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Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
MGW Group, Inc. v. Gourmet Cookie
Bouquets.com
Claim Number: FA0405000273996
PARTIES
Complainant
is MGW Group, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented
by Pamela S. Ratliff, of Baker
Botts L.L.P., 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 600, Dallas, TX 75201. Respondent is Gourmet Cookie Bouquets.com, which is a trading style used by All About Gifts & Baskets, LLC
(“Respondent”), represented by Stephen
H. Sturgeon, of Stephen H. Sturgeon
& Assoc., 11116 Hurdle Hill Drive, Suite 200, Rockville, MD 20854.
REGISTRAR
AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <gourmet-cookie-bouquets.com>,
registered with Bulkregister, Llc.
PANEL
The
undersigned certify that they have acted independently and impartially and to
the best of their knowledge have no known conflict
in serving as Panelist in
this proceeding.
Robert
A. Fashler (Panel Chair), Houston Putnam Lowry, and Mark V.B. Partridge as
Panelists.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the “Forum”)
electronically on May 19, 2004; the Forum received
a hard copy of the Complaint
on May 21, 2004.
On
May 25, 2004, Bulkregister, Llc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the
domain name <gourmet-cookie-bouquets.com>
is registered with Bulkregister, Llc. and that Respondent is the current
registrant of the name. Bulkregister,
Llc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Bulkregister, Llc.
registration agreement and has thereby agreed to
resolve domain name disputes
brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (the
“Policy”).
On
May 26, 2004, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting
a deadline of June 15,
2004 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via e-mail,
post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts,
and to postmaster@gourmet-cookie-bouquets.com by e-mail.
A
timely Response was received and determined to be complete on July 6, 2004.
On
July 12, 2004, a timely Additional Submission from Complainant was received and
determined to be complete.
On
July 19, 2004, a timely Response to Additional Submission was received from
Respondent and determined to be complete.
On July 19, 2004, pursuant to Respondent’s request to
have the dispute decided by a three-member
Panel, the Forum appointed Robert A.
Fashler (Panel Chair), Houston Putnam Lowry, and Mark V.B. Partridge as
Panelists.
On
July 20, 2004, the Panel issued an Order for Extending Time for Rendering a
Decision, extending the time period within which the
Panel was required to
render its decision to August 11, 2004.
On
July 26, 2004, a second Additional Submission (Complainant’s Response to
Respondent’s Additional Submission) was received after
the deadline for
submissions.
On July 29, 2004, a Request for Permission to Submit an
Additional Response to Respond to Complainant’s Second Additional Response
was
received from Respondent after the deadline for submissions.
On
August 5, 2004, the Panel issued an additional Order for Extending Time for
Rendering a Decision, extending the time period within
which the Panel was
required to render its decision to August 16, 2004.
RELIEF
SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’
CONTENTIONS
A.
