Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
Web House USA, Inc. v. eDollarShop
Hostmaster a/k/a eDollarShop.com
Claim
Number: FA0304000155180
Complainant is
Web House USA, Inc., Pleasant Grove, UT (“Complainant”) represented
by Jon D. Corey. Respondent is eDollarShop.com Hostmaster, Provo,
UT (“Respondent”).
REGISTRAR
AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <edollarshop.com>, registered with Go
Daddy Software, Inc.
The
undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially
and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known
conflict in serving as
Panelist in this proceeding.
Sandra
Franklin as Panelist.
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the "Forum")
electronically on April 22, 2003; the
Forum received a hard copy of the
Complaint on April 23, 2003.
On
April 22, 2003, Go Daddy Software, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that
the domain name <edollarshop.com> is registered with Go Daddy
Software, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Go
Daddy Software, Inc. has
verified that Respondent is bound by the Go Daddy
Software, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve
domain-name
disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").
On
April 30, 2003, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"),
setting a deadline of
May 20, 2003 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via
e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts,
and to postmaster@edollarshop.com by e-mail.
Having
received no Response from Respondent, using the same contact details and
methods as were used for the Commencement Notification,
the Forum transmitted
to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On
June 2, 2003, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by
a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Sandra
Franklin as Panelist.
Having
reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the
"Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its
responsibility under
Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(the "Rules") "to
employ reasonably available means calculated
to achieve actual notice to Respondent."
Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents
submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules,
the Forum's
Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems
applicable, without the benefit of any Response
from Respondent.
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant makes the following assertions:
1. Respondent’s <edollarshop.com>
domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP common law
mark.
2. Respondent does not have any rights or
legitimate interests in the <edollarshop.com> domain name.
3. Respondent registered and used the <edollarshop.com>
domain name in bad faith.
B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in
this proceeding.
In 2002,
Complainant, Web House USA Inc., “conceived of the idea of selling [I]nternet
store fronts to customers and providing hosting
services, inventory services
and shipping services for those customers.” Integral to the development of
Complainant’s Internet storefront
idea was its registration of the
<mydollarshop.com> domain name, which occurred on July 8, 2002.
Complainant has made continuous
use of the MYDOLLARSHOP mark in commerce from
the date of registration to the present.
On
September 3, 2002, Complainant’s <mydollarshop.com> domain name and
corresponding website “went live.” Between the July 8,
2002 registration date
and the September premier of its services, Complainant directed the development
of the MYDOLLARSHOP website
and creation of the related web interface. Once the
<mydollarshop.com> website was operational, Complainant immediately began
marketing and selling online stores using the MYDOLLARSHOP mark through a
variety of channels. Complainant acquired its first customer
on September 14,
2002. On October 8, 2002, Complainant had its one hundredth customer.
Currently, Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP entity
has over 17,000 customers.
Respondent,
eDollarShop.com, registered the contested <edollarshop.com> domain
name on October 11, 2002. Complainant’s investigation of Respondent reveals
that Respondent copied the content from Complainant’s
<mydollarshop.com>
website and posted it on <edollarshop.com>.
Paragraph 15(a)
of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of
the statements and documents submitted
in accordance with the Policy, these
Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
In view of
Respondent's failure to submit a Response, the Panel shall decide this
administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's
undisputed
representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and
draw such inferences it considers appropriate
pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of
the Rules.
Paragraph 4(a)
of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three
elements to obtain an order that a domain
name should be cancelled or
transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent
is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which
Complainant has
rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and
is being used in bad faith.
Complainant has
established common law rights in the MYDOLLARSHOP mark pursuant to Policy ¶
4(a)(i).
Under the
Policy, a complainant must fulfill its initial burden to prove, by a
preponderance of the credible, relevant and admissible
evidence, that the
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which it has
rights. Although discussed infra, the language used in the Policy is
misleading because, while it uses the present tense, it has been interpreted as
meaning “identical
or confusingly similar to a mark” in which Complainant had
rights when Respondent registered the infringing domain name. See TotalFinaElf
E&P USA, Inc. v. Farnes, FA 117028 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 16 2002)
(finding that in order to bring a claim under the Policy, Complainant must
first establish
a prima facie case. Complainant’s initial burden is to
provide proof of “valid, subsisting rights in a mark that is similar or
identical to the
domain name in question”).
