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Thomas B. Hudson v. Ted Machi &Associates [2003] GENDND 88 (21 January 2003)


National Arbitration Forum

DECISION

Thomas B. Hudson v. Ted Machi & Associates

Claim Number: FA0211000133759

PARTIES

Complainant is Thomas B. Hudson, Linthicum, MD (“Complainant”).  Respondent is Ted Machi & Associates, Arlington, TX (“Respondent”).

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME 

The domain name at issue is <houselaw.com>, registered with Network Solutions, Inc.

PANEL

The undersigned certify that they have acted independently and impartially and to the best of their knowledge have no known conflict in serving as Panelists in this proceeding.

Charles K. McCotter, Jr., James A. Carmody and Tyrus R. Atkinson, Jr., as Panelists.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the “Forum”) electronically on November 19, 2002; the Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on November 25, 2002.

On November 21, 2002, Network Solutions, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <houselaw.com> is registered with Network Solutions, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Network Solutions, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Network Solutions, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

On November 26, 2002, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of December 20, 2002 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@houselaw.com by e-mail.

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on December 16, 2002.

On January 7, 2003, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles K. McCotter, Jr., James Carmody and Tyrus R. Atkinson, Jr., as Panelists.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant is the owner of Consumer Credit Compliance Company, LLC, which is in the business of providing legal services including researching, compiling, analyzing and forwarding to clients recent legal developments in the area of mortgage and home equity lending.  Complainant is located in the State of Maryland.

“HouseLaw” is registered to Complainant for use in providing the legal services noted above.  “HouseLaw” represents a widely recognized array of information and services provided by Complainant.  Complainant has many national, regional, and local subscribers to its HouseLaw monthly lending reporting services.

Complainant has an Internet address for the monthly reporting services at <houselaw.net>.

Complainant has held “HouseLaw” as a service mark since its registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office on April 4, 1995.  The service mark was registered to Complainant and is recorded under registration number 1,887,635.

Respondent registered <houselaw.com> on February 8, 1996, well after Complainant’s first use and registration of “HouseLaw”.

Despite acquiring the domain name in 1996, Respondent neither used nor exhibited preparations to use <houselaw.com> in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to Complainant’s notice to Respondent of Complainant’s registration of the service mark. 

Complainant contacted Respondent in the fall of 2000 and advised Respondent of Complainant’s rights in “HouseLaw” as a registered service mark and requested transfer of the domain name.  Complainant also sent Respondent correspondence via overnight delivery on March 12, 2002, again informing Respondent of Complainant’s rights in “HouseLaw” and inquiring whether Respondent was willing to surrender its use of the domain name.  Complainant followed the March 12, 2002 correspondence with another letter sent to Respondent via overnight delivery on May 7, 2002.  Respondent failed to respond to any of the three messages.

 

<houselaw.com> was not an operational website until approximately April, 2002, well after Complainant notified Respondent of Complainant’s challenge to Respondent’s use of <houselaw.com>.

Respondent is not commonly known as <houselaw.com> or “HouseLaw”.  Respondent is commonly known as “Ted Machi & Associates”.  Respondent has never applied for a license or permission from Complainant to use its trademarked name.

Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name. 

Respondent is intentionally capitalizing on the notoriety and good name of Complainant’s “HouseLaw” products and services within the mortgage lending industry in an attempt to attract Internet users to Respondent’s website.  Complainant spent considerable monetary and non-monetary resources in developing “HouseLaw” into a nationally recognized and widely used product.

The service mark and trademark are identical.

<houselaw.com> advertises real estate legal service, including services related to purchasing a home.  “HouseLaw” products provide legal advice regarding residential real estate lending.  Respondent is offering services in the same field as the services provided by Complainant.