Complainant’s Primary
Submissions
Complainant
asserts that:
(a)
Complainant:
(i)
began using
the trademark COOKIE BOUQUET (the ‘Trademark”) in connection with its cookie
business in 1983,
(ii)
is the
franchisor for COOKIE BOUQUET and COOKIES BY DESIGN franchise shops, which
produce and sell gourmet cookies, decorated cookies
and specialty cookie gift
arrangements,
(iii)
or its
franchisees operate nearly 250 shops throughout the United States that
advertise and sell cookies in association with the Trademark
and logos that
include the Trademark,
(iv)
sells
cookie products over the Internet through websites accessed via the domain
names <cookiebouquet.com> and <cookiesbydesign.com>,
(v)
holds two
incontestable U.S. trademark registrations for the Trademark (one for cookies
and the other for retail store and mail order
services in the field of
cookies), both registered in August 1996 and claiming first use to June 1983,
(vi)
secured
both of those registrations issued on the basis of acquired distinctiveness
(secondary meaning),
(vii)
since 1983,
has extensively advertised and promoted its products and business and used its
COOKIE BOUQUET marks, such that the Trademark
is well known and has acquired
secondary meaning,
(viii)
achieved
gross sales in 2002 of approximately US$57,000,000,
(ix)
together
with its franchisees, spends approximately US$1,750,000-$2,000,000 per year on
advertising and public relations,
(x)
holds eight
additional US trademark registrations for trademarks that include the
Trademark, seven of which are incontestable,
(b)
in early
2003, Complainant learned that Respondent was operating a competing cookie
business over the Internet in association with
the Domain Name;
(c)
on October
9, 2003, Complainant’s attorney sent a cease and desist letter to Respondent
via certified mail but the letter was returned
unopened and marked “unclaimed
return to sender”;
(d)
on November
3, 2003, Complainant’s attorney sent another cease and desist letter to
Respondent via Federal Express, but received no
response;
(e)
on December
15, 2003, Complainant’s attorneys sent a third cease and desist letter to
Respondent via email;
(f)
Respondent
replied to that email on December 16, 2003, stating that the address used in
the previous cease and desist letters was
an old address and that the email
version of the cease and desist letter was the first received by Respondent;
(g)
on January
5, 2004, Respondent wrote to Complainant’s attorneys stating that Respondent
had removed all references to “Cookie Bouquet(s)”
on Respondent’s website, but
did not agree to remove the words “Cookie Bouquet” from the Domain Name;
(h)
the January
5, 2004, correspondence from Respondent also confirmed that Respondent had
added a disclaimer to Respondent’s website
clearly indicating that Respondent
has no affiliation with Complainant or the Trademark;
(i)
the Domain
Name is confusingly similar to the Trademark;
(j)
Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interest in the Domain Name because:
(i)
Respondent
is not commonly known by the Domain Name,
(ii)
Complainant
has prior rights in the Trademark, and Respondent has made no prior lawful use
of the Trademark, and
(iii)
Respondent
registered the Domain Name long after Complainant adopted, began using, and
registered the Trademark, and after the Trademark
acquired secondary meaning
and became well known,
(k)
Respondent
registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith because:
(i)
Complainant’s
Trademark and business are well known by the consuming public and by members of
the retail cookie business,
(ii)
Respondent
had actual or constructive knowledge of Complainant’s prior rights in the
Trademark and of Complainant’s business,
(iii)
Respondent
knew or ought to have known that its use of the nearly identical Domain Name in
connection with a competing cookie business
would cause consumer confusion,
(iv)
Respondent
registered the Domain Name to benefit from the goodwill associated with
Complainant’s Trademark and business,
(v)
Respondent
selected the confusingly similar Domain Name to draw consumers seeking Complainant’s
products and services to Respondent’s
competing business for commercial gain by
creating a likelihood of confusion with the Trademark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation
or endorsement of Respondent’s website, and
(vi)
Respondent
essentially admitted that its use of the Trademark with competing goods is
confusing to consumers by adding a disclaimer
to its website stating
“gourmet-cookie-bouquets.com is not affiliated with the COOKIES BY
DESIGN®/COOKIE BOUQUET® franchise shoppes
or MGW Group, Inc.” (the “Disclaimer”), but continues to use the
Domain Name nonetheless.
B.
