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Timor-Leste - Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 8(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict: Initial reports of States parties due in 2005 [2007] UNCRCSPR 9; CRC/C/OPAC/TLS/1 (4 May 2007)
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Convention on theRights of the
Child
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Distr.
GENERAL CRC/C/OPAC/TLS/1
4 May 2007
Original: ENGLISH
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COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
CONSIDERATION OF
REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES
UNDER ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 1, OF THE
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD ON THE
INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT
Initial reports of States parties due in 2005
TIMORLESTE[*]
[1 March 2007]
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1 4 3
II. RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 5 11 3
III. PRIMARY LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 12 14 5
IV. CHILDREN AND MILITARY SERVICE 15 18 6
V. DEMOBILIZATION, REHABILITATION AND
REINTEGRATION 19 24 6
VI. PROMOTION OF THE PROTOCOL 25 26 7
VII. OTHER ARMED GROUPS 27 8
I. INTRODUCTION
- The
date of receipt of Government’s accession to the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement
of children in armed
conflict is 2 August 2004, without reservation, but with the following
declaration:
“Pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 2 ... the
Government of TimorLeste declares that the minimum age for voluntary
recruitment
into its national armed forces is 18 years, as specified by the
domestic law of TimorLeste.”
- This
report generally applies to the period since the restoration of independence in
May 2002 up until December 2005.
- Although
it is not due until the Protocol has been in force for two years
(i.e. 2 September 2006), the report is submitted early in
order
to enable its inclusion within the Government of TimorLeste’s
piloting of a consolidated human rights treaty reporting
process based on the
preparation of an expanded common core document and associated treatyspecific
documents.
- This
report has been prepared in accordance with the provision of article 8.1 of the
Optional Protocol and in broad accordance with
the guidelines provided in
document CRC/OP/AC/1 and is included as part of the report on the Convention on
the Rights of the Child
(CRC), to which reference may also be made for the
broader national context concerning children (that latter document (CRC/C/TLS/1)
and the expanded common core document (HRI/CORE/TLS/2007) jointly comprise
TimorLeste’s initial CRC report).
II. RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
- Even
though it precedes the period due to be covered in this document, it is useful
to canvass events immediately prior to the restoration
of independence in May
2002 (for which the primary reference concerning children is a 2001 UNICEF
study). During the period of resistance,
many children engaged in military
activities, on both sides of the conflict (that is, the FALINTIL (Armed Forces
for the Liberation
of TimorLeste) proindependence resistance and the Indonesian
military and proIndonesian militia groups).
- “On
both sides of the conflict the age of child soldiers ranged from 10 to 18 years
old, although most were between the age
of 15 and 18 years old. Accurate figures
on the number of children combatants participating on either side are impossible
to obtain.
In the past, FALINTIL did not maintain consistent records of the
ages of the names of its soldiers ... On the proautonomy side, the
militia
created lists of recruits, including those who were under 18 at the time of
recruitment. However these lists were either
destroyed or remain with militia
leaders or the Indonesian army in
Indonesia.”[1]
- The
2001 study notes that: “Most children joined [the militia groups] for the
following reasons: the prestige and power of being
able to carry a gun, wear a
uniform and gain respect from elders; coercion such as intimidation and threat
of death or the death
of family members; payment; and a chance to escape from
abusive or impoverished family
situations.”[2]
- During
the public hearings of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
(CAVR), several Timorese persons gave evidence
of their experiences as children.
One male addressed the forced recruitment of children by the Indonesian military
to serve as TBOs
(tenaga bantuan operasional, or assistant to
military operations). He was forcibly recruited at the age of 11
years:
“As a TBO, other than work at the base camp, I had to
accompany [my recruiting sergeant] when he went to fight. I had to lie
down at
the back of the army and fill up the magazines in their guns. One day one of the
TBOs refused to carry more than the heavy
load he was already carrying. The
soldier was angry. When they arrived back at base camp, all of the soldiers in
the platoon and
the TBOs were gathered together. The commander said that a TBO
is not allowed to refuse to carry something. The army had come to
help and to
bring independence. After that, the TBO who had refused to carry the goods was
called and before everyone’s eyes
he was shot dead. We were let know that
if we refused something, our fate would be the same as his. We had to carry
heavy goods each
time the camp moved. Each time all of the TBOs were given an
injection in their left and right hips. The medicine was clear yellow.
