2000)
(finding that “[n]either the addition of an ordinary descriptive word . . . nor
the suffix ‘.com’
detract from the overall impression of the dominant part of
the name in each case, namely the trademark SONY” and thus Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)
is
satisfied).
Additionally,
top-level domains, such as “.com,” are considered irrelevant when conducting a
“confusingly similar” analysis under
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Therefore, Respondent’s
domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. See Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady,
D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (finding that the top-level of the domain name
such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain
name for the purpose of
determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar).
Accordingly, the
Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.
Complainant’s
submission to the Panel asserts that Respondent does not have any rights or
legitimate interests in the <landcruiserconnection.com> domain
name. Because Respondent has failed to submit a Response, Complainant’s
assertions are unopposed and the Panel is permitted
to accept all reasonable
inferences contained in the Complaint as true, unless clearly contradicted by
the evidence. See Vertical
Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum
July 31, 2000) (failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in
the allegations of Complainant
to be deemed true).
Additionally,
because Complainant has provided proof of valid, subsisting rights in a mark
that is confusingly similar to the domain
name in question and alleged that
Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, the burden
shifts to Respondent.
By failing to respond, Respondent has consequently failed
to assert any circumstances that could substantiate its rights or interests
in
the subject domain name. See Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web,
D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (finding that once Complainant asserts that
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in
respect of the domain name,
the burden shifts to Respondent to provide credible evidence that substantiates
its claim of rights and
legitimate interests in the domain name); see also Parfums Christian Dior v. QTR Corp.,
D2000-0023 (WIPO Mar. 9, 2000) (finding that by not submitting a Response,
Respondent has failed to invoke any circumstance which
could demonstrate any
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name).
Unrefuted
evidence indicates that Respondent intimated its desire or willingness to sell
its rights in the subject domain name to
an “interested entity.” Respondent’s
apparent willingness to dispose of its rights in the domain name suggests it
lacks rights in
<landcruiserconnection.com> under Policy ¶¶
4(c)(i) and (iii). See Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Stork, D2000-0628 (WIPO Aug. 11, 2000) (finding
Respondent’s conduct purporting to sell the domain name registration suggests
it has no
legitimate use); see also Skipton
Bldg. Soc’y v. Colman, D2000-1217 (WIPO Dec. 1, 2000) (finding no rights in
a domain name where Respondent offered the infringing domain name for sale and
the evidence suggests that anyone approaching this domain name through the
worldwide web would be "misleadingly" diverted
to other sites).
Additionally,
Respondent continues to make use of the <landcruiserconnection.com> domain
name despite changing its corporate identity to Cruiser Connection and moving
its operations to <4x4connection.com>.
Respondent has made clear that it
intends to continually divert Internet traffic from the infringing domain name
to its website,
thereby profiting from unauthorized use of Complainant’s mark
in the domain name. Such use fails to establish rights or legitimate
interests
in the domain name under the Policy. See Big Dog Holdings, Inc. v. Day, FA 93554 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 9,
2000) (finding no legitimate use when Respondent was diverting consumers to its
own website by
using Complainant’s trademarks); see also MSNBC Cable, LLC v. Tysys.com,
D2000-1204 (WIPO Dec. 8, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in
the famous MSNBC mark where Respondent attempted to
profit using Complainant’s
mark by redirecting Internet traffic to its own website).
Respondent is
not authorized or licensed by Complainant to make use of the LAND CRUISER mark,
or any confusingly similar variation,
in a domain name. Information before the
Panel indicates that Respondent is not commonly known by the <landcruiserconnection.com>
domain name, but is incorporated under the “Cruiser Connection” moniker.
Moreover, Complainant’s LAND CRUISER mark is well-known and
is associated with
Complainant’s goods and services. Therefore, Respondent fails to establish
rights in the domain name under Policy
¶ 4(c)(ii). See Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp.,
D2000-0020 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interest where
Respondent was not commonly known by the mark and
never applied for a license
or permission from Complainant to use the trademarked name); see also Victoria’s Secret v. Asdak, FA 96542
(Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 28, 2001) (finding sufficient proof that Respondent was
not commonly known by a domain name confusingly
similar to Complainant’s
VICTORIA’S SECRET mark because of Complainant’s well-established use of the
mark).
Accordingly, the
Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.
At the time
Respondent registered the <landcruiserconnection.com> domain name,
Complainant’s LAND CRUISER mark was famous as a result of Complainant’s
extensive use and promotion of the mark. Consequently,
Respondent likely knew,
or should have known, of Complainant’s rights in the LAND CRUISER mark.
Therefore, Respondent’s registration
of the domain name, despite having at
least constructive knowledge of its infringing characteristics, constitutes bad
faith registration
under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Digi Int’l v. DDI Sys.,
FA 124506 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 24, 2002) (holding that “there is a legal
presumption of bad faith, when Respondent reasonably should
have been aware of
Complainant’s trademarks, actually or constructively”); see also
Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, [2002] USCA9 115; 279 F.3d 1135, 1148 (9th Cir. Feb.
11, 2002) (finding that "[w]here an alleged infringer chooses a mark he
knows to be similar to another, one can
infer an intent to confuse"); see
also Samsonite Corp. v. Colony
Holding, FA 94313 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 17, 2000) (finding that evidence of
bad faith includes actual or constructive knowledge of a commonly
known mark at
the time of registration).
Respondent’s bad
faith use of the domain name is enunciated under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i).
Specifically, Respondent indicated its willingness
to sell its rights in the
disputed domain name in a discussion with Complainant’s counsel by stating, “In
the meantime an offering
is being prepared to sell the domain name to
interested entities.” Respondent is holding <landcruiserconnection.com>
hostage while attempting to solicit bids for the domain name registration,
which constitutes bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i).
See Am. Online, Inc. v. Avrasya Yayincilik
Danismanlik Ltd., FA 93679 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 16, 2000) (finding bad
faith where Respondent offered domain names for sale); see also Am.
Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. “Infa dot Net” Web Serv., FA 95685 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 6, 2000) (finding
that “general offers to sell the domain name, even if no certain price is
demanded,
are evidence of bad faith”).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.
Having
established all three elements required under ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes
that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it
is Ordered that the <landcruiserconnection.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED
from Respondent to Complainant.
Tyrus R. Atkinson, Jr., Panelist
Dated:
May 2, 2003
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