Respondent’s Primary
Submissions
Respondent asserts that:
(a)
Respondent:
(i)
started its
business in January 2002 in Yorktown, Virginia, and subsequently moved to
Leesburg, Virginia in November 2002,
(ii)
resells the
products of seventeen existing gift companies, including four bakeries,
(iii)
divided its
nearly 1,000 unique gift items into various departments, and developed separate
websites that use different generic domain
names for each distinct category of
product sold through each website, and
(iv)
the Domain
Name is part of a network of websites whose names were chosen to describe the
products on each of Respondent’s websites,
including
<holiday-gifts-gift-baskets.com>, <baby-diaper-cakes.com>, and
<gourmet-gifts-gift-baskets.com>;
(b)
Complainant
has not established trademark rights in the Domain Name because:
(i)
COOKIE
BOUQUET is generic and is merely descriptive of the products that Respondent,
Complainant and other retailers sell, such that
the consuming public does not
associate COOKIE BOUQUET with Complainant, and Respondent submitted various
pages printed from the
Internet in support of that assertion,
(ii)
the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has declared in the past that
COOKIE BOUQUETS is too generic to trademark,
(iii)
COOKIE
BOUQUET(S) is not inherently distinctive because at least four companies
applied to trademark this term up to nine years before
Complainant’s trademark
application, but those applications were not successful,
(iv)
Complainant’s
rights in the Trademark are not solid, as Courts or the U.S. Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board could determine that COOKIE
BOUQUET is generic,
(v)
Complainant’s
application for the Trademark may have contained fraudulent representations,
including a representation by the President
of Complainant that “to the best of
my knowledge and belief, no other person, firm or corporation has the right to
use said mark
in commerce, either in the identical form or in such near
resemblance hereto as to be likely, when applied to the goods and services
of
such other person, firm or corporation to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive . . .”,
(vi)
given the
complex trademark issues involved, this matter is outside the Panel’s purview,
and
(vii)
Complainant’s
submissions do not provide sufficient evidence of the existence of
Complainant’s registered Trademark;
(c)
Respondent
has rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name because:
(i)
since at
least as early as April 2002, Respondent has had a business relationship with a
company in Ohio named Cookie Bouquets, Inc.
(“CBI”), which sells cookies
through a website accessed via the domain name <cookiebouquets.com>,
(ii)
at the time
that the Domain Name was registered in August of 2002, Respondent was making a
bona fide offering of goods and services
at its website accessed via the Domain
Name, offering primarily cookies manufactured and supplied by CBI,
(iii)
Respondent
received permission from CBI to use its company name, product names,
descriptions and images on Respondent’s website,
(iv)
the owner
of CBI was aware of the Domain Name when Respondent began selling CBI’s
products under the Domain Name, and had no problem
with that activity,
(v)
Respondent
had no reason to believe it was infringing on the Trademark because of CBI’s
activities involving the words “Cookie Bouquets”
since 1983,
(vi)
Respondent
registered the Domain Name before being aware of any claim regarding the
Trademark, and Complainant did not make Respondent
aware of the Trademark until
sixteen months after Respondent registered the Domain Name;
(d)
Respondent
has not registered and used the Domain Name in bad faith because:
(i)
Respondent
did not know that Complainant held the Trademark when Respondent registered the
Domain Name;
(ii)
Complainant
does not promote or advertise the name of its business as COOKIE BOUQUET in
Virginia;
(iii)
Respondent
registered the Domain Name in relation to a legitimate business interest and
offered goods and services under the Domain
Name before Complainant initiated
this dispute and before Respondent had knowledge of Complainant and its claims;
(iv)
Respondent
removed all references to COOKIE BOUQUET from its website and added the
Disclaimer immediately upon becoming aware of the
Complainant’s claims and the
Trademark; and
(v)
Respondent
did not register the Domain Name in bad faith and did not intend to sell the
Domain Name or disrupt Complainant’s business.
C.