Complainant is
correct in its assertion that “The UDRP does not require that Complainant have
a registered trademark or service mark”
and that the dispute resolution policy
is broad in scope. Complainant’s submission is thorough in attempting to
establish common
law rights in the MYDOLLARSHOP mark. However, the established
timeline of events makes it difficult to conclude that Complainant
had common
law rights in the MYDOLLARSHOP mark at the relevant time. Specifically,
Complainant registered its <mydollarshop.com>
domain name on July 8, 2002
and started promoting products and related services under the MYDOLLARSHOP mark
in September 2002. About
a month later, Respondent registered the disputed <edollarshop.com>
domain name.
Numerous
decisions have determined that the relevant point in time when Complainant must
evidence rights in the MYDOLLARSHOP mark
is prior to Respondent’s registration
of the domain name. The panel in Transpark LLC v. Network Administrator,
FA 135602 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 21, 2003), articulated this position in
stating:
Without
establishing rights in a mark that predates a disputed domain name registration
the outcome would allow junior trademark users
to contest a prior domain name
registration. Such an outcome is contrary to the Policy, which was intended to
protect against infringement
of existing trademark rights by identical or
confusingly similar domain name registrations. Therefore, the Panel concludes
that Policy
¶ 4(a)(i) assumes that Complainant’s rights must predate
Respondent’s domain name registration, which numerous, previous decisions
have
held. See Phoenix Mortgage Corp. v. Toggas, D2001-0101 (WIPO Mar. 30,
2001) (finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) “necessarily implies that the
Complainant’s rights predate the Respondent’s
registration . . . of the domain
name”); see also Ezcommerce Global Solutions, Inc. v. Alphabase Interactive,
D2002-0943 (WIPO Nov. 21, 2002) (allowing a junior trademark user to challenge
a domain name registration, which predates Complainant’s
trademark rights, is
“obviously contrary to the intent of the Policy and to trademark law
generally”).
Transpark LLC v. Network Adm’r, supra; see also Djr Holdings,
LLC v. Gordon a/k/a IQ Mgmt. Corp., FA 141813 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 4,
2003) (“This Panel is satisfied that for purposes of the UDRP, Complainant has
established common
law rights in the DEF JAM SOUTH prior to Respondent’s
registration” (emphasis added)).
Therefore, given the above, in order to succeed Complainant
must show common law rights in the mark prior to Respondent’s registration
of
the domain name.
Complainant’s burden to demonstrate common law rights in the
mark is measured from the time Complainant made actual use of the MYDOLLARSHOP
designation. See McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 16:1, “Priority at Common Law” (4th
ed. 2002). Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP mark is descriptive, and describes
Complainant’s product and related services. Marks categorized
as “descriptive”
cannot be protected unless secondary meaning is proven, whereas fanciful and
suggestive marks are regarded as being
“inherently distinctive” and are
protectable immediately upon use. McCarthy, supra at § 11:25 and
§11:4; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., [1992] USSC 108; 505 U.S. 763
(1992). Therefore, because Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP mark is descriptive,
Complainant must show that the consuming public related
Complainant and its
mark with the goods produced under that mark, and that there was some secondary
meaning associated with the mark
at the time Respondent registered the domain
name. See Front Range Internet, Inc. v. Murphy a/k/a This Domain For Sale,
FA 145231 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 4, 2003).
The Panel notes that Complainant’s burden is difficult
because it began using its domain name about one month before Respondent
registered
the <edollarshop.com> domain name. Establishing that
secondary meaning existed in a descriptive mark in such a short amount of time
is an arduous task.
However, without the benefit of a Response, the Panel is
permitted to accept all reasonable assertions contained in the Complaint
as
true, unless clearly contradicted by the evidence. Complainant asserts that it
had rights in the MYDOLLARSHOP mark at the time
of Respondent’s registration of
the domain name, and Complainant supports its assertions with substantial
evidence and exhibits.
Therefore, the Panel concludes that Complainant’s
assertions are reasonable, and are not clearly contradicted by the evidence or
any competing submission by Respondent. See Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson,
D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is
appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint”);
see also
Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat.
Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that Respondent’s failure to respond allows
all reasonable inferences of fact in
the allegations of Complainant to be
deemed true).
Moreover, Complainant has submitted evidence that indicates
Respondent copied the content of Complainant’s <mydollarshop.com>
website
onto Respondent’s website at the <edollarshop.com> domain name.
This evidence supports the Panel’s inference that, along with the consuming
public’s association of Complainant and its
mark with the goods produced under
the mark, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in its mark
as well.