Respondent registered the domain name after Complainant’s first use and federal registrations of its service mark.  Since both parties are located within the United States, Respondent is deemed to have had constructive notice of Complainant’s mark at the time of its registration.  Because of the extensive national promotion of the “HouseLaw” products and their wide notoriety and recognition within the residential real estate lending field, the evidence is present to show that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark.

Respondent registered the domain name in an intentional attempt to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his website, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark.

B. Respondent

Respondent is an attorney in Arlington, Texas, doing business as Ted Machi & Associates.

The Texas Code of Professional Responsibility which governs advertising for attorneys licensed in the State of Texas, does not permit a law firm to have a fictitious or assumed name such as the “HouseLaw firm” but does allow for attorneys to use web addresses or domain names which are descriptive of the type of legal services provided by the attorney or law firm.

“House” and “Law” are generic terms that when used in combination connote many different sub-areas of law and housing including but not limited to usury, housing and building code violations, zoning and ordinance of homes, restrictive covenants, boundary disputes, deceptive trade practices, insurance claims and so forth.  Respondent contends that the similarity in Complainant’s registered service mark and Respondent’s domain name is not confusing to the party’s respective target audiences.

After Complainant learned that Respondent has acquired the domain name <houselaw.com>, Complainant purchased the domain name registrations <houselaw.net>, <houselaw.info> and <houselaw.us>.  Complainant only utilizes <houselaw.net> and purchased the other domain name registrations in bad faith to prevent other persons and entities from utilizing those domain names, which may accurately describe their business or services.  Complainant continues to use <creditcompliance.com> as its website’s main page address.

In preparation for the use of the website located at <houselaw.com> Respondent began writing the text in 1997 but misplaced it.  In 1998 Respondent obtained permission from a client to use photographs of the damage to his house and property for use on Respondent’s website.  Sometime in August 2001, Respondent contacted a web designer to begin the design of several websites for Respondent’s Internet marketing efforts.  In particular, he was hired to create the websites <debtdrs.com>, <seriousinjurylaw.com> and <houselaw.com>.  Respondent’s websites were put online with <houselaw.com> being the last.  Respondent was unaware that Complainant had registered a service mark “HOUSELAW” when it requested the domain name <houselaw.com>.  Respondent is a private law firm that represents individuals in personal injury and property claims against insurance companies, sellers of real estate, and in individuals filing for bankruptcy protection.

Respondent does not desire to cause confusion or be associated in any way with Complainant’s business, a publisher of real estate law summaries and synopses of court decisions that may affect large lending institution customers.  There is no way that Complainant’s customers could be confused by or exploited by Respondent’s similar domain name.

Complainant’s argument that Respondent is using <houselaw.com> as an intentional attempt to attract Complainant’s customers is blatantly false and unfounded.

While Respondent was slow to develop its website after first registering it in 1996, at all times since registration, Respondent has intended to use the website. 

Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name, did not register or use it in bad faith, and Complainant has failed to prove that Respondent has no substantial rights and interests in the domain name, that its use has been in bad faith or any other reason why the domain name should be transferred to Complainant.

C. Additional Submissions

None

FINDINGS

1. Complainant is an individual who is the owner of a business that provides, for financial gain, legal services and materials to customers desiring such information as it relates to mortgage and home equity lending.

2. Respondent is an individual who operates a law firm that represents clients desiring legal representation in the areas of personal injury, bankruptcy, property damage, and other such areas of law.

3. Complainant began using the term “HouseLaw” in 1994 and registered the term with the United States Patent and Trademark Office on April 15, 1994, receiving the service mark HOUSELAW with registration date of April 4, 1995.

4. HOUSELAW provides substantial information to its customers in the nature of court decisions, legislation, and other information relating to mortgage lending. 

5. HOUSELAW has a large base of customers including banks, lending institutions, and law firms.

6. HOUSELAW currently makes its materials available on the Internet by use of a website at <houselaw.net>.

7. The domain name <houselaw.com> is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s service mark HOUSELAW.

8. Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name <houselaw.com>.

9. Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith.

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

(1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

Complainant has rights to the service mark HOUSELAW by virtue of registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  This circumstance is sufficient under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy, D2000-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001).

The remaining issue is whether the domain name and service mark are identical or confusingly similar.

The domain name <houselaw.com> is comprised of the entire service mark with the addition of the top-level domain “.com”.  The top-level domain “.com” is of no consequence when conducting a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis. See Pomellato S.p.A. v. Tonetti, D2000-0493 (WIPO July 7, 2000); see also Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (which found that the top level of the domain name “.com” does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar).  What is left is the second-level domain <houselaw> to be compared with the service mark HOUSELAW.  They are identical.

Respondent argues that the domain name is comprised of two generic terms.  As such, Respondent contends that the <houselaw.com> domain name is generic such as to defeat Complainant’s exclusive control of every use of the HOUSELAW service mark. Respondent cites as authority for this proposition the case of Gen. Machine Prods. Co., Inc. v. Prime Domains, FA 92531 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar.16, 2000).  However, the General Machine case is not authority to support a finding against Complainant under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). 

Complainant prevails under Policy¶4(a)(i).

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Respondent is not affiliated with Complainant nor authorized by Complainant to use Complainant’s service mark.  Complainant contends that Respondent has never been known by the name HOUSELAW in accordance with Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  Neither party mentions a noncommercial or fair use of the domain name.

Complainant contends that he has exclusive rights to use the registered mark. See Am. Online v. Tencent Communications Corp., FA93668 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 21, 2000).

As result of Complainant’s showing, and Respondent’s apparent lack of rights and legitimate interests in the domain name, the burden must shift to Respondent to demonstrate his rights and legitimate interests in the domain name. See Clerical Med. Inv. Group Ltd. v. Clericalmedical.com, D2000-1228 (WIPO Nov. 28, 2000).

Respondent may demonstrate his rights and legitimate interests in the domain name by any of the methods set out in Policy paragraph 4(c).

For Respondent to prove his contentions as to rights and legitimate interests, Respondent must produce “concrete evidence” not “mere personal assertions.” See Do The Hustle LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (wherein it was stated as follows: “Where a complainant has asserted that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name, it is incumbent upon the respondent to come forward with concrete evidence rebutting this assertion.  This information is uniquely within the knowledge and control of the respondent.  Failure of a respondent to come forward with such evidence is tantamount to admitting to the truth of complainant’s assertions in this regard”).

Respondent’s argument as to the generic nature of the domain name that he raised under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) should, in all fairness, be considered here.  In the case cited by Respondent, it was held by the panel that the word at issue, “craftwork”, even though Complainant owned a trademark for the word “craftwork”, was demonstrated by Respondent to be in “widespread use in a descriptive sense”, that Complainant failed to show that consumers are likely to associate <craftwork.com> only with Complainant, and that consequently Respondent could not be proved to be without legitimate rights and interests in the domain name <craftwork.com>.  In the cited case respondent produced as evidence, lists of hundreds of businesses that use “craftwork” as, or as part of their corporate name.  See Gen. Machine Prods. Co., Inc. v. Prime Domains a/k/a Telepathy, Inc., FA 92531 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 16, 2000).  Respondent presents no evidence in this case to warrant finding that HOUSELAW is in widespread use in a descriptive sense. Complainant attached as an exhibit several Google searches for HOUSELAW.  The search results illustrate that, other than Complainant, few other parties use the word HOUSELAW as part of any title or business name. The Google search results are concrete evidence in support of Complainant’s position. Respondent is required to produce evidence to support its allegations in order to prevail. See Do The Hustle LLC v. Tropic Web, supra.  The Panel has examined the exhibits in this case.  Nothing appears that suggests that Complainant cannot rely on HOUSELAW as an enforceable service mark. 

Respondent’s next contention is that before any notice to him of the dispute, his use, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services was made.  If Respondent can prove this issue, he will prevail. See Policy ¶ 4(c)(i).

