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Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
Elm Grove Dodge Chrysler Jeep, Inc. v.
Schedule Star c/o Adolph Santorine
Claim Number: FA0410000352423
PARTIES
Complainant
is Elm Grove Dodge Chrysler Jeep, Inc. (“Complainant”),
represented by David R. Croft, of Seibert & Kasserman, L.C., P.O. Box 311, 1217 Chapline Street, Wheeling, WV 26003. Respondent is Schedule Star c/o Adolph Santorine (“Respondent”), represented by Keith Peluchette, Esq., Rte 40 East, Liberty Bldg., P.O. Box
60, Triadelphia, WV 26059.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The
domain names at issue are <elmgrovedodge.com> and <elmgrovedodge.net>, registered with Gkg.net, Inc. <elmgrovedodge.com> was registered on
July 17, 2002. <elmgrovedodge.net> was registered on April 14, 2003.
PANEL
The
undersigned Daniel B. Banks, Jr., certifies that he and the other panelists
acted independently and impartially and to the best
of his knowledge and
belief, have no known conflict in serving as Panelists in this proceeding.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on October
26, 2004; the National Arbitration Forum
received a hard copy of the Complaint
on October 28, 2004.
On
October 26, 2004, Gkg.net, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration
Forum that the domain names <elmgrovedodge.com> and <elmgrovedodge.net> are registered with Gkg.net, Inc. and
that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Gkg.net, Inc. has verified that Respondent
is bound by the Gkg.net, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to
resolve
domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with
ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On
November 4, 2004, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of
Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”),
setting a deadline
of November 24, 2004 by which Respondent could file a Response to the
Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent
via e-mail, post and fax, to all
entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical,
administrative and billing
contacts, and to postmaster@elmgrovedodge.com and
postmaster@elmgrovedodge.net by e-mail.
A
timely Response was received and determined to be complete on December 6, 2004.
On December 15, 2003, pursuant to Complainant’s request
to have the dispute decided by a three-member
Panel, the National Arbitration Forum
appointed Honorable Nelson A. Diaz, G. Gervaise Davis, III and Daniel B. Banks,
Jr., as Panelists.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A.
Complainant
Complainant
is in the business of selling and servicing new and used automobiles. It claims common law trademark and West
Virginia statutory service mark rights and trade name rights with respect to
Elm Grove Dodge
Chrysler Jeep, Inc. (EGDCJ), Elm Grove Dodge Chrysler Jeep and
Elm Grove Dodge, Inc. Elm Grove Dodge,
Inc. was registered by Complainant with the Secretary of State of West Virginia
(WVSOS) on September 30, 1987. A change
of name amendment was filed on June 24, 1993 to change the name to Elm Grove
Dodge Chrysler Jeep, Inc. The trade
name, Elm Grove Dodge Chrysler Jeep was established with the WVSOS on October
17, 2003. The Service Mark was
registered with the WVSOS on August 11, 2004.
Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names
for the following reasons:
1
– Respondent is not affiliated in any way with Complainant.
2
– Respondent is not in the business of selling or servicing automobiles.
3
– Respondent is not commonly known by the <elmgrovedodge.com> or <elmgrovedodge.net>
domain names.
Respondent
is not using the disputed domain names in connection with a bona fide offering
of goods or services. Respondent’s use
of the disputed domain names will misleadingly divert customers and will
tarnish Complainant’s mark.
The
disputed domain names were registered and are being used by Respondent in bad
faith. Respondent’s intent is to
circumvent legitimate Internet traffic intended for Complainant to websites
that contain defamatory information
about Complainant. Respondent is attempting to embody an
alleged lemon law claim against the manufacturer of the automobile he purchased
with this domain
name dispute for his commercial gain. Such use violates ICANN Policy which
prohibits registration and use to “intentionally attempt to attract, for
commercial gain, internet
users …by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant’s mark as to source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
Respondent’s web site or location or of a product or service on Respondent’s
web site or location.”
B.