Complainant’s Supplemental
Submission
Complainant asserts that:
(a)
this case
is properly before the Panel and does not involve complex trademark issues
because Complainant’s incontestable registrations
of the Trademark are prima
facie evidence that:
(i)
Complainant
has the exclusive right to use the Trademark in association with cookies and
the retail sales of cookies, and Complainant’s
exclusive right to prevent
others from using an identical or confusingly similar mark,
(ii)
the
Trademark is not generic, and
(iii)
the
Trademark has acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning,
(b)
the Panel
does not have legal authority to make a legal determination that certain of
Complainant’s trademark registrations are invalid,
as requested by Respondent;
(c)
Complainant
has established its rights in the Trademark because:
(i)
Complainant’s
incontestable trademark registrations are prima facie evidence that the
Trademark has acquired secondary meaning,
(ii)
Respondent
has not presented sufficient or any evidence that the Trademark is generic;
(iii)
the
Trademark was never generic; rather, the Trademark was originally descriptive,
but has acquired secondary meaning through use
over time,
(iv)
Respondent
has not provided evidence, and Complainant has no information and does not
believe, that the USPTO has ever denied an application
to register COOKIE
BOUQUET on the basis of genericness, and
(v)
copies of
Complainant’s registration certificates are sufficient verification of the existence
of its registered trademarks;
(d)
the Domain
Name is confusingly similar to the Trademark because:
(i)
an
incontestable trademark registration for a descriptive mark is conclusive
evidence that the mark has acquired distinctiveness and
secondary meaning,
(ii)
Complainant’s
rights are and were superior to every unsuccessful third party applicant
referred to in the Response,
(iii)
Complainant
and CBI have entered into a written agreement (the “Co-Existence Agreement”)
relating to Complainant’s use of the trademark
COOKIE BOUQUET and CBI’s use of
the trademark COOKIE BOUQUETS which
includes acknowledgement by CBI of Complainant’s trademark rights (Note: in
support of its submissions regarding CBI, Complainant
provided an Affidavit of
the owner of CBI, Ms. Dinene Clark, in which Ms. Clark attests to certain
relevant facts, as discussed in
greater detail later in this Decision ),
(iv)
the Domain
Name incorporates the entire Trademark, and none of Respondent’s other domain
names incorporate a third party’s registered
trademark or refer to the name of
third party suppliers whose products are sold through Respondent’s websites,
and
(v)
the
Disclaimer is evidence that the Domain Name is confusingly similar to the
Trademark, as the Disclaimer would not be required if
there was no likelihood
of confusion;
(e)
Respondent
has only provided hearsay evidence regarding its alleged affiliation with CBI
and its allegation that CBI had given it
permission to use the Domain Name,
which is contradicted by affidavit evidence of CBI’s owner;
(f)
Respondent’s
claim that it was not aware of the Trademark when it registered the Domain Name
is not plausible because:
(i)
Complainant’s
trademark registrations are constructive notice of Complainant’s rights in the
Trademark,
(ii)
Complainant’s
franchise system is one of America’s largest and most successful retail cookie
chains, and is well known nationwide,
and
(iii)
Complainant
operates several COOKIES BY DESIGN retail stores in Virginia, which actively
promote and advertise the Trademark;
(g)
Respondent
has not provided any plausible, admissible evidence that it registered or is
using the Domain Name in good faith;
(h)
Respondent
is using the Domain Name in bad faith because:
(i)
Respondent
added the Disclaimer to its website after receiving a cease and desist letter
from Complainant’s attorneys, precisely because
Respondent knew and agreed that
the Domain Name was likely to cause consumers to believe mistakenly that
Respondent was affiliated
with or sells products of Complainant,
(ii)
Respondent
did not have CBI’s permission to use COOKIE BOUQUETS in the Domain Name, but
chose to use COOKIE BOUQUETS nonetheless,
and
(iii)
Respondent
removed some references to COOKIE BOUQUET(S) from its website after receiving
Complainant’s cease and desist letter, but
did not change, and continues to
use, the Domain Name.
D. Respondent’s Supplemental Submission
Respondent asserts that:
(a)
Complainant
does not necessarily have enforceable rights under the UDRP Policy
notwithstanding that Complainant has registered the
Trademark because the
Trademark is generic or descriptive and is commonly used by others;
(b)
Complainant’s
Trademark registrations are invalid and subject to cancellation because
Complainant’s application contained an obviously
false and fraudulent affidavit
and fraudulent misrepresentations;
(c)
a grave
injustice would occur if the Panel transferred the Domain Name to Complainant,
the Trademark registrations were subsequently
cancelled due to actions by
Respondent in the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, and Respondent was
consequently unable to recover
the Domain Name;
(d)
Complainant
has not met the burden of proving that Respondent did not have a legitimate
interest in the Domain Name;
(e)
Respondent
does in fact have rights in the Domain Name because:
(i)
Respondent
has satisfied the requirements of section 4(c)(i) of the UDRP Policy by using
the Domain Name in connection with a bona
fide offering of goods and services,
and
(ii)
there is a
low threshold for determining whether Respondent has a legitimate right in the
Domain Name, and Respondent meets that threshold;
(f)
Complainant
has failed to prove that Respondent registered and used the Domain Name in bad
faith; and
(g)
Complainant
has failed to prove that Respondent was aware of Complainant’s trademark rights
prior to Respondent’s registration of
the Domain Name, and Respondent has
provided evidence that Respondent did not know of any trademark issues until
Complainant first
contacted Respondent in December 2003.
