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Generic Top Level Domain Name (gTLD) Decisions |
Nike, Inc. v. Tammy Camp
Claim
Number: FA0412000373590
Complainant is Nike, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented
by Philip Davison, One Bowerman Drive, DF/4, Beaverton,
OR 97005. Respondent is Tammy Camp (“Respondent”), 10517
Greensprings Drive, Tampa, FL.
REGISTRAR
AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <airnike.com>, registered with I.D.R.
Internet Domain Registry Ltd.
The
undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially
and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known
conflict in serving as
Panelist in this proceeding.
Tyrus
R. Atkinson, Jr., as Panelist.
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on November
30, 2004; the National Arbitration
Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint
on December 2, 2004.
On
December 2, 2004, I.D.R. Internet Domain Registry Ltd. confirmed by e-mail to
the National Arbitration Forum that the domain name
<airnike.com>
is registered with I.D.R. Internet Domain Registry Ltd. and that Respondent is
the current registrant of the name. I.D.R. Internet
Domain Registry Ltd. has
verified that Respondent is bound by the I.D.R. Internet Domain Registry Ltd. registration
agreement and
has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by
third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution
Policy (the "Policy").
On
December 3, 2004, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"),
setting a deadline of
December 23, 2004 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint,
was transmitted to Respondent
via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and
persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and
billing
contacts, and to postmaster@airnike.com by e-mail.
Having
received no Response from Respondent, using the same contact details and
methods as were used for the Commencement Notification,
the National
Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent
Default.
On
January 5, 2005, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided
by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration
Forum appointed Tyrus R.
Atkinson, Jr., as Panelist.
Having
reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the
"Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum
has discharged its
responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules")
"to employ reasonably
available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent." Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision
based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN
Rules,
the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and
principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without
the benefit of any
Response from Respondent.
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant makes the following assertions:
1. Respondent’s <airnike.com>
domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s NIKE mark.
2. Respondent does not have any rights or
legitimate interests in the <airnike.com> domain name.
3. Respondent registered and used the <airnike.com>
domain name in bad faith.
B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in
this proceeding.
Complainant is
the world’s leading sports and fitness company. It designs, manufactures and
markets a broad range of “athletic and
athleisure” footwear, apparel and
equipment.
Since 1971,
Complainant has continuously used and promoted the NIKE mark in connection with
its commercial goods.
Complainant has
registered its NIKE mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) (Reg. Nos. 978,952 issued February
19, 1974; 1,214,930 issued
November 2, 1982; 1,945,654 issued January 2, 1996). Many of Complainant’s registrations for the NIKE mark have become
incontestable.
Respondent registered
the <airnike.com> domain name on April 30, 2004. Respondent’s domain name does not resolve to
an active website.
Paragraph 15(a)
of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of
the statements and documents submitted
in accordance with the Policy, these
Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
In view of
Respondent's failure to submit a Response, the Panel shall decide this
administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's
undisputed
representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and
draw such inferences it considers appropriate
pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of
the Rules.
Paragraph 4(a)
of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three
elements to obtain an order that a domain
name should be cancelled or
transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent
is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which
Complainant has
rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and
is being used in bad faith.
Complainant has
established rights in the NIKE mark through registration with the USPTO and
continuous use of the mark in commerce
since 1971. See Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. v. Wick, FA 117861 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Sept. 16, 2002) (“Under U.S. trademark law, registered marks hold a
presumption that they are inherently
distinctive and have acquired secondary
meaning.”); see also Janus Int’l
Holding Co. v. Rademacher, D2002-0201 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2002) (finding that
Panel decisions have held that registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity, which creates a rebuttable
presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive. Respondent has the burden of refuting this assumption.).
Respondent’s
domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because the domain
name incorporates the NIKE mark in its entirety
and merely adds the generic
term “air.” Such slight alteration does
not negate the confusing similarity between Complainant’s mark and Respondent’s
domain name pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
See Arthur Guinness Son
& Co. (Dublin) Ltd. v. Healy/BOSTH, D2001-0026 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2001)
(finding confusing similarity where the domain name in dispute contains the
identical mark of Complainant
combined with a generic word or term); see
also Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Inja,
Kil, D2000-1409 (WIPO Dec. 9, 2000) (finding that “[n]either the addition
of an ordinary descriptive word . . . nor the suffix ‘.com’
detract from the overall impression of the dominant part of the name in each
case, namely the trademark SONY” and thus Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)
is satisfied).
Additionally,
the addition of the generic top-level domain “.com” is not enough to
distinguish Respondent’s domain name from Complainant’s
mark pursuant to Policy
¶ 4(a)(i). See Isleworth Land Co. v.