Respondent
Respondent
challenges Complainant’s legal status as a corporation entitled to recognition
under West Virginia law and cites a lack
of evidence to support such a
finding. Respondent also challenges
Complainant’s lack of evidence of usage of the marks claimed. Respondent asserts that the only evidence of
such usage is Complainant’s attorney’s “bald-faced” assertion of such usage in
the Complaint. In this regard, a
corporation called Elm Grove Dodge, Inc. was “authorized to do business” in
West Virginia on September 30, 1987.
That corporation ceased such authority on June 24, 1993 when such
authority was transferred to a “new” entity named Elm Grove Dodge
Chrysler
Jeep, Inc. In conclusion, Respondent
asserts that Complainant has proven no protectable mark. Respondent also asserts that Complainant’s
alleged marks are not identical or confusingly similar to the disputed domain
name because
the alleged marks are in “huge letters with strike-through lines”
while the disputed domain names are in lower case with no spaces
between and
the disputed domain names do not contain the words “Chrysler” and “Jeep”.
Respondent
claims rights and legitimate interests in the domain names. In 2002, Respondent purchased a new vehicle
from Complainant. This purchase was
apparently not an enjoyable experience for Respondent and he uses the disputed
domain names for the purpose of complaining
about his experience. Respondent claims a legitimate noncommercial
or fair use of the domain names without intent for commercial gain.
As
to registration and use in bad faith, Respondent claims that commercial gain is
a definite, express prerequisite for bad faith
and Respondent’s use of the
domain names is not for a commercial gain.
Also, Respondent has made no practice of attempting to capitalize on
domain names. Respondent claims that
Complainant’s underlying motive is to harass and bully Respondent in order to
squelch the free speech of those
interested in comparing notes about auto
dealer practices and makes no showing of any deleterious effects due to
Respondent’s use
of the domains. This
proceeding is a bad faith attempt to reverse hijack the domains.
FINDINGS
1 – The disputed domain names are
identical or confusingly similar to marks claimed
by the Complainant.
2 – Respondent has demonstrated rights
and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names.
3 – The disputed domain names were not
registered and are not being used in bad faith.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint
on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of
law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the
following three elements to obtain an order that
a domain name should be
cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain
name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the Complainant
has rights;
(2)
the
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name;
and
(3)
the domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
While
the panel finds that the disputed domain names are identical or confusingly
similar to the marks claimed by the
Complainant, the panel also finds that Respondent’s 2002 and 2003 registration
of the disputed domain names predates both
Complainant’s trade name and service
mark registration. See Phoenix
Mortgage Corp. v. Toggas, D2001-0101 (WIPO Mar. 30, 2001) (finding that
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) “necessarily implies that Complainant’s rights predate
Respondent’s
registration. . .of the domain name”); see also Ezcommerce
Global Solutions, Inc. v. Alphabase Interactive, D2002-0943 (WIPO Nov. 21,
2002) (allowing a junior trademark user to challenge a domain name
registration, which predates Complainant’s
trademark rights, is “obviously
contrary to the intent of the Policy and to trademark law generally”).
Furthermore,
Complainant has failed to provide proof that Complainant’s mark has gained
secondary meaning. Complainant makes a
mere recitation of secondary meaning in the Complaint. See Weatherford Int’ll, Inc. v. Paul
Wells, FA 153626 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 19, 2003) (“[a]lthough Complainant asserts common law
rights in the WELLSERV mark, it failed to submit any evidence indicating
extensive use or that
its claimed mark has achieved secondary source identity .
. . [a]lthough Complainant’s WELLSERV product and related services may
be
well-known among relevant consumers, that is a finding that must be supported
by evidence and not self-serving assertions); see also Lowestfare.com LLA v. US Tours &
Travel, Inc., AF-0284 (eResolution Sept. 9, 2000) (finding that marks classified as descriptive cannot be protected
unless secondary meaning is proven and to establish secondary meaning
Complainant must show that the public identifies the source of the product
rather than the product itself).