After the
injection the goods didn’t feel heavy and they could keep walking without
getting tired. At night my legs were very
sore but there was no other
sideeffect.”[3]
- With
respect to the proindependence side, the UNICEF study notes that many young
people “witnessed abuses against family members
and colleagues perpetrated
by the Indonesian military. This made them want to join clandestine
organizations that served FALINTIL,
student groups and other proindependence
groups”.[4]
- The
study concludes as follows (its conclusion is cited in
full):
“Children in East Timor participated in the conflict
although for different reasons. The numbers of child soldiers involved
are
impossible to ascertain. Children who joined the proindependence clandestine
groups and FALINTIL expressed that they did so willingly,
and usually as a
result of illtreatment of family members and friends by the Indonesian armed
forces. These child soldiers were committed
to the cause of an independent
East Timor. Some members of the proautonomy militias joined because of
abuses from the proindependence
side, and a commitment to integration with
Indonesia. However most were forcibly recruited with violent compulsion methods,
or offers
of payment. Children who joined FALINTIL and the clandestine network
were treated well by their commanders, whereas those involved
in the militia
groups reported that their seniors used fear and intimidation to ensure that
they carried out their activities. Neither
side has provided adequate
postservice compensation or services specifically directed at child soldiers.
Anecdotal evidence suggests
that children involved in the proindependence side
had positive experiences on the whole, although coupled with some negative
aspects.
However those in the militias were exposed to excessive violence and
often show high levels of trauma and antisocial behaviour. The
full social
implications of the experiences of these children will not be known for years to
come and deserve further study.”
- It
is in the wake of such experiences that the Government has formed the new
provisions governing the protection of children within
armed forces and,
potentially, in armed conflict.
III. PRIMARY LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
- The
main framework underpinning these provisions is the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that, on matters of international relations, the State
shall be governed by, inter alia, the protection of human rights
(sect. 8.1),
and that the legal system shall be in accordance with international law (which
invalidates any State rules to the contrary) (sect. 9). It further provides that
all citizens have the right and duty to defend territorial sovereignty (sect.
49.1), which is to be guaranteed
by the national defence force (sect. 146.2), in
which service is to be in accordance with the law (sect. 49.2).
- The
relevant national law is the Organic Law of the FALINTILEast Timor Defence
Forces (FALINTILFDTL) (Law No. 7/2004). This law came
into effect on 5 May 2004
(i.e. four months prior to the Optional Protocol entering into force in
TimorLeste), and provides that
the defence force shall be “exclusively
made up of citizen volunteers” (art. 14.1). There are presently 1,435
persons
employed within the Force, comprising two infantry battalions and one
naval component.
- A
current review by the Secretary of State for
Defence[5] (“Force 2020
Study”) is examining all policy aspects. There is believed to be no
prospect of amending current provisions
concerning recruitment under the age of
18 years. Whilst the option of providing for military conscription is being
canvassed, this
is viewed as highly unlikely to be
supported.[6]
IV. CHILDREN AND MILITARY SERVICE
- Article
14 of the Organic Law (Composition of the FFDTL) provides that the defence force
may comprise only citizen volunteers, and
that “2. No person under 18
years of age may be recruited for military service in the
FALINTILFDTL”.
- Defence
advisers state that the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET) ID Card issued in early 2001 for
the national
Constituent Assembly elections is used as the proof of age for enlistment
purposes.[7]
- Accordingly,
article 2 of the CRC Optional Protocol is satisfied in two senses: there is no
provision within TimorLeste for nonvoluntary
recruitment, and the minimum age of
voluntary recruitment is 18 years. As a result, the requirement of article 1 is
also satisfied
and articles 3 and 5 are not applicable (except to
note, with respect to article 5, that the national laws are conducive to the
child’s
rights in accordance with the maximum standards advocated within
the Protocol). Article 6.1 is satisfied, except to the extent that
there remains
an opportunity to more explicitly assign legal status to the Protocol
(potentially within the forthcoming Children’s
Code, but likely preferably
within the FALINTILFDTL Organic Law).
- It
is believed that these provisions enjoy widespread support, especially in the
immediate wake of so many children having been adversely
affected by
participation in recent armed conflict.
V. DEMOBILIZATION, REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
- The
Optional Protocol is applicable to children and adolescents to the extent that
it may be applied to those involved in or otherwise
impacted by the earlier
conflict. FALINTIL demobilized during 2000 and officially dissolved on 31
January 2001. On 1 February 2001,
coinciding with the formation of the
FALINTILbased new national defence force, the National Council the interim
United Nationsappointed
legislative body decided that the minimum age for
military recruitment be 18 years.
- The
demobilization process was assisted by the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance
Programme (FRAP), implemented by the International
Organization for Migration.