Lost in Space, SA, FA 117330 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 27, 2002) (finding it
is a “well established
principle that generic top-level domains are irrelevant when conducting a
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis”); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin.
Ltd., FA 153545 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (“The addition of a
top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark
is
identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required
element of every domain name.”).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.
Respondent has
failed to respond to the Complaint.
Therefore, the Panel accepts all reasonable allegations set forth in the
Complaint as true. See Am.
Online, Inc. v. Clowers, FA 199821 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 14, 2003)
(finding that the failure to challenge a complainant’s allegations allows a
panel to accept
all of complainant’s reasonable allegations and inferences as
true); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Shing, FA
205699 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 8, 2003) (finding that the failure to respond to a
complaint allows a panel to make reasonable inferences
in favor of a
complainant and accept complainant’s allegations as true).
In addition, the
Panel construes Respondent’s failure to respond as an admission that Respondent
lacks rights and legitimate interests
in the disputed domain name. See Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Greenhouse Agency Ltd., D2000-1221 (WIPO
Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that Respondents’ failure to respond can be construed as
an admission that they have no
legitimate interest in the domain names); see also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Domain Deluxe, FA 269166 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 29,
2004) (“The failure of Respondent to respond to the Complaint functions both as
an implicit
admission that Respondent lacks rights to and legitimate interests
in the domain names, as well as a presumption that Complainant’s
reasonable
allegations are true.”).
Respondent has
made no use of the <airnike.com> domain name; as such, it cannot
be said to be making a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor can it be
said to be making a
legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name. In
these circumstances, Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii) are inapplicable to
Respondent. See Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS v. Kahveci,
D2000-1244 (WIPO Nov. 11, 2000) (“merely registering the domain name is not
sufficient to establish rights or legitimate interests
for purposes of
paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy”); see also Pharmacia & Upjohn AB v.
Romero, D2000-1273 (WIPO Nov. 13, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate
interests where Respondent failed to submit a Response to the Complaint
and had
made no use of the domain name in question).
Furthermore,
nothing in the record establishes that Respondent is commonly known by the
disputed domain name. Moreover,
Respondent is not licensed or authorized to register or use domain names that
incorporate Complainant’s marks.
Therefore, the Panel concludes that Respondent lacks rights and
legitimate interests in the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Tercent Inc. v. Yi, FA 139720
(Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s WHOIS
information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly
known by’ the disputed domain
name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) does not apply); see
also Charles Jourdan Holding AG v.
AAIM, D2000-0403 (WIPO June 27, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate
interests where (1) Respondent is not a licensee of Complainant;
(2)
Complainant’s prior rights in the mark precede Respondent’s registration; (3)
Respondent is not commonly known by the domain
name in question).
The Panel finds
that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.
Respondent
has not used the disputed domain name since registering it eight months ago.
Such passive holding equates to bad faith
use and registration under Policy ¶
4(a)(iii). See Phat Fashions v. Kruger, FA 96193 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec.
29, 2000) (finding bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) even though Respondent
has not used the domain
name because “It makes no sense whatever to wait until
it actually ‘uses’ the name, when inevitably, when there is such use, it will
create the confusion described in the Policy”); see also Alitalia –Linee
Aeree Italiane S.p.A v. Colour Digital, D2000-1260 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2000)
(finding bad faith where Respondent made no use of the domain name in question
and there are no
other indications that Respondent could have registered and
used the domain name in question for any non-infringing purpose).
Furthermore,
Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name, which incorporates
Complainant’s well-known NIKE mark while adding
the generic word “air,”
suggests that Respondent knew of Complainant’s rights in the NIKE mark.
Additionally, Complainant’s numerous
trademark registrations on file at the
USPTO gave Respondent constructive notice of Complainant’s mark. Therefore, the
Panel finds
that Respondent chose the disputed domain name based on the
distinctive and well-known qualities of Complainant’s mark, which is
evidence
of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Samsonite Corp. v. Colony Holding, FA
94313 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 17, 2000) (finding that evidence of bad faith
includes actual or constructive knowledge of a commonly
known mark at the time
of registration); see also Orange Glo Int’l v. Blume, FA 118313 (Nat.
Arb. Forum Oct. 4, 2002) (“Complainant’s OXICLEAN mark is listed on the
Principal Register of the USPTO, a status
that confers constructive notice on
those seeking to register or use the mark or any confusingly similar variation
thereof”).
The
Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.
Having
established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel
concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it
is Ordered that the <airnike.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED
from Respondent to Complainant.
Tyrus R. Atkinson, Jr., Panelist
Dated:
January 17, 2005
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