E. Late Submissions
The
Panel sees no reason to consider the further supplemental submissions filed by
both parties out of time and with no basis under
any of the applicable rules,
and is not considering those submissions at all.
FINDINGS
Complainant has not proven that the
Domain Name was registered or is being used by Respondent in bad faith.
Given the foregoing, it is not necessary
to find whether Complainant has proven the Domain Name is confusingly similar
to a trademark
or service mark in which Complainant has rights or whether
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain
Name.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint
on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of
law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following
three elements to obtain an order that a domain
name should be cancelled or
transferred:
(1)
the domain
name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which Complainant has
rights; and
(2)
Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3)
the domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant holds two registrations in
the USPTO for the trademark COOKIE BOUQUET, one for cookies and one for retail
store and mail
order services in the field of cookies. Both registrations issued in August of 1996
and are now incontestable. Both
received the benefit of section 2(f) of the Lanham
Act (proof of acquired distinctiveness/secondary meaning).
Complainant asserts, and Respondent does
not contradict, that Complainant has been carrying on business in association with
the Trademark
since 1983 and that its business has become very significant over
time such that:
(a)
Complainant
or its franchisees operate approximately 250 retail outlets in the United
States and sell cookies at those outlets in
association with the Trademark;
(b)
Complainant
sells cookies directly to customers in association with the Trademark via the
Internet;
(c)
gross
retail sales have grown to US$57,000,000 as of 2002; and
(d)
Complainant
and its franchisees spend approximately US$1,750,000-$2,000,000 per year on
advertising, marketing, and public relations.
Under US law, the two registrations for
the Trademark are presumed valid (Section 7(b) of the Lanham Act) and are incontestable (Section 14 of the Lanham Act). Nonetheless, Respondent asserts that the Trademark is generic and
commonly used, and that therefore the two registrations are not
valid. Respondent even goes so far as to accuse
Complainant of having made false representations to the USPTO.
Respondent points to a few failed
attempts by third parties to register identical or similar trademarks,
asserting that this is proof
that the Trademark is generic and not
registrable. The Panel does not accept
that submission. There are many
plausible reasons why the other applications were abandoned. The existing evidence does not prove
Respondent’s assertion. Even if
Respondent was correct, and those other applications were rejected on the basis
of descriptiveness, it was still open to Complainant
to establish secondary
meaning, which it did to the satisfaction of the USPTO.
The Panel is not inclined to “second
guess” the USPTO on this point. The
Panel also notes that Respondent has provided no basis on which it can be
inferred that Complainant made false representations
to the USPTO. Even if Complainant had made false
representations to the USPTO, that is not a proper matter for consideration by
this Panel. The Panel expressly notes
that it considers those allegations to be inappropriate and improper.
Respondent filed various printouts
downloaded from particular Internet search engines and websites that are
intended to prove common
use and adoption of the words “cookie bouquet” in a
generic and distinctive manner.
Respondent does not say who downloaded the copies from the Internet and
whether the copies are accurate.
Respondent does not provide any additional evidence to substantiate or
interpret what the Internet downloads are supposed to prove.
For example, there
is no way of knowing whether a particular business is actually a franchisee of
Complainant.