The beneficiaries of FRAPbased assistance to demobilized personnel were
determined on the basis of names
provided by the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front
for an Independent East Timor) high command during the period of cantonment.
However,
the FALINTIL leadership had “sent almost all soldiers under the
age of 18 home to their villages and back to school. [There
have] been no
specific programs aimed at specifically assisting demobilised FALINTIL child
soldiers in East Timor ...” (UNICEF
(2001), p.
14).
- Despite
receiving little material assistance, former proindependence child soldiers were
reported in 2001 as being:
“treated well by their communities,
and receive respect for their involvement in the armed struggle. Former
clandestine youth
were underground, and due to the structure of their networks
were often unknown to the populace. Although those who are known to
the local
people are still held in high esteem, those who are feeling disaffected and
angry who have become involved in criminal
activities are losing the respect of
the public. These youth feel left out of the process of rebuilding the country
that they fought
for. Many feel that they have given a large part of their lives
to the movement and therefore neglected their schooling. Now many
cannot gain
positions at university, as they have not studied properly for years. They have
difficulties with gaining meaningful
employment that they feel entitled
to” (ibid., p. 22).
- Those
children and adolescents involved in the militia who returned to TimorLeste have
been susceptible to more explicit hostility.
The CAVR process has provided a
primary means to address such problems of reintegration. In this, many persons
involved with the
militia or autonomy movement have described and expressed
regret and remorse for their behaviour, with corresponding assistance for
the reintegration of such people into their communities.
- However,
it is regrettable that one possible consequence of the already very difficult
demobilization process, which expedited the
return of children to their
communities, is that such children may have been effectively denied the forms of
assistance with reintegration
and education or employment that was afforded
others involved in the struggle for independence. For some communities, such
lack of
assistance has been a factor in influencing antisocial behaviour (in the
face of lack of constructive opportunities) or participation
in oftentroublesome
martial arts groups.
- Nevertheless,
for the purposes of current reporting, it must be noted that, by
December 2005, it is unlikely that any children involved
in the armed
conflict up until 1999 would still be aged under 18 years.
VI. PROMOTION OF THE PROTOCOL
- In
these early stages of independence, emphasis was placed on establishing an
appropriate legislative and administrative regime; that
is, on ensuring
compliance with the age provisions of the Optional Protocol to the highest
standard advocated (i.e. no recruitment
below 18 years). Promotion and advocacy
of the principles and priorities of the Optional Protocol have occurred as part
of broader
efforts by Government especially in cooperation with UNICEF to
promote and advocate the principles and provisions of CRC. The
Government’s
early accession to both the Convention and its Optional
Protocols has enabled a unified approach to community awarenessraising.
- Certainly,
Government believes that its adoption of the Optional Protocol’s highest
standards concerning military enlistment
favours this broader approach to
promoting child rights. Reference should be made to section I.B of the
CRCspecific report, with
respect to comment concerning article 42.
VII. OTHER ARMED GROUPS
- It
is widely held that one continuing legacy of the recent conflict and especially
of militia activity is the network of martial
arts groups across the country.
Whilst these groups do not explicitly come within the ambit of article 4 of the
Optional Protocol,
the Government views it as necessary to monitor their
activities to where possible foster constructive engagement with such groups
to ensure that they commonly provide positive recreational opportunities for
many adolescents and to where necessary regulate and
even intervene where they
appear to practise more illicit or violent activities. Such issues are discussed
within the main body of
the CRCspecific document (sect.
VII.C).
[*] In accordance with the information
transmitted to States parties regarding the processing of their reports,
the present document
was not formally edited before being sent to the
United Nations translation
services.
[1] UNICEF
(2001), “East Timorese Children Involved in Armed Conflict: Case Studies
Report October 2000February 2001”, UNICEF
East Timor, p. 18. This
study is the primary reference on the involvement of children in armed conflict
in TimorLeste. It was part
of a broader UNICEF regional study on “Children
Involved in Armed Conflict in East Asia and the Pacific”.
[2] Ibid., pp. 1011.
[3] CAVR, “CAVR
Public Hearing: Children and Conflict, Dili, 2930 March 2004”, pp.
1314.
[4] Ibid., p. 18.
[5] Changed to Ministry of
Defence following the restructuring of the Government in July 2005, Decree Law
3/2005 of 29 June 2005.
[6] The issue of
conscription was earlier raised in the “Independent Study on Security
Force Options and Security Sector Reform
for East Timor” (The Centre for
Defence Studies, King’s College, London, 2000) but rejected.
[7] Refer to section IV.A of
the CRC initial report for a description of birth registration and the identity
of the child in TimorLeste.
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