Respondent states in his Affidavit that he “acquired the domain name ‘HouseLaw.com’ in 1996 with the intention of creating a website dedicated to those who had purchased homes under false pretenses that had damage claims against homebuilders and realtors who failed to disclose defects.”  He “began writing the text for the proposed website in 1997 but misplaced what I had written.”  He hired a web designer to design several websites, in August 2001, but did not go on line with the website in question until “sometime in 2002.”  The Affidavit of Chris Woods states that Respondent contacted him in 2001 to design several websites, including <houselaw.com>.  He does not state what work, if any, he did for Respondent on this website from 2001 until the date of notice of this dispute except to state that he has not fully completed <houselaw.com> as of the date of this proceeding.  Respondent admits that he did not “go on line” with the domain name until April 2002. “However, the preparation of the web page began long before then and modifications continue today.”

Neither Respondent nor Woods produce any actual documents or other written matter calculated to illustrate any work done in preparation prior to the date of notice of the dispute in March 2002.  There is nothing for the Panel to examine except the sworn allegations of Respondent that he began some text which he no longer has, and contacted Woods.  What appears then is that Respondent commenced operation of the website at <houselaw.com> after notice of the dispute represented by Complainant’s letter of March 12, 2002.  The Panel does not accept the bare allegation of Complainant that notice of the dispute was made in 2000, since there is no evidence of such a communication included in the pleadings and Respondent denies receipt of the notice. 

Respondent is required to present concrete evidence of his preparations to satisfy the rule in Do The Hustle LLC v. Tropic Web.  Respondent’s only evidence is his statement that he prepared some text in 1997, which was never thereafter used, and that he contacted Woods.  This is the entire preparation done in a span of six years.  The Panel decides that under the facts and circumstances presented by Respondent, there is insufficient “demonstrable preparations to use the domain name” prior to March 12, 2002, to warrant finding for Respondent under the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i). “Demonstrable” as used in Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) is taken by the Panel to mean proved by evidence in the manner required in Do The Hustle LLC v. Tropic Web.  Respondent fails to prove demonstrable preparation.

Complainant prevails under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Complainant bears the burden of proof on the issue of bad faith.  He may proceed to illustrate bad faith by any of the methods set out in Policy paragraph 4(b) or by any other method not set out in the Policy that would prove bad faith registration and use on part of Respondent.

Complainant’s first position is that Respondent registered the domain name after Complainant’s first use and federal registration of its service mark.  Since both parties are located within the United States, Respondent is deemed to have had constructive notice of Complainant’s mark at the time of registration.  Additionally, Complainant engages in extensive national promotion of its HOUSELAW products, and those products have gained industry-wide notoriety and recognition within the residential real estate lending field.  Complainant’s HOUSELAW products’ popularity in the residential real estate lending industry, along with its registration of HOUSELAW as a service mark, is evidence that Respondent knew of Complainant’s mark and acted in bad faith in registering the domain name, it is contended.  Respondent denies actual knowledge of the service mark at the time of registration.

Respondent must be held to be on constructive notice of Complainant’s service mark since both are United States citizens. See Briefing.com Inc. v. Cost Net Domain Manager, D2001-0970 (WIPO Sept. 12, 2001).  But constructive notice alone cannot be taken as evidence of bad faith. See Sterling Inc. v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. and Domain Traffic, D2002-0772 (WIPO Nov. 13, 2002).  There must, in addition to constructive notice, be some evidence to support an inference that Respondent either knew or should have known of Complainant’s mark either because of its widespread use or the fame of the mark. See Expedia, Inc. v. European Travel Network, D2000-0137 (WIPO Arp. 18, 2000); Document Techs. v. Int’l Elec. Communications, Inc. D2000-0270 (WIPO June 6, 2000).  There is some evidence presented by Complainant in this case that HOUSELAW is in widespread use.  The evidence shown is the content of the web page, the customer list, and the allegation by Complainant that Complainant’s products have gained “notoriety and recognition within the residential real estate lending field.” Cf. Sterling Inc. v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. and Domain Traffic where the panel refused to make the inference that respondent knew or should have known of the trademark because of its widespread use where the evidence of the widespread use was merely the conclusory, unsupported statement by complainant.  Complainant has not proven the widespread or famous nature of his service mark by proper evidence to the extent that an inference of actual notice may be made against Respondent.  The inference cannot be drawn that Respondent knew of the service mark HOUSELAW at the time of registration by this evidence alone. 