The Panel is of the view that this type
of evidence should be scrutinized very carefully. Admissibility and weight should be determined cautiously on a
case by case basis. In this regard, we
refer to St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster
& Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (1999) where the US District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division, stated at pages 774
and
775:
While some look to the Internet as an
innovative vehicle for communication, the Court continues to warily and wearily
view it largely
as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and
misinformation. So as not to mince
words, the Court reiterates that this so-called Web provides no way of
verifying the authenticity of the alleged
contentions that Plaintiff wishes to
rely upon in his Response to Defendant’s Motion. There is no way Plaintiff can overcome the presumption that the
information he discovered on the Internet is inherently untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the
Internet. No web-site is monitored for
accuracy and nothing contained therein is under oath or even subject to
independent verification absent underlying documentation. Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that
hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any
location at any time. For these
reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing,
even under the most liberal interpretation
of the hearsay exception rules found
in Fed.R.Civ.P. 807.
The Panel will admit Respondent’s
Internet evidence but will afford it only minimal weight tending to suggest
that some third parties
may possibly be using the words “cookie bouquet” in a
generic or descriptive manner. However,
that evidence, in and of itself, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of
validity and acquired distinctiveness represented
by the Certificates of
Registration for the two US registrations.
The Domain Name is not identical to the
Trademark. The primary difference is
the word GOURMET, which appears before the words COOKIE BOUQUETS in the Domain
Name.
The
Domain Name is not identical to the Trademark. The primary difference is the
word “gourmet”, which appears before the words “cookie
bouquets” in the Domain
Name. The Panel recognizes that the following circumstances may support a
finding that the Domain Name is
confusingly similar:
(a) the
Domain Name incorporates the entirety of the Trademark (see Oki Data Ams.
Inc. v. ASD Inc., D2001-0903 (WIPO NOV. 6, 2001));
(b) the
only significant difference between the Domain Name and the Trademark is the
addition of the descriptive word GOURMET (see Brown & Bigelow Inc. v.
Rodela, FA 96466 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 5, 2001)).
The Panel also recognizes that the
addition of descriptive terms to weak, descriptive marks has been found in some
UDRP cases to be
sufficient to avoid a finding that a domain name is
confusingly similar to a complainant’s trademark. See, for example, Grand
Bay Mgmt. Co. v. Allegory Invs., D2001-0874 (WIPO Sept. 21, 2000) (casinograndbay.com not confusingly
similar to GRAND BAY), and Virgin Enters. Inc. v. Internet Domains,
D2001-1008 (WIPO Oct. 16, 2001) (virginmail.com not confusingly similar to
VIRGIN).
In fact,
the Panelists are not in agreement on whether or not Complainant has met the
burden for proving that the Domain Name is confusingly
similar to the
Trademark. However, given the Panel's findings on bad faith, discussed below,
it is not necessary for to decide whether
the Trademark is sufficiently weak
that confusing similarity is avoided by the addition of “gourmet”.
Complainant bears the burden of proving
that the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. Complainant has not tendered any evidence
proving that Respondent has acted in a manner that would constitute bad faith
under Policy
4(b). Rather, Complainant
points to the surrounding circumstances and asks the Panel to infer that
Respondent must have been acting in bad
faith.
Complainant asserts that a legal presumption of bad faith arises in
circumstances where Respondent should have been aware of the Trademark.
One crucial fact emerges from the
submissions and evidence tendered by both parties. Specifically, the objective circumstances in which Respondent
registered and began using the Domain Name are such that Respondent
and anyone
else in Respondent’s position might easily have concluded, in good faith, that
Complainant does not have an enforceable
monopoly of the words “cookie bouquet”
and that those words could be used by anyone.
Moreover, Complainant is, in large part,
directly responsible for creating one crucial aspect of these
circumstances. Complainant’s evidence
shows that Complainant has entered into the Co-Existence Agreement with CBI
(Cookie Bouquets, Inc.) of Columbus,
Ohio.