Respondent’s <edollarshop.com> domain name is
confusingly similar to Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP mark. Substituting an “e” for
the “my” in Complainant’s mark fails
to create a distinguishable domain name
under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), especially in situations such as this, where Respondent
offers identical
goods and services as Complainant. See 19, 2000)
(finding that the domain names <ecanadiantire.com> and
<e-canadiantire.com> are confusingly similar to Canadian
Tire’s
trademarks); see also Busy Body,
Inc. v. Fitness Outlet, Inc., D2000-0127 WIPO Apr. 22, 2000) (finding that
the domain name <efitnesswholesale.com> is confusingly similar to
Complainant’s
mark, FITNESS WHOLESALE) (noting that “Respondent has registered
and attempted to use the disputed domain name in the same line of
services as
that which Complainant provides, and that this makes it likely that consumers
would be confused as between these two
sources”).
Accordingly, the Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been
satisfied.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
Complainant’s
submission to the Panel asserts that Respondent does not have any rights or
legitimate interests in the <edollarshop.com> domain name. Because
Complainant has provided proof of valid, subsisting rights in a mark that is
confusingly similar to the domain
name in question and alleged that Respondent
lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, the burden shifts to
Respondent.
By failing to respond, Respondent has consequently failed to assert
any circumstances that could substantiate its rights or interests
in the
subject domain name. See Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624
(WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (finding that once Complainant asserts that Respondent has
no rights or legitimate interests in
respect of the domain name, the burden
shifts to Respondent to provide credible evidence that substantiates its claim
of rights and
legitimate interests in the domain name); see also Parfums Christian Dior v. QTR Corp.,
D2000-0023 (WIPO Mar. 9, 2000) (finding that by not submitting a Response,
Respondent has failed to invoke any circumstance which
could demonstrate any
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name).
Uncontested evidence reveals that Respondent uses the <edollarshop.com>
domain name to usurp Complainant’s business, while diverting Internet users
from Complainant’s <mydollarshop.com> domain name
and corresponding
website to its own. Respondent “pirated” content from Complainant’s
MYDOLLARSHOP website for the sole purpose of
posting the infringing material on
its <edollarshop.com> website. Such opportunistic use fails to
establish rights in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See
Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. R & S
Tech., Inc., FA 96577 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 27, 2001) (finding that
Respondent’s commercial use of the domain name to confuse and divert Internet
traffic is not a legitimate use of the domain name); see also N. Coast Med., Inc. v. Allegro Med., FA
95541 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 2, 2000) (finding no bona fide use where Respondent
used the domain name to divert Internet users
to its competing website).
No evidence before the Panel supports a finding that
Respondent is commonly known by the <edollarshop.com> domain name
pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). The content on Respondent’s website remains
almost identical to Complainant’s “first in
use” website. In fact, Respondent’s
website continually references Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP mark. For example,
text on Respondent’s
website states, “If after 90 days of following the steps
outlined in the MyDollarShop.com Guide to Marketing . . . we will
deposit a $40 Commission into your account.” Such flagrant infringement fails
to support a finding
of rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. See
Gallup Inc. v. Amish Country Store,
FA 96209 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that Respondent does not have
rights in a domain name when Respondent is not known
by the mark); see also Charles Jourdan Holding AG v. AAIM, D2000-0403 (WIPO June 27, 2000) (finding no
rights or legitimate interests where (1) Respondent is not a licensee of
Complainant;
(2) Complainant’s prior rights in the domain name precede
Respondent’s registration; (3) Respondent is not commonly known by the
domain
name in question).
Accordingly, the Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been
satisfied.
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith
pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Specifically, Respondent intentionally
chose a
domain name that was confusingly similar to Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP mark for
the purpose of diverting unsuspecting Internet
users. As demonstrated by
Complainant’s evidence indicating the existence of actual confusion, Respondent
has used the <edollarshop.com> domain name to intentionally
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating a
likelihood of confusion with
Complainant’s MYDOLLARSHOP mark. Thus,
Respondent’s diversionary use of the domain name constitutes bad faith under
the Policy. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Celebrex Drugstore, FA 123933
(Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 21, 2002) (finding that Respondent registered and used
the domain name in bad faith pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because Respondent
was using the confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet users to its
commercial website);
see also Drs.
Foster & Smith, Inc. v. Lalli, FA 95284 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 21, 2000)
(finding bad faith where Respondent directed Internet users seeking
Complainant’s site
to its own website for commercial gain).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.
Having
established all three elements required under ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes
that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it
is Ordered that the <edollarshop.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED
from Respondent to Complainant.
Sandra Franklin, Panelist
Dated: June 10, 2003
WorldLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/GENDND/2003/596.html