Complainant next argues that Respondent re-registered <houselaw.com> in February, 2002, having actual notice of Complainant’s HOUSELAW registered mark and prior to any bona fide offering of goods and services using the mark, in bad faith.  Renewal of a registration in bad faith cannot support a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Substance Abuse Mgmt., Inc. v. Screen Actors Modesl [sic] Int’l, Inc.(SAMI), D2001-0782 (WIPO Aug. 14, 2000) (where it was stated “…[T]he Policy could have been drafted to address both bad faith registration or at the time of renewal.  It does not, referring only to a registration having been obtained in bad faith”); see also Weatherall Green & Smith v. Everymedia.com, D2000-1528 (WIPO Feb. 19, 2001). 

Complainant next contends that Respondent’s domain name is substantially identical to Complainant’s registered mark, and is used to access a website offering competing services.  Such action, Complainant contends, is an attempt by Respondent to disrupt Complainant’s business, and is further evidence of bad faith.  Complainant presents no evidence to support this contention.  There is no evidence submitted of any disruption of Complainant’s business of any kind by Respondent.  This bare allegation cannot be sustained without proof.

Complainant contends that Respondent is using Complainant’s registered service mark as its domain name in an intentional attempt to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s registered mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, and endorsement of Respondent’s website and services offered on its website. See Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  Complainant presents no evidence to support this contention. 

The evidence is undisputed that Respondent registered the domain name in 1994 and made no use of it on the Internet until after notice of the dispute on March 2002.  “Various panels have ordered transfer of a domain name after a extended period of non-use by its registrant, typically referred to as ‘passive holding’.  In each instance, non-use coupled with a complainant having valid trademark rights commencing prior to the date on which the offending domain name was registered coupled with the registrant having actual or imputed knowledge of those rights…”  See Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Robin Sousa, D2001-1308 (WIPO Dec. 21, 2001) and cases cited therein.  While this Panel has previously stated that Complainant’s proof of registration and less than conclusive proof of widespread use of the service mark did not warrant a finding of actual notice of the service mark by Respondent at the time of registration, Complainant’s proof, coupled with Respondent’s passive holding of the domain name presents a different factual situation.

The Panel notes that Respondent is a lawyer.  Complainant’s services and products are law-related and directed to law firms, banks and lending institutions.  The question then is whether the Panel should impute knowledge of Complainant’s service mark to Respondent at the time of registration of the domain name.  Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Panel finds that this is the proper resolution of this issue.

Furthermore, the Panel cannot find any actual or contemplated active use of the domain name by Respondent that would not be illegitimate, such as by being a passing off, an infringement of consumer protection legislation, or an infringement of Complainant’s rights under trademark law. See Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, D2000-0003 (WIPO Feb. 18, 2000).  Respondent is found to have registered and used the domain name <houselaw.com> in bad faith.

Complainant prevails under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

DECISION

The Panel finds that the domain name <houselaw.com> now registered to Respondent, Ted Machi & Associates, be TRANSFERRED to Complainant, Thomas B. Hudson.

Tyrus R. Atkinson, Jr.,  Chairman for the Panel

Charles K. McCotter Jr, James A. Carmody and Tyrus R. Atkinson, Panelists.
Dated:  January 21, 2003


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