CBI appears to be as much a direct competitor of Complainant as
Respondent. The Affidavit of Dinene
Clark, who is the owner of CBI, confirms that Complainant and CBI both use
nearly identical trademarks, but
CBI and Complainant have established undisclosed
terms and conditions that are supposed to avoid confusion between the two
trademarks. Ms. Clark’s Affidavit
asserts that the two marks are not confusing with each other, but does not
explain why she believes this to
be the case.
For all intents and purposes, the
trademark used by CBI, namely COOKIE BOUQUETS, is identical to the Trademark
used by Complainant,
namely COOKIE BOUQUET.
CBI and Complainant both sell cookies in association with their
respective trademarks. They both make
sales through the Internet. They both
use domain names that feature the words “cookie” and “bouquet(s)”. Under the Co-Existence Agreement,
Complainant and Respondent agreed to carry on such activities in some manner
that is supposed to
avoid actual confusion in the marketplace. Complainant has not provided the Panel with
a copy of the Co-Existence Agreement.
However, it is difficult for the Panel to understand how Complainant and
CBI can effectively avoid confusion when there is so much
overlap in their
respective trademarks, domain names, businesses, products and services.
Under the common law, including the laws
of the United States, a distinctive trademark performs the core function of
identifying the
source of particular products and services. When a trademark owner intentionally creates
a situation in which there is more than one user of the same or a confusingly
similar
trademark for the same type of products or services, that may erode or
even destroy the distinctiveness of the subject trademark. A properly crafted and enforced license
agreement will not create such problems in most common-law jurisdictions,
including the United
States. However, a
co-existence agreement is not the same thing as a license agreement. In fact, a co-existence agreement can
actually undermine trademark rights rather than bolster them (see California Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist
Baking Co., 166 F. 2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947)).
As it turns out, Respondent was in a
direct business relationship with CBI around the time that it registered the
Domain Name. Respondent purchased and resold
cookies made by CBI. Even if Respondent
was aware of Complainant and the Trademark, it is easy to see how it might have
formed the view that the words
“cookie bouquet” could be used by anyone. If Complainant does not consider CBI’s
trademark, COOKIE BOUQUETS, to be confusing with the Trademark or to infringe
the Trademark,
it is difficult to see why the Panel should infer or presume
that Respondent must have been aware that the Domain Name would cause
confusion
with the Trademark and that Respondent must have been acting in bad faith when
it registered and began using the Domain
Name.
Also, the Trademark lacks inherent
distinctiveness. Registration was
achieved only on the basis of acquired distinctiveness (secondary
meaning). Although registration may
serve as constructive notice of the mark’s validity (and acquired
distinctiveness), the average person rarely
appreciates the technicalities of
trademark law, which is often counter-intuitive. When a trademark lacks inherent distinctiveness then, depending
on the surrounding circumstances, there may be a greater possibility
of it
being incorporated in a domain name in good faith. This is not a trademark infringement case. It is not enough that the Domain Name be
confusingly similar to the Trademark.
The Policy also requires Complainant to prove bad faith. This is an additional reason why the Panel
is reluctant to infer or presume bad faith.
Taking into consideration the
Co-Existence Agreement, CBI’s trademark, domain name, business, products and services,
CBI’s dealings
with Respondent, the Trademark’s lack of inherent
distinctiveness, and the weak evidence provided by Respondent suggesting that
additional
third parties may be using the words “cookie bouquet” in a generic
or descriptive manner, the Panel finds that the available evidence
is not
sufficient to support an inference or presumption that Respondent was acting in
bad faith in registering and using the Domain
Name.
The Panel finds that Complainant has
failed to prove bad faith on the part of Respondent, and, therefore, has failed
to meet its burden
under Policy 4(a)(iii).
Given
the Panel’s finding on bad faith, it is not necessary for the Panel to consider
whether or not Complainant has proven that Respondent
lacks rights or
legitimate interests.
DECISION
As
Complainant has failed to establish all three elements required under the ICANN
Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be
DENIED.
Robert A. Fashler (Panel Chair)
Robert A. Fashler, Panel Chair
Houston Putnam Lowry, Panelist
Mark V.B.
Partridge, Panelist
Dated: August 16, 2004
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