The Panel finds
that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain
names because they are used to criticize
Complainant. See Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000) (finding
that Respondent has free speech rights and legitimate First Amendment interests
in the domain
name <bridgestone-firestone.net> where Respondent linked
the domain name to a “complaint” website about Complainant’s products);
see
also TMP Worldwide Inc. v. Potter,
D2000-0536 (WIPO Aug. 5, 2000) (finding
that a criticism forum is an exercise of First Amendment rights and, therefore,
a legitimate noncommercial use of the <tmpworldwide.net>
and
<tmpworldwide.org> domain names); see also Legal & Gen.
Group Plc v. Image Plus, D2002-1019 (WIPO Dec. 30, 2002) (“the goals of the
Policy are limited and do not extend to insulating trademark holders from
contrary
and critical views when such views are legitimately expressed without
an intention for commercial gain”).
There is absolutely
no evidence that Respondent is using the disputed domains for a commercial
use. Therefore, the Panel finds that
Respondent’s use of the disputed
domain names is noncommercial in nature, and therefore, legitimate pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See New York Press v. New York Press, FA
94428 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 18, 2000) (finding that Respondent's use of its
website for review and criticism of the New York press
(media) and the fact
that he applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for the NEW YORK PRESS
mark, for use with his online
publication is evidence that he began to use the
domain name for a legitimate non-commercial use); see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Etheridge,
D2000-0906 (WIPO Sept. 24, 2000) (finding that Respondent has rights in the
<missionsuccess.net> domain name where she was
using the domain name in
connection with a noncommercial purpose).
Furthermore, the Panel finds that
Respondent registered the disputed domain names prior to the date in which
Complainant established
rights in the EGDCJ mark. Therefore, the Respondent has demonstrated rights and legitimate
interests in the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). See Latent Tech. Group, Inc. v. Fritchie, FA 95285 (Nat. Arb. Forum
Sept. 1, 2000) (finding that Respondent does have a legitimate interest in the
domain name where Complainant
applied for registration of the mark after
Respondent registered the domain name and Complainant has not proven any
earlier use of
the mark); see also Warm Things, Inc., Inc. v. Weiss,
D2002-0085 (WIPO Apr. 18, 2002) (finding that Respondent had rights or
legitimate interests in a domain name when its registration
of that domain name
occurred before Complainant had established rights in its alleged mark).
Respondent
asserts that it only registered the disputed domain names to voice concerns and
complaints about Complainant.
Respondent currently uses the domain names for this very function. No one reading the web site would be
confused as to sponsorship. The Panel
finds that Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain names does
not constitute bad faith registration and
use pursuant to Policy ¶
(4)(a)(iii). See Legal & Gen. Group Plc v. Image Plus, D2002-1019 (WIPO Dec. 30, 2002) (finding initial interest
confusion is displaced by the criticism content at Respondent's website
and
that such a "low level of confusion is a price worth paying to preserve
the free exchange of ideas via the Internet");
see also Bridgestone
Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000) (stating that as a general proposition, “the same facts
establishing fair use and the exercise of free speech negate a finding of bad
faith intent” (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F.
Supp. 2d at 535-536)).
The
Panel also finds that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the
domain names in using the domain names for a noncommercial
purpose. Therefore, Respondent did not register or
use the domain names in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Mule Lighting, Inc. v. CPA, FA 95558 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 17,
2000) (finding no bad faith where Respondent has an active website that has
been in use for two
years and where there was no intent to cause confusion with
Complainant’s website and business); see also Nintendo of Am. Inc. v. Jones, D2000-0998 (WIPO Nov. 17, 2000)
(finding no bad faith where Respondent operates the fan club website without
commercial gain, therefore
the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) cannot be
established).
DECISION
Having
established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel
concludes that relief shall be DENIED.
Daniel B. Banks, Jr., Panel Chair
G. Gervaise Davis & Hon. Nelson Diaz,
Panelists
Dated: December 27